



(Sudan Resistance Committees and the signatory forces to the Revolutionary Charter for Establishing People's Power)

## **The political vision to end the war in Sudan:-**

### **Preface:**

The war in Sudan, since April 15, has raised many pressing questions in the minds of the Sudanese people about the future that can be created according to the goals of the glorious December revolution. The most important of these questions is how to end this war and what the future will be like.

Since the first signs of the October 25 coup, the mass movement, led by the Resistance Committees, has remained independent and affirmed its position from all actors in the political scene. This is after it became clear through direct experience that the interests and concerns of the civil and military forces that advanced the positions of power and the political façade - since the first December movement – are not the same as the interests and concerns of the majority of Sudanese people. The armed conflict currently circulating in the streets of Sudanese cities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia "Janjaweed militia" exposed this distinction in a blatant way that amounted to a wide-ranging threat to people's lives and livelihoods.

In the Revolutionary Charter for Establishing People's Power, we are based on a comprehensive vision of the nature of the state and understand that the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Janjaweed is not a conflict over national issues as they claim, but a conflict within the political and economic elite affiliated with the regional powers that control the two military powers and the political parties that support them in order to achieve the interests of those axes, and therefore when we put forward the tools to end the war, we proceed from a stand point that classifies both sides of the conflict as enemies of the interests of our homeland and its people.

Portraying the conflict by assuming that one of the parties or both as a struggle against the Islamic Front regime or one of its branches is a deliberate anonymity that tries to exclude the fact that the members of the Islamic Front are present at both sides of the conflict, and that the regime itself is not just people, but a complete structures system of the way Sudan's resources are monopolized by a corrupt elite, and policies that serve the interests of the outside world, not the Sudanese men and women.

Ending this war begins with defeating the claims of both sides to their political legitimacy through the formation of the power of the people and its rejection to recognize the parties or the legitimacy of their war, and to impose the will of the people to end the violations that they carry out and put forward a revolutionary political discourse against the states and institutions that push for the continuation of the war. Based on our charter, which we agreed upon after extensive grassroots consultations and for a long period of time, we present to the Sudanese people the steps and features of our plan to end the war, and we are working to implement it, and we hope that our people will participate with us in conducting a dialogue about it and work hard with us to implement it.

### **Causes of war and armed conflict:-**

#### **Introduction:**

The War was and still is the natural product of the reality of settling/bargaining with the 2019 constitutional document, a reality of a constitutional legitimization of the militia, the multiplicity of security centers, and the transformation of the executive apparatus of the state into multiple centers of influence, divergent interests and biases, and the concentration of most economic institutions and security reform authorities and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the hands of the army leaders. A reality that resulted in creating an ostensibly civil rule or a double military kleptocracy fundamentally complicit and competing at the same time, based on senior army generals and commanders on the one hand, and the family empire of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia on the other side. A two-faceted military kleptocracy colludes against the rising revolutionary discourse and the growing tide of the mass movement, competes for the Revolutionary Charter for Establishing People's Power to

increase its political, economic, and military influence, a thorny situation that has made the political economy, at some point after the settlement, a political business market par excellence in which the two parties maneuvered to strengthen their positions, alliances, and network interests.

The RSF invested in the situation systematically and rapidly, with the full complicity of decision centers within the military institution, and expanded numerically, militarily, and logistically in a frightening manner, and coordinated and developed its economic investments separate from the state apparatus to the point of upgrading to a parallel state economy. It formed a network of international relations independent of the state apparatus and entered with the full weight of everything it gained in this period in the local, regional and international political business market, and accumulated from the balance of its dependents and allies with high skill, in return for the pursuit of senior army leaders to strengthen their economic empire independent of the powers of the civilian government in the case of the constitutional document and linking it directly with business leaders and most networks of interests and parasitic capitalist brokers associated with the remnants of the former regime, and expanding them in alliance with tribal leaders and civil and community figures as a main goal to expand their political market in an effort to reproduce the usual reality of centralized kleptocratic military power that accompanies all the totalitarian regimes that have ruled the country.

The two sides also invested in joint polarization in military rentier groups following the Juba Peace Agreement to expand their political market militarily and politically amid the signatory powerful forces, in a way that led to the division of the Revolutionary Front itself in the end to complete the process of splitting the civil bloc represented by the Forces of Freedom and Change.

The coup of October 25, 2021, was a turning point to reformulate and shape the political scene from the determinants of the alignment and synthesis of the August 2019 settlement to the combination and alignment of the nascent political business market for the wings of the counter-revolution bird, paving the way for the subjugation and subjugation of those who were not sufficiently absorbed in it. The steadfastness and valor of the revolutionaries in the Decembrist streets for more than a year and a half remained the main obstacle to the crystallization of the new dual political market system, and the maturity of its political project and its transformation into a stable alternative authority.

The long confrontation and the clarity and adherence of the revolutionaries and the Resistance Committees to their radical position, rejecting the return of models of settlements and civil-military partnership. The presence of the militia and the presence of army leaders in the leadership of the military institution, and the revolutionary demand calling for the dissolution of the militia, and the return of the SAF to the barracks, all contributed to strengthening the contradictions between the two coup partners and enhancing the options for competition over the areas of complicity. This was supported by the economic recession associated with the coup and the cessation of international aid, and the deficit and paralysis in the state apparatus in the reality of the post-coup, which cast a shadow on the political business market itself, which is fed by the state apparatus, of course. In addition to the reality of regional and international changes represented by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and the growing conflict in the African Sahel, which contributed to widening the gap between the allies of these parties and their proxies in the local context, with the growing tide of the mass movement and the control of the Resistance Committees on the street and the political scene and the inability of all parties to attract them to a political ceiling lower than the slogans raised.

Both the SAF and the RSF resorted, as usual, to their civilian legislators from the settlement forces to break the noose and buy sometime and regroup. Despite the failure of the settlement forces to co-opt the Resistance Committees and the revolutionary bloc to the new settlement project with their Framework Agreement, the slogans of the Resistance Committees remained dominant and cannot be bypassed, foremost of which is the dissolution of the militia and the restructuring of the army.

The formation of a unified professional national army, which made it a major and pivotal issue that is inseparable at the heart of the Framework Agreement and the postponed and even the most postponed five, workshop. And because the development of clear and specific determinants and roadmap for the procedures for building a unified national army naturally meant the end of the era of the dual political business market and the necessity of dissolving one of its parties in the other, the issue has become existential for the two parties, for the militia, it means losing the status of its military and economic independence and independent foreign relations and cutting off the way to its expansionist project politically and militarily, and for the military institution a danger to its existence as a regular sovereign institution in itself, after the militia invested in its political market and pushed its civilian allies to declare that the RSF is suitable as the nucleus of a professional national army away from the current institution, which made the issue of security and military reform and the outcomes of the perceptions presented by the two parties in it, during the security and military reform workshop, backbreakers in the midst of the irreparably growing contradictions between the two sides, which led the scene to the current bloody war.

Assessing the essence of the current conflict according to the conceptual background of the Unified National Charter of the Resistance Committees "Revolutionary Charter for Establishing people's Power" and its perceptions of the radical treatments of the crisis of war and peace in the Sudanese state, necessarily requires an analysis of the social context of the current war and the nature of the inherited discourse and structures through which the two sides move to mobilize for the option of war to legitimize their conflict

on power, resources and military rents, the Rapid Support Forces Militia cannot be defined more accurately than that it is a gang of murderous and criminal bandits who have made the sale of their weapons their source of income. They put their weapons under the hands of warlords and military rentier brokers who aspire to power and wealth, but in essence and their deeper social context, they remain the result of real just historical grievances based on the absence of balanced development and the inherited historical neglect of the issues of nomads, their rights and the basics of their lives, and the inability of the political elite and successive governments of the Sudanese state to adopt a positive approach to deal with the issues of land conflict, and formulas of sustainable and fair governance to manage the conflicts of pastoralists and farmers and reach a formula and an objective consensus framework to deal with them, which left a worsening reality that made the flattery and livelihood from military action a popular option among those societies, an option in which warlords and authoritarian ambitions invested and created a false discourse for the essence of the conflict away from the right to balanced development and fair distribution of power and wealth and the pursuit of a new Sudan in which all Sudanese find themselves, for a speech of loyalty to the leaders of the family militia who turned into new privileged people away from the issues of their local communities and their just grievances and became a face of the old central state itself without seeking to change it structurally or even change its biases partially in favor of a society that matters and its issues, and even provided their soldiers to the incinerators of regional wars in Libya, Yemen and elsewhere to expand the influence of the family militia business market. And now that the militia has reached the war square it resorted to the discourse of grievance and tribal mobilization and playing on the holocausts of hate speech and ethnic polarization and forgot that it did not provide anything to the issues of her local communities throughout its presence for nearly four years.

On the other hand, we find that the military institution/Sudan Defense Force, despite its existence as a previous institution to form the post-national independence state itself, and its control over most of the power scene after the departure of the colonizer and its consideration as the most organized bloc of the middle class in society, as the main protector of the old state and its privileges and the beating heart of the state inherited from the colonizer, it remains more nationalist and representative of all Sudanese people whenever we go to its base, away from its top, and even more from politicization as we move down the pyramid. And despite the weakening, empowerment, politicization and emptying, that took place throughout the era of the former regime, the army truly needs a complete reformulation, but cannot be compared to a militia in any way. The transformation of the nature of the National Salvation regime from its mid-second decade, and post-Naivasha Agreement to an integrated institutional corruption situation contributed to the transformation of nepotism and empowerment networks in the civil and military services from networks of political empowerment to networks of family/social empowerment and public relations networks that mitigated the impact of blatant political empowerment in the

first decade. In addition to the fact that all the massacres of the public interest in the military institution after the June 30 coup failed in changing the base structure of the army, and the work of unlawful dismissal from work for the public good inflicted on the figures who are considered the most popular and most hostile figures to the National Islamic Front and its elements in the army, but it completely failed to entirely reconstitute the institution in favor of the organization which's reflected in its tendency to form the Popular Defense and other parallel militias.

It is clear that the influence of the former regime is increasing at the top of the military institution and is dwindling to the extreme in its base, and that the rhetoric of the "army is a Kizani militia" in its blatant form is the discourse of the militia and its civilian allies to legitimize their movements and gain popular sympathy, but there are still real dangers associated with the presence of army generals in the army command, and the presence of significant pockets of the former regime in the military institution as nuclei for upcoming militias. This is in addition to other dangers with the presence of opportunistic leaders inclined and amenable to alliance and collusion with regional axes and consolidation and opening the way for inclusiveness.

Despite all these tragic complications, the Sudanese army, after its restructuring, reform, and restoration of nationalism, remains the option that can be relied upon to restore the state in the face of the specter of the militia statelet, the civil democratic state that we aspire to, not the state of historical privileges, biases and priorities of the state inherited from the colonizer.

Dealing with the question of the position and biases of the Resistance Committees to stop the references of their unified national charter we find that their actual bias, according to the social nature of the parties to the conflict, is to the issues, priorities, and aspirations of the local communities to which the militia belongs, Like the rest of the other regions of Sudan through the adoption of the Revolutionary Charter for Rural and Local Communities Issues and their ownership of their decisions and resources in accordance with the principles of social justice, fair distribution of power and wealth, and the dismantling of central levels of authority for the benefit of local communities, and for army bases affected by the current conflict by proxy for senior generals, and the necessity of structuring, reforming and restoring the army to the bosom of the people as a professional national institution that monopolizes state violence and constitutes the pillar of the rule of law and institutions protects and safeguards the Constitution, while emphasizing the firm and principled bias towards the victims of war and its displaced persons who have a real interest in a comprehensive and just peace, their security, safety, freedom, dignity and their right to life in all parts of Sudan.

#### • **Rapid Support Forces Militia:**

The Janjaweed militia emerged as a brutal arm of the central authority to suppress "rural revolutions" and maintain formulas of subjugation and cheap extraction. Then the shift that happened is through the deal that took place between the militia and the European Union in the issue of preventing illegal immigration to Europe, and its role was extended to include the repression of all the anti-authority movements that escalated due to the imposition of austerity and impoverishment policies, after its successes in suppressing the armed revolutions, the militia's role escalated and developed by employing it in regional mercenaryism in the Yemen war. These growing anti-toiling roles allowed it to build relations independent of the state apparatus, as well as to gain sufficient institutional autonomy from the usual state violence to directly follow the head of state by an independent law. That independence pushed the door wide open for the militia to start building its independent economic institutions to become a full-fledged political actor with a great deal of independence and influence, but its basic identity and source of strength is that it is a parallel military group with military equipment, strength and training that was not available to other paramilitary groups in the history of the modern Sudanese state.

The militia leadership appreciated its independent interests in the context of the fracture of power and chose to ensure a position in the reality after the collapse of the authority after it became inevitable in 2019.

The political front that assumed the position of the political crossing point for the December movement at that time saw this militia as an ally capable of helping them in managing their political project, so it provided constitutional, institutional, and political support for that militia. The RSF militia invested in the opportunity it seized from the remnants of the political façade to strengthen its capabilities independent of the state with foreign relations, and further political, military, and economic expansion until its ambitions in shaping the reality and future of the country became more serious.

The performance of the transitional authority in files that concern the interests of the revolutionary social forces in peace, justice and a decent life caused the decline of its popular support and the escalation of the sense of political independence of the revolutionary organizations towards more political contradiction.

The military component of the transitional authority at the time (the command of the armed forces and the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces Militia), favoring the option of replacing the political façade with a new ally of the Juba peace movements, and some defectors from the civilian component of the transitional authority (the Forces of Freedom and Change) to manage the transitional period until it reaches the election, and it seems that the militia leadership has bet on its economic arsenal and its political and military expansion to acquire a large position in the formation of the future authority in the country. On October 25, the military component chose to overthrow its civilian partners in the transitional authority.

The revolutionary forces clearly clarified the fact that their interests contradict the militia. The independence of these forces helped in crystallizing its position on the militia, radically calls for its annihilation as an institution by dissolving it. This radical position formulated new political possibilities and impossibilities that were one of the catalysts for the militia's choice to return to the alliance with what was left of the old political façade and its compromise proposal that guarantees the militia's members not to be prosecuted and preserve the economic arsenal and the consequent political power until the elections to be held at the end of the foreseeable transitional period.

Another catalyst for the militia's return to alliance with what remains of the old political façade was the re-formation of contradictions between regional and international powers following developments in the Yemen war and the struggle for influence on the Red Sea coast between the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and the outbreak of the Ukraine war between Russia and the European-American West on the other, and the consequent escalation of the conflict between these powerhouses in the African coast. The militia's new option to return to an alliance with what remains of the old political façade put it in a political confrontation with its ally in the October 25 coup, the Sudanese Armed Forces.

#### • **Army (Sudanese Armed Forces):**

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is the oldest official institution that was formed in the colonial period and maintained an influential position throughout our national history after independence. Where this institution ruled Sudan in all its recent history, directly or indirectly, as a pressure group that defines the features of political power of the state and maintains and dominates the extractive mode of the state.

The armed forces gained relative autonomy early on due to their institutional primacy and maintained a central role in protecting, sustaining, and developing the extractive mode of the state apparatus. The result of this independence is the continuous pursuit of various political facades to use them to gain power.

The period of Nimeiri's rule witnessed the emergence of the economic independence of the armed forces from the state apparatus, through which privileges were provided to the employees of the armed forces that enable them to maintain their loyalty in light of deteriorating living conditions.

The deterioration that resulted from the adoption of austerity policies and their political effects. This was the differentiation of the interests of the leadership from the interests of soldiers, junior officers, and the social incubators from which they recruit.

This autonomy gave the armed forces the ability to build and protect their interests and develop new tools to suppress rural revolts in order to sustain the extraction pattern, hence creating militias. With the growing economic and political independence of the armed forces, the moment of separation in 1999 witnessed the

tyranny of the military wing of the authority over the civilian wing. Since then, the armed forces have been looking for the civilian wing to complete what they need to maintain and legitimize their power, which made them search externally for political support and get involved in the slide of deepening dependency, which was the price of the secession of the south and the mercenaryism for the regional axes in the Yemen war, and this pushed it internally to haphazardly create a facades of opportunists at random.

At the moment of the collapse of power in 2019, following the revolutionary movement, the leaders of the armed forces chose to maintain their privileges – provided by their position of extraction and mercenary – and work to develop these privileges to become a sole ruler. However, it collided with the rebellion of its soldiers in an unusually sensitive place and time. In the rural revolutions, in front of the General Command and in the midst of a broad popular revolutionary movement, it chose to absorb the shock and sacrifice some of its leaders in favor of the rest. It proposed elections in nine months, betting on its ability with the Janjaweed militia to manipulate the results. But the militia's ambitions were too great to be exploited in favor of building the authority of the armed forces' command leaders.

The armed forces and their militia ally were forced to accept the partnership after June 30 to absorb the overwhelming revolutionary uprising, and their failure with the Janjaweed militia to impose de facto authority after committing the massacre of cracking down the sit-in. But it did not abandon its ambitions to protect the privileges of its leaders and expand them through monopolization of power and worked during the transitional period with all forms of conspiracy to weaken the political façade by employing its internal contradictions and feeding opportunistic currents in it, and managing the peace and foreign relations files until the moment of the onslaught came on (October 25, 2021).

In light of its search for external political support after the coup, it slipped deep into the slide of dependency and normalized relations with the Zionist entity and mortgaged itself to regional allies against its various rival currents inside and outside the coup authority. This coincided with the intensification of the conflict between the global powers and the consequent re-planning of regional alliances, which led to the opening of new and dangerous opportunities and "enablers" for scenarios of power and wealth struggle and the position of proxy in the project of deepening dependency.

The expansion of the ambitions of external powers in deepening dependency and the ambitions of the internal parties conflicting for power in light of the growing patriotism and independence of the popular resistance movement, led to the intensification of the conflict over power and wealth between the conflicting parties, so it was natural that one of the scenarios contained in managing that conflict militarily, a scenario that has come true.

The context of the current armed conflict and the resulting situations and consequences necessitate a shift in the plan of popular resistance action, in order to address urgent social priorities and open the way for the continuation of revolutionary work in order to achieve the goals of the revolution, in exchange for the outcome of the victory of either party or any of the old or new formulas of settlement.

#### • **Security and Intelligence Service:**

The security apparatus, by virtue of its fully politicized composition in favor of the Islamic Movement and its popular security apparatus, contributed to prolonging the war, coordinating mobilization and military alert, inciting strife, and ethnic strife, seeking to mobilize tribes and threaten societal peace, and supervising the coordination and arrangement of the work of ideological militias, and shadow brigades associated with the former regime, in addition to its direct military roles through the elements of its operations body, which participated in the battles unofficially and without issuing any decisions or decrees for their return. The apparatus has also complicated the military scene through the formation of special task battalions parallel to the army. These battalions reached in their maximum manifestations to try to dominate the field and take military decisions and impose them on the armed forces and impose a discourse, plans and priorities on the current war tracks have almost completely transformed the army into a mere echo of it, amid the silence and complicity of the army leadership, which was keen to grant the members of these militias military ranks at random, in a way that recalled the status of the Rapid Support Forces Militia and the reality of its growing influence in the pre-war

period. The security apparatus eventually turned into a "maestro" of the war and a de facto manager to coordinate most of the tasks, tactics, strategies; political discourse, mobilization, recruitment on the ground; and employed its networks inside the RSF Militia itself in grabbing all the strings and hitting all parties with each other, and manipulating the political and military discourse and the balance of injustice and bitterness deposited from the violations of the war in favor of the projects of the Islamic movement system and its allies, and employing the contradictions of the scene to open the way for the militarization of political and civil life and demonize all revolutionary and civil forces based on circulating the positions of part of them on everyone, and then transforming the post-war reality into an integrated reaction to the glorious December revolution, its goals, slogans and sacrifices, to escape the record of its crimes and bloody violations throughout the life of the former regime.

### **Urgent social priorities: -**

Placing the principle of preserving the right to life, livelihood, and sovereignty of the Sudanese people at the top of priorities, providing the required health care for the injured, evacuation of emergency cases, opening safe paths in war zones, and seriously dealing with the issue of food security and meeting living needs, and distancing the masses from any attempts to create ethnic or regional alignments to use the Sudanese as fuel in these battles that do not reflect their interests, and to build a popular anti-war position that puts the security, livelihood and sovereignty of the people as a compass for their national forces in light of these conditions and the subsequent consequences of addressing these tasks.

It requires organizing people in neighborhoods and areas by benefiting from the experience of the Resistance Committees in organizing and grassroots work, in addition to activating the Resistance Committees as a platform for coordination and joint action to confront the discourses of division and ethnic alignment by building popular public opinion against the militarization of civil life and the refusal to control and seizure of power by coercive force, as well as the rejection of foreign political and military interventions, and work hard to neutralize the violent machine in the country under the command of the authority of the people, which places their security, livelihood and sovereignty as a top priority.

### **Consequences and scenarios of the length and expansion of the war:**

When talking about the length of the conflict, the consequences and risks of its development, and the scenarios of its continuation, everyone's horizon jumps to the two sides resorting to tribal and civil mobilization to strengthen their field balances to reach the scene of total civil war, or the scenario of dividing the state itself into "cantons" and conflicting states as a natural coronation for the process of the proliferation of weapons, the multiplicity of armed movements and the growing tendency of local communities to armament, which puts under the hands of each group of societal components weapons, militia and resources, and in the absence of the party that monopolizes the official violence of the state, the state itself is absent and opens the way for all ambitions, the scenario of internationalizing the crisis remains possible with its two options; the option of external parties supporting the parties to the conflict in a way that makes it more prolonged, violent, destructive and continuous, or the option of placing the country under international wills and forces, peacekeeping and semi-full mandate status according to unpredictable estimates and time ranges.

The option of ending the war by establishing a new totalitarianism that is stronger than its predecessors, ecstatic about the prospect of victory in the war, and trading security for freedom like eternal totalitarianism remains an option as well. However, the closest model to the nature of the international powers that invest in the current war scene is the model of the "non-governable state", the model of the continuation of the war without the victory of one party over the other, the expansion and multiplicity of the parties to the conflict, and the inability of all parties to form a de facto government or authority, in a way that turns the country into conflicting fiefdoms where the international allied powers invest in each party in extracting their resources and competing in their military rents and trade.



All these outcomes make the process of accelerating the end of the war with a peaceful solution an imperative necessity for the survival and cohesion of the Sudanese state, and to save millions of Sudanese from a destructive and frightening reality carried by each of these scenarios.

The position of "against war" and "stopping the war" has become the prevailing discourse among most civil forces after the outbreak of war, even if their interests, priorities, and goals differ in promoting the discourse, the militia's allies and supporters of its position promote this discourse to save the militia's position and re-legitimize it via negotiation after the failure of its project in resolving the conflict and seizing power. They aspire to turn back the clock and return to the station of the Framework Agreement as the only political horizon alternative to the option of war or open a new political path in which they participate as a third-party representing the civilians in the worst case.

The rest of the revolutionaries adopt this option out of distrust in the two sides of the war, the militia and the current army leadership and see it as a struggle for power between the centers of the counter-revolution, not as a conflict between the choice of the state or no state and will end with a settlement between the two parties in the end, after shedding the blood of thousands of Sudanese, and therefore resorting to the option of stopping the war, will be biased towards the lives, security, safety and right to life, but go deeper than that by adopting the option of ending the war and its causes according to what is stated in the Revolutionary Charter. But after nearly six months of the outbreak of the war and the clarification of its features, nature and horizon, the discourse related to it will naturally change, and before talking about the options of the current reality and the most appropriate spaces of movement in its spaciousness, the natural mechanisms to stop it should study any war was before the decision was made that which one suits our current reality. Any war in any part of the world does not stop except with one of five options, either the victory of one of the parties to the war, or the entry of a third party that settles the war in its favor against the two parties to the conflict, or through settlement and political consensus between the two parties to the conflict, or through international intervention and the imposition of international control and the option of stopping the war internationally on both sides, or by conducting a broad societal dialogue and imposing a common popular vision to end the war, accompanied in the process of its formulation by community incubators and open power centers within the two centers of the conflict. And imposing the process of ending the war in accordance with the conditions, aspirations, and perceptions of the masses and not the aspirations of the parties to the conflict or offering the option of withdrawing popular legitimacy from the two parties to the conflict and withdrawing the force of arms from them through societal pressure and influencing the soldiers, bases, and incubators of the two parties to the conflict in case of their intransigence.

Returning to our current context and in light of the Resistance Committees' adherence to the peaceful horizon, the option of armed bias against the two parties remains out of the question, and the need to adhere to national sovereignty and reject the commandments makes the option of direct international intervention unavailable, and the settlement between the two parties with their ceilings naturally means a return to the pre-war square and the reality of the multiplicity of security centers and opens the way for a temporary truce after which the war returns in a more violent manner, leaving us with the only and least expensive option is to continue the peaceful struggle, initiate societal dialogue and impose a popular vision to stop the war. This is the choice that we believe in and will work on as it can be activated and strengthened with differentiated, integrated, and different mechanisms of action that flow in the same path.

### **Plan to end the war: -**

1) With regard to the position towards the Rapid Support Forces Militia, which is to dissolve it and consider it a terrorist organization, and with regard to the position towards the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the demands of civilians with regard to the conditions and obligations related to them, the position of which is based on their recognition as a regular force representing the institutions of the Sudanese State, monopolizing the official violence of the State apparatus and under the command of civilian governments and the authority of the people; it is fully authorized by the state apparatus and the Sudanese people and their living political, civil, and societal forces, in accordance with the following requirements that guarantee the process of reforming them and

restoring their nationalism and professionalism, and its neutrality and representation of all Sudanese people under the guarantee of popular control and all international and regional institutions and the free peoples of the world:

1. Dismiss and hold army commanders accountable for their involvement in war crimes before and after April 15, 2023, and their involvement in legitimizing and strengthening the influence of the RSF Militia to the extent that it poses a threat to the Sudanese state and Sudanese national security, in addition to their involvement in the crimes of cracking down the General Command sit-in, and the October 25 coup, and the accompanying repression and killing of peaceful demonstrators.
2. Reinstate the dismissed officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the armed forces, numbering more than 106,000, by political decision immediately and without delay or adherence to the procedures, restoring the nationalism and neutrality of the armed forces, the confidence and rallying of the people around them, and the absence of their bias or leaders in favor of certain political parties at the expense of others.
3. Dismissing all officers and non-commissioned officers of the Armed Forces whose political affiliation to any political force has been proven for the public interest, in accordance with the laws of the Armed Forces, while fulfilling their full rights and entitlements, in a way that guarantees the neutrality and professionalism of the Armed Forces and their freedom from political connections, decisively and definitively.
4. Forming a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces from those dismissed from the armed forces returning to service and their pensioners who are known for their professionalism, nationalism and neutrality, taking into account the representation of all regions, peoples of Sudan and its communities, to assume the tasks of leading the military institution and supervising the tasks of security and military reform and building the unified national army in accordance with the understandings of comprehensive and lasting peace with armed struggle movements, in a way that addresses the imbalances in societal representation in the leadership of the military institution, removes from it the specter of political polarization, and ensures its neutrality, independence, and professionalism.
5. Dissolving all militias closely linked to the military establishment, demobilizing, and disarming them, and ensuring the monopoly of violence and weapons for official state institutions only, while creating a complete systematic break with the approach of the Sudanese Armed Forces using militias as a tool in resolving their internal conflicts.
6. Employing the economic resources associated with the RSF Militia's investments, its economic empire, and its bank accounts with the resources of the Military Industries System of the Sudanese Armed Forces for the benefit of compensating the victims of the war and those affected by it, and rebuilding what was left behind by the war.
7. Supporting the option of civil democratic transformation and handing over power to civilians through their revolutionary popular councils local and national in accordance with the terms of reference of the Revolutionary Charter, with a commitment to reject political quotas and governments of independent competencies formed in a superficial way.

2) Formulating a popular vision about the procedures and mechanisms of the demobilization and reintegration process and perceptions of reform security and military services, with the assistance of honorable armed forces, veterans, pensioners, and dismissed persons from regular forces and their development through a broad process of community dialogue, presentation, and mobilization of masses and bases of the armed forces and societal symbols in the RSF circles around it as a popular vision that's not biased to a party other than those with real interests in lasting peace, cessation of war and dismantling of the Rapid Support Forces Militia and building a unified national professional army.

3) Inviting enlightened societal, civil, and religious figures, aligned with the revolution, to initiate a broad dialogue process with civil administrations, community leaders, and tribal and sect leaders on the necessity of ensuring

that tribes, sects, and civil and societal components will not enter as parties to the current conflict in the manner in which it opens the way for it to turn into an endless civil war, and to develop this dialogue into the form of a comprehensive and a native comprehensive peace treaty that rejects and criminalizes the exploitation of the tribal institution as a lever for war, based on the legacy of the leaders of civil and societal role and its historical role in calming, resolving and stopping conflicts, not fueling them and fanning their anger.

4) Opening channels of direct dialogue with the ranks and honorable members of the armed forces and societal figures in circles of local influence to the Rapid Support Forces Militia on the necessity of stopping the war on the terms of the revolutionaries, citizens, and real stakeholders in peace and the need to overcome the specter of the militia state and the multiplicity of security centers, towards building a unified, professional national army in which all Sudanese people can find themselves, at all levels. A dialogue that its basis will be the recognition of historical injustices in the social circles of the militia and the rest of Sudan. It is necessary to solve it within a broader national framework, and to recognize the army as a sovereign institution that officially monopolizes violence of the state, and constitutes the beating heart of the state of law and institutions, and that this will only come about with the removal of the army from the market, politics, and civil life, and to be restructured to remove anyone with a political affiliation in its corridors, and not limited to the cadres of the former regime only.

5) Expanding the horizon of societal dialogue in all areas, from the horizon of the current war to the horizon of the crisis of war and peace that has been inherited in the Sudanese state and which has been going on since the emergence of the modern state until now.

The transfer of the war to the center in Khartoum is the peak of the crisis and its arrival at a horizon similar to models of the ancient war is linked to the central state in its ancient form and puts before everyone the challenge of building a new national project, where all Sudanese people find themselves, or the disintegration and dissolution of the Sudanese state instead.

Addressing the issue of the current war does not occur in isolation from previous wars by addressing the roots of the inherited crisis of war and peace in the Sudanese state through the references contained in the Revolutionary Charter for Establishing people's power.

6) Withdrawing recognition of the Rapid Support Forces Militia as an armed force with constitutional legitimacy and declaring it a terrorist group that violates and terrorizes civilians and demands that its leaders and main figures be held accountable internally and externally and not recognize any militia formation.

7) Beginning a broad public campaign against the war and its violations and declaring non-recognition of its motives. This campaign spread widely through posters and leaflets in neighborhoods, villages, and media outlets inside and outside Sudan. This step will be followed by holding protests in all regions of Sudan and in front of foreign embassies and their government headquarters to demand a declaration of non-recognition of the right of the two parties, SAF and RSF, to represent the Sudanese people and determine their fate or negotiate and conclude agreements in their name.

8) Formation and announcement of the Transitional Revolutionary Council and nomination of representatives of the Transitional Legislative Councils, followed by directly appointing local governments, states and the national government by the Transnational Legislative Council.

9) Holding demonstrations and processions inside and outside Sudan to work on granting legal legitimacy to the formed Revolutionary Governments and the declaration of the National Government.

10) Classifying the warring forces as forces that are enemies of the Sudanese people, hijacking their decision, and aggressing against them.

11) The National Transitional Revolutionary Council shall begin immediately, in accordance with the Charter, to establish laws related to the structure of the military and security establishments.

12) In the event that the two parties, or one of them, rejects the government's decision to stop the war, the government shall immediately proceed to addressing countries and international organizations to classify it as a terrorist organization and prosecute anyone who recognizes it or support it. This person is to be held responsible for the damages that befall Sudan and its people as a result of this recognition or support.

13) The governments and formed councils remain committed to the objectives and timetables of the Charter for the transitional period to the Sudanese people, have the opportunity to establish a state according to those goals, which analyzed and explained the roots of the crisis of the war and final solutions were established for it, such as balanced development, justice, and restructuring the military system, civil service and establishing just and comprehensive peace by establishing the Peace Conference and the Constitutional Conference, and the establishment of the permanent constitution for Sudan.

14) Building a digital platform to monitor and observe the victims, those affected, and the destruction that occurred in the infrastructure.

15) Opening complaints locally and in the International Criminal Court against Al-Burhan, the army leaders, and against Hemedti and the leaders of the RSF, as they were the ones who ordered the war and carried out and supervised the killing of citizens and the looting of their properties and the rest of the crimes committed.

16) Completing a constitutional declaration upon which the temporary Revolutionary Council to be established to seize power and build the power of the people, which must precede the formation of the executive and judicial authority.

17) Declaring the RSF Militia "Janjaweed" as a terrorist militia and considering the current version of the leadership of army as a terrorist militia until the military institution is freed from tyranny and kidnapping.

18) Holding generals and warmongers accountable politically and judicially.

**Vision into the variables of the current scene and perceptions of stopping the war according to the terms of reference of the Revolutionary Charter To establish people's power: -**

- Regarding calls for Sudanese-Sudanese civil dialogue in the capitals of neighboring countries: according to formulas of the failure that accompanied all the understandings that took place between the Sudanese outside Sudan under international supervision, and the interference of neighboring countries and their interests in the ongoing conflict in Sudan and the involvement of some of them in it, directly or indirectly like the rest of the international community, and according to the fact that most internal conflicts are inherited in the Sudanese state is a direct product of foreign interventions and old and modern colonial policies.

The most appropriate option is the option of internal Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue with a reference and pure national within Sudan in areas outside the scope of war, including all segments of Sudanese society and societal forces, and the living mass forces in it, and opens the way for an extended community dialogue process in all localities and administrative units and addresses issues of war and peace, people's livelihood issues, and democratic civil transition, the postponed issues of national establishment, and paves the way for the National Constitutional Convention as the final platform to address the roots of the Sudanese crisis.

### **Regarding the calls for mobilization, alert, and arming civilians issued by the Armed Forces Command:**

Reality requires that it is more effective for the Sudanese Armed Forces to be content with retrieving those dismissed from the army its ranks in case it needs more forces on the ground, whose number exceeds (100 thousand Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and more than (six thousand) officers from trained and qualified fighters and those who are trained to fight are graduates of the military institution, instead of training civilians from scratch and throwing them into battles with a trained and experienced militia, or even establishing a new militia, provided that it is completed the return of those dismissed from military service by a direct political decision, just as they were dismissed by a political decision, which may constitute a real guarantee of the competence, professionalism and neutrality of the Sudanese Armed Forces and prevent them from kidnapping and political bias, with the need to deal seriously with the process of stopping the use of militias of a political, ideological and ethnic nature that are fighting with the military establishment against the militia, in a way that confirms the complete rupture between the army as a state institution and the doctrine of using militias to resolve internal conflicts and taking full advantage of the current lesson.

### **-Regarding the terms of reference for forming civil authority in the post-war period:**

Based on the fact that the political quota governments in the period before the October 25 coup were the main levers of the political division, the coup, and the war after it. The reality of the current war and the expansionist discourses parties participating in the political process and rallying different parties in the political scene around this party. This may open the door to greater quarrels and divisions, which makes political quotas a reality, and national unity governments are a catalyst for war and further polarization. And independent governments of competencies proved its failure throughout the period of the previous transitional authority and its bias in most cases was inevitable in favor of the interests of the international community and external powers at the expense of the demands and goals of the revolution, which makes the power of the people emerging from local revolutionary councils according to perceptions of the Revolutionary Charter to establish people's power is the only option to ensure the representation of the interests and aspirations of every one of the Sudanese people, and the will of their local communities, ensuring the representation of all Sudanese peoples in power structures in a way that ensures consideration of the reality of diversity and pluralism and the representation of all segments of society and their patterns of production and the fair division of power and wealth and addressing the roots of war and conflict in a fair and transparent manner. The temporary revolutionary councils can play the roles of forming temporary authority structures until the process of building people's authority is completed to address the vacuum resulting from the lack of a civil authority that represents the revolutionaries and the civil space at this Critical stage of the country's history.

### **Regarding the process of civilian participation as a third party in the negotiation process between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces Militia:**

To ensure the presence of the revolution's agenda at the negotiating table and to direct outcomes negotiating in a way that ensures a reasonable limit to the requirements of the revolution, we find that the best formula for avoiding the reality of a crisis of political divisions, legitimacy of representation, inclusion of parties to the process, and commitment to the Three No's of the street in the presence of the same parties of the coup authority remained on opposite sides of the negotiating table this time. The abstinence of civilians to participate in the negotiation process, and the negotiation is limited to issues related to the cease fire, withdrawing military appearances, handing over full authority to civilians, and an immediate ceasefire. The departure of all military manifestations from cities, villages and civilian gatherings, and a commitment not to waging conflict within cities, civilian communities, and villages.

**The revolution is a people's revolution, and power is the power of a people... and the military to the barracks and the Janjaweed is to be dissolved.**

**Mercy, forgiveness, and glory to the martyrs**

**2023-10-10 AD**