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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



ISP - Integrated Approach for Security and Peace

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### **Holistic Strategic Review of CSDP engagement in Somalia and the Horn of Africa 2022**

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The EU has been actively involved in the Horn of Africa and Somali State-building including in restoring stability and building security through a comprehensive engagement encompassing all EU foreign policy instruments, i.e. development cooperation, promotion of good governance, rule of law and human rights, humanitarian aid, as well as security assistance, including through the CSDP Missions and Operation in and off the coast of Somalia and support to AMISOM (ATMIS as of April 2022). The Horn of Africa remains an arena of geopolitical competition and a geostrategic priority for the EU thus necessitating continuous comprehensive engagement in order to protect its interests. Internal and inter-state conflicts, violent extremism, climate change and population growth are aggravating instability and fragmentation in the region, which continues to suffer from a lack of common security architecture. The Horn of Africa is also faced with an unprecedented humanitarian emergency and risk of famine, which has been further aggravated by the consequences of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.

Somalia remains the regional centre of gravity of insecurity mainly generated by Al-Shabaab (AS) and also a harbour for all types of opportunity-based criminality. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been largely suppressed, but there is a risk that any lack of dissuasive posture would immediately allow the Piracy Action Groups to resume their operations. The current geopolitical context as well as unprecedented humanitarian emergency in Somalia and the region have reconfirmed the importance of securing the critical shipping lanes from the Gulf region through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea to Europe.

The current situation in Somalia, following the peaceful transition of power, provides some ground for cautious optimism. However, serious political engagement from the new Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the recently formed Government, involving constructively the Federal Member States (FMS) is absolutely key to advance the State-building and security transition from the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to Somalia's security responsibility both on land and off shore, and to counter the continuous threat of AS. Reinforced commitment from Somalia's international partners, including the EU will be essential to achieve this.

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There is a momentum to reinvigorate the EU's CSDP actions in Somalia, as the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has clearly indicated a wish for a more comprehensive EU engagement and support to build the required capacity and capability for the takeover of security responsibilities both on land and off shore.

The launch of ATMIS and the agreement on an ambitious drawdown schedule of the AU presence in Somalia makes security reform, i.e. the implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP) and the capability building of the Somali Security Forces (SSF) – Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) and Somali Police Force (SPF), including Darwish - a top priority for the coming years. Parallel reinforced efforts on political and economic reforms are equally essential as they are all interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

The fragile political environment and continuous security threat posed primarily by AS will likely continue to hamper the CSDP engagement, particularly by on land Missions. In such a context, a certain level of flexibility and adaptability in the mandates will be required in order to adjust and sequence the approach, depending on the overall security sector reform dynamics and priorities. Furthermore, it is suggested that some activities/tasks can be temporarily postponed or de-activated.

The holistic Strategic Review suggests that the CSDP Missions and Operation build and consolidate their progresses, aiming at reinforced local ownership and determination to advance reforms in the security sector with a view to support STP implementation.

The Strategic Review also offers recommendations to optimize the EU's Integrated Approach and strengthen synergies between CSDP Missions and Operations, other EU actions and support provided by EU Member States and international partners. The capacity building support through the CSDP Missions coupled and synchronized with the deliveries of equipment funded by the European Peace Facility (EPF), will remain essential for Somalia to be more in control of its security both on land and at sea.

The EU could play a bigger role in the development of the regional maritime security architecture, as it has a unique position to develop a reliable link between the two regions of the South-Western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In this context, in accordance with the Strategic Compass, the Operation ATALANTA will seek to consolidate the EU's ability to act as a security provider and active promoter of the regional maritime security architecture by fostering synergies with other European initiatives such as the Maritime Coordinated Presence in the North-Western Indian Ocean and the European Maritime Awareness Mission (Agenor) in the Strait of Hormuz. Capitalising on

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the elements of success of the Operation, such as the prevention of acts of piracy and countering trafficking of narcotic drugs, forms a solid basis to further give resilience to its mandate, including by contributing to the implementation of the arms embargo. The Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in his letter of August 2022 to the EU High Representative indicated a wish to strengthen cooperation with the EU on matters relating to maritime security. The letter, however, does not provide sufficient legal grounds for Operation ATALANTA's return to fight piracy and protect the World Food Programme (WFP) deliveries in Somalia's territorial sea. The matter was further discussed with the EU High Representative during his visit to Somalia in September 2022.

Taking into account the outcomes of the holistic Strategic Review and the above mentioned considerations, it is recommended to:

- a. Extend the mandates of Operation ATALANTA, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia for another 2 years, until 31 December 2024 as part of the EU's Integrated Approach in Somalia and the Horn of Africa;
- b. Establish a regular information sharing mechanism with the Somali authorities at political level facilitated and coordinated by the EU Delegation;
- c. Continue seeking synergies and coordination between the Missions/Operation and with the EU Delegation, as well as coordination with the relevant international partners;
- d. Mainstream and integrate the Rule of Law, Human Rights, IHL, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and Children and Armed Conflict, as well as climate change into the activities of the CSDP Missions and Operation.

For the **Operation ATALANTA**, it is recommended to:

- a. Consolidate and adapt the mandate of the Operation, as part of the overall EU efforts as a global security provider, especially in the maritime domain, in line with the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan;
- b. Continue contributing to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy, and the protection of WFP deliveries and other vulnerable shipping on the basis of UNCLOS, in the Area of Operations. Resume operations in Somalia's territorial waters as soon as appropriate an legal framework is granted;

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- c. Stand ready to contribute to the implementation of the arms embargo and continue fighting against narcotic drugs trafficking;
- d. Increase the AOO of Operation ATALANTA to include all the Red Sea;
- e. Establish a mechanism of information sharing related to IUU fishing towards the FGS through INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu;
- f. Increase the support to EUCAP Somalia to provide local capacity building support to the SNCG and/or maritime police units and ensure more regular key leader engagement with the Somali authorities and support the FGS in fisheries enforcement and control;
- g. Further strengthen links and mutual support with the European Maritime Awareness Mission (AGENOR) in the Strait of Hormuz, in line with their respective mandates as part of Operation ATALANTA's transformation into a broader maritime security operation;
- h. Explore all options to increase synergies and interactions with CMP NWIO;
- i. Enhance the counter narrative to protect the EU and the Operation ATALANTA against disinformation campaigns;
- j. Rename and rebrand "EU NAVFOR SOMALIA - ATALANTA Operation" into "EU NAVFOR ATALANTA Operation".

It is recommended that **EUCAP Somalia**:

Continue the balanced approach of maritime and police activities to respond to the Somali-owned and led security agenda priorities and needs.

On **maritime aspects**, **EUCAP Somalia** is recommended:

- a. Continue to reinforce, through capacity building support and the provision of equipment and infrastructure, maritime police units in and around the four main Somali ports, with a focus on Mogadishu, Berbera and Bosasso ports. Subsequently, the Mission could explore opportunities for a possible engagement with the maritime police unit in Kismayo port;

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- b. In Somaliland, taking into account the positive results achieved, prepare a transition strategy by mid next mandate. In Puntland, if conditions are not met within 6 months for an engagement with the PMPF, consider closing the Field Office;
- c. Contribute to the development of the Somali Coast Guard functions, supporting the civilian capacities/activities, regardless of the entity in charge;
- d. Continue to advise and mentor, as appropriate, the relevant FGS ministries, including the Somali Maritime Administration on the development of Coast Guard functions and the establishment of the relevant inter-agency coordination mechanisms in the maritime sector;
- e. Provide advice and capacity building support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources in relation to the fisheries control and enforcement, in close coordination with the EU Delegation/DG MARE and other relevant partners; facilitate, as relevant, the exchange of collected data between Operation ATALANTA/DG MARE and the FGS/INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu;
- f. Provide advice on the best practices in tackling toxic waste related issues, including on access to reliable analytical products, and promote among Somali interlocutors a regional approach in the remits of Djibouti Code of Conduct.

On **police and law enforcement**, **EUCAP Somalia** is recommended:

- g. Focus on the provision of advice and mentoring as well as project support to the FGS MoIS and SPF on the development of the Somali Police Darwish Concept at federal and FMS levels, including C3 arrangements for the implementation of the STP in complementarity of the support under the Joint Police Programme. Until the C2 structures and the status of the State Darwish are clarified, focus on engagement with the Federal Darwish;
- h. Support strengthening of the inter-operability between the Somali Security Forces, notably the SPF and the SNAF, for the implementation of the STP, in coordination with EUTM Somalia;
- i. Support further operationalisation of the INTERPOL NCB network, linking it with the Immigration departments at the Mogadishu port/airport, as well as with the Criminal Investigation Departments (CIDs) in FMS and the SPF EOD Department. Define transition strategy for the handover of this task before the end of the next mandate;

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- j. Strengthen the police-prosecution cooperation and the interaction within the whole criminal justice chain, with a focus on the maritime domain.

For **EUTM Somalia** it is recommended to:

- a. Finalize support, training and advice activities to the Somali-Owned Training System (SOTS) and initiate mentoring/monitoring with a view to ensure that the SOTS becomes self-sustainable under the SNAF responsibility within the coming mandate;
- b. Continue training activities on enabling functionalities (such as C-IED and logistics) and aim at educating individuals in specific skills (such as leadership, staff courses, C2, as well as train the trainer and train the teachers courses), based on SNAF needs in support of the STP implementation;
- c. Support, advise and mentor the SNAF on establishment of a functioning C2 structure, operational planning, and enabling functionalities in the SNAF chain of command as of the level of SNAF GS, and down to Regional Headquarters and Joint Operations Centres (JOC's);
- d. At strategic level, focus on the development of an effective SNAF GS organization and command and control structure through advice and mentoring activities and de-activate the support provided to MoD;
- e. Support the establishment of a KMM within the C2 structure of the SNAF GS;
- f. Support a logistic unit in Mogadishu, in support of STP implementation;
- g. Support and advise the SNAF on the planning, identification, implementation and delivery of the EPF Assistance Measures to the SNAF;
- h. Support and advise the SNAF, according to the STP, in the preparation to replace ATMIS in the medium term.



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### **I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

1. This holistic Strategic Review assesses and analyses the progress of the CSDP Operation ATALANTA and the Missions of EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia against their mandates in the framework of the international community's activities and the EU Integrated Approach in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. It assesses the achievements of EU political and strategic objectives while considering the holistic Strategic Review of 2020 and its recommendations. It also identifies opportunities for continued CSDP engagement and elements for possible adjustment. Current mandates of the three CSDP engagements expire on 31 December 2022.
2. This holistic Strategic Review has been developed by the EEAS in consultation with the relevant Commission services. It has also been the subject of extensive consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia, EU Member States, international partners and relevant stakeholders and has been informed by an inter-service mission to Somalia, discussions on the progress of implementation of UNSCR 2628 (2022), as well by the recent visit of the High Representative in Mogadishu. The holistic Strategic Review has been conducted in compliance with the "Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP crisis management operations" under the responsibility of the High Representative.
3. This holistic Strategic Review has also benefited from the ongoing Conflict Analysis Screening – Somalia and the Conflict Prevention Report on Djibouti.

## **II. SITUATION**

The Horn of Africa remains an area of competition for influence and natural resources between regional and international actors, which has been further exacerbated in the context of weakened multilateralism and increasing multi-polarity. A trend of further regionalisation of the conflicts is becoming increasingly apparent as the region suffers from weak integration and lack of an effective and common security architecture, as well as effects of climate change and rapid population growth. Such context provides a fertile ground for the spread of violent extremism, transnational organized crime and hampers economic development. The region is also faced with an unprecedented humanitarian situation and risk of famine. The Horn of Africa remains a geo-strategic priority for the EU necessitating continuous comprehensive engagement in order to protect its interests.

Somalia is the regional centre of gravity of insecurity mainly generated by AS. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been largely suppressed (no piracy incidents have been reported since April 2019), but not eradicated and it is clear that the capability and intent remains; there is a risk that any lack of dissuasive posture would immediately allow the Piracy Action Groups to resume their operations. The Russian military aggression in Ukraine and the subsequent efforts to identify alternative sources of energy supply has further increased the significance of securing the shipping routes from the Gulf region to Europe.

Situation in Somalia, following the finalization of the delayed electoral process and the peaceful transition of power provides reasons for some cautious optimism. Serious political engagement from the new Somali President and the recently formed government, involving constructively the FMS, is necessary on key political decisions, notably the finalization of the Constitutional Review Process, the implementation of the National Security Architecture (NSA) and the organisation of the maritime security architecture. These decisions are prerequisite for Somalia to assume gradually the lead of its security responsibilities both on and off shore on the basis of the Somali Transition Plan (STP).

The FGS appears to be better coordinated and more explicit in its positions, demonstrating enhanced ownership to advance the reforms and security transition. The FGS is also highly interested in revenue generation from the country's vast marine resources and the development of Blue Economy. However, Somalia still lacks sufficient capabilities to manage the maritime sector properly, including to monitor and patrol its Exclusive Economic Zone. Countering IUU fishing continues to represent a major challenge for Somalia.

**a) Regional context**

4. After transitions towards democracy in Sudan and Ethiopia sent waves of hope, the region is today in deep crisis. Government instability, erosion of social fabric and loss of trust between citizens and state are the main descriptors. The Horn is an area of competing influence between regional and international actors as weakened multilateralism and increasing multipolarity are allowing the countries in the region to engage across ideological blocks – e.g. with China, the US, the EU, the Gulf, Turkey and Russia at the same time. Conversely, it also allows for international actors to intervene in national, regional and local conflicts in the Horn of Africa, often pushing diverging interests through proxies or state actors, which makes crisis management through the multilateral entities even more complex.
5. The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have struggled to adapt to this changing landscape. Neither organisation has proactively or effectively engaged to solve regional crises, putting more onus on the EU and other international actors to step in. The United Nations (UN) is also suffering from dysfunctional multilateralism as interests clash and divisions in the UN Security Council deepen.
6. A trend of further regionalisation of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa is becoming increasingly apparent and instead of regional integration, governments have engaged in mutual degradation. The region is lacking an effective and common security architecture. This provides fertile soil for concerning trends, such as the spread of AS along the Swahili coast and into Ethiopia, or the turnstile of mercenaries – regional and international – circling between Libya, Chad, CAR, South Sudan and Darfur. The smuggling of drugs, gold, arms and contraband and trafficking of people inside the region as well as across the Red Sea and the Mediterranean enriches local warlords, traffickers and AS but hampers national economies. Somalia remains the regional centre of gravity of insecurity, mainly generated by AS, but also a harbour for all types of opportunity-based criminality, on top of which piracy is not a stand-alone criminal business. Russia's military aggression in Ukraine and the subsequent efforts to identify alternative sources of energy supply, especially in the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), has further increased the significance of securing the shipping routes from the Gulf region through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea to Europe.

7. The impact of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine will further increase the severe ongoing humanitarian emergency. This can also increase the probability of the resurgence of all types of criminality, notably piracy, as well as forced displacement and conflict over scarce resources. The piracy threat remains at low level in the Area of Operation (AOO) of Operation ATALANTA, but there is a risk that any lack of dissuasive posture would immediately allow the Piracy Action Groups (PAG) to resume their operations. No piracy-related incidents on the high seas have been reported since April 2019. The conduct and presence of Operation ATALANTA assets and multinational anti-piracy naval forces in the area, such as Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and Independent Deployers (ID), together with the application of the Best Management Practices (BMP) and Private Armed Security Team (PAST) on board some of the vessels are considered to be the likely causes of piracy deterrence and/or suppression.
8. The Indian Ocean is exposed to a variety of illicit maritime activities, such as narcotic drugs and weapons trafficking, as well as human trafficking. Known narcotic drugs trafficking routes run through the Arabian Gulf and East Africa from Central Asia, notably Afghanistan, producers, to Africa and onwards towards the Western markets. African states, in particular Kenya and the Seychelles, are increasingly afflicted by the problems of drug addiction. It is understood that a large proportion of drugs is intended for the European market. Weapons are generally smuggled via maritime routes from the Makran Coast to Yemen and Somalia, with lighter weapons going to Somalia and heavier ones to Yemen. Overall, the illicit weapons trade is linked to criminal and terrorist organisations and threatens the stability of Somalia and the wider region. Illicit trade in charcoal from Somalia towards the Gulf States, also represents a source of funding for AS in Somalia through several taxation systems.
9. Regarding Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, most Western Indian Ocean countries lack the capacity to effectively license foreign vessels, monitor and patrol their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), as well as enforce the existing regulations. Many Fishing Vessels (FVs) attempt to fish without permission or without reporting catches to the host nation, significantly damaging Indian Ocean's fisheries and ecosystems. As far as Somalia is concerned, a well-known narrative exists that the unauthorised exploitation of Somali fishing resources by foreign fishing fleets threatens the livelihood of Somali coastal communities, pushing them towards piracy. Somalia's inability to monitor and patrol the EEZ is utilised by a number of local and regional actors in Somalia to take their shares in this profitable

business. Countering IUU fishing represents a major challenge for Somalia. In its report released in November 2021, the Auditor General to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) reported an under collection of, at least, USD 56 million in revenue in the fisheries sector. The EU has been supporting the resource sharing agreements on fisheries (tuna) between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS), but implementation remains an issue (e.g. Puntland continues to issue licenses to the foreign vessels although according to the current legislation only the FGS is allowed to do so).

10. The centre of gravity of other regional dynamics that represent additional threats to the freedom of navigation is located in the Strait of Hormuz. New kind of threats cannot be ruled out, although the likelihood of their occurrence is very low. In this sense, besides piracy, Best Management Practice 5 (BMP5) considers anti-ship missiles, sea mines and Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WB-IED), as security threats for shipping traffic transiting across the region. In this view, the reported attack in July 2021 on a MV MERCER STREET using a drone off the coast of Oman, together with the use of limpet mines and unmanned skiffs, as well as the reported cybersecurity incidents, depict a change in the maritime security scenario.

**b) Somalia**

Political situation

11. Over the last two years, the political situation in Somalia remained fragile due to the former President Muhammed Abdullahi Farmaajo's isolationist governance and attempt to extend his term, as well as continuous tensions between the FGS and the FMS. The period has been characterised by political divisions and growing fragmentation among the Somali Security Forces (SSF) and institutions along the clan lines. President Farmaajo has been accused of abandoning federalism and attempting to centralise his power, including by using the SSF to exert his political posture to the regions instead of fighting AS and there has been limited, if any, progress on the state building process during his administration. Farmaajo promoted nationalism, sovereignty and territorial integrity, which increased his popularity among the Somali public but strained the relationship with Kenya and multilateral partners, including the AU, UN and the EU. With the Small Horn Alliance between Farmaajo, Abiy in Ethiopia and Afwerki in Eritrea, regional dynamics changed to the worse. While the peaceful conclusion of presidential elections, and the recent endorsement of the Federal Government, there is

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grounds for careful optimism regarding overall progress, efforts to address the ongoing lack of political reconciliation to determine a clear direction on the federal state-building governing model as supported by the EU and wider international community.

12. Initial statements by the President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), elected in May 2022, suggest there could be an opening of a new chapter in building sustainable peace in Somalia. President HSM's focus on reconciliation with the FMS, convening of a National Consultative Council in June 2022, resulted in outlining the following priorities: 1) completion of the Constitutional Review Process; 2) National Security Architecture, force generation and the fight against AS; 3) universal direct elections across the country; 4) political and social reconciliation, resumption of talks with Somaliland; 5) federalisation of Somalia, establishment of the district level governance; 6) formation of a functional independent judiciary; and 7) developing a unified response to drought, in cooperation with the international partners. Recent developments offer some ground for cautious optimism. President HSM also aims to strengthen the security cooperation with international partners and appears to consider the EU as a close partner. During his first months in office, President HSM has visited the UAE, Turkey, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt and Ethiopia. It is clear that the President wants to rebuild relationships with international partners and ensure constructive engagement with all, including avoiding regional players engaging in proxy conflicts on Somali soil.
13. During the past years, tensions between the FGS and some of the FMS have undermined the state-building process and progress towards the key reform milestones, including in the security sector. Key political decisions on the implementation of the National Security Architecture (NSA), as jointly agreed between the FGS and FMS in May 2017, notably the integration of regional forces, respective Command & Control (C2) arrangements and the organisation of the maritime security architecture remain pending. Serious political engagement from the President HSM and his government, involving constructively the FMS, will be necessary to move forward on the interlinked reforms, and to enable Somalia to assume gradually the lead of its security responsibilities both on and off shore.
14. With the new UNSC mandate for a reconfigured AMISOM (UNSCR 2628(2022)) - the launch of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 1 April 2022 and the initial messaging of the President of wanting to eliminate AS through a military, financial and

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ideological war - the fight is expected to intensify. The gradual withdrawal of ATMIS should be compensated by a step-by-step handover of security responsibilities to Somalia, provided the required capabilities are generated. This will need a reinforced Somali commitment to build the SSF and provide a clear overview of the numbers of troops to allow for decisions on force generation as well as – crucially – force integration.

15. The FGS expects international partners and in particular the EU, to scale up and accelerate security assistance in strengthening the security institutions and the capacity building to the SSF, in line with the Somali vision, priorities and needs. The FGS appears to be better coordinated and more explicit in its position. The FGS has indicated a wish for a more comprehensive, effective and timely EU support, in order to create the necessary conditions for the state-building and sustainable development.

### Security situation

16. The security situation in Somalia remains dire, with AS being the main threat to peace and stability not only to the country, but also to the region. Given the number of attacks in the first months of 2022, it could be assessed that AS is on the rise militarily, as well as socially and economically.
17. AS has at least 10,000 military fighters across its strongholds in southern and central Somalia (and a few in the Galgala Mountains in the north). The group continues to rely on asymmetrical warfare tactics and mostly operates in small units acting against a variety of targets and demonstrating the ability to disrupt political, economic and social processes as well as humanitarian response across the country. Its main tactics are ambushes, IEDs, targeted assassinations, mortar and complex attacks mainly against AU presence and SSF, although civilian casualties account for a significant part of the overall casualty statistics. Complex attack by AS on the ATMIS Forward Operating Base in Ceel Baraf, Middle Shabelle in May 2022 or on Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu in August 2022 are a stark reminder of continuous threat posed by the group.
18. AS has formed financial, economic and social networks and manages to self-sustain its operations. The network consists of thousands of affiliates and supporters with positions in governmental, security and financial institutions. They have capabilities to share relevant intelligence and influence counter actions of SSF. Furthermore, AS influence on the financial system is severe. The group takes two main taxes from businesses in areas it does not control

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(including Mogadishu), the customs taxes on imports and exports at the ports and through transit, and the annual Zakah, which is 2.5% of the capital and assets of traders. In return, AS controls large areas where it provides services, including security and justice.

19. On maritime security, AS only has limited capabilities for transport of cargo and personnel along the coast, but the group taxes almost every shipment entering into Somali ports. Maritime crimes, notably trafficking and smuggling, as well as the IUU fishing have been increasing.
20. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Somalia continues to operate in the country's northeast, particularly from its bases in the East of the Gollis mountains. ISIL operational activity beyond the northeast has partly competed with AS for territorial control and resources. Like its rival AS, ISIL relies on asymmetrical tactics but is considerably less sophisticated in targeting government personnel, businesses and civilians. Its tactics also include suicide attacks and suicide-by infantry attacks.
21. In the north, tensions persist between Puntland and Somaliland over the control of the Provinces of Sool, Sanaag and Ayn (or Cayn), erupting into clashes and inter-communal violence targeting civilians.
22. Large parts of the country are still under AS control and inaccessible to government officials without military support. Main Supply Routes (MSR) are frequently compromised, leading to difficulties in troop support and logistical supply. Somalia's partners acknowledge that the AU security engagement in Somalia, ATMIS, remains necessary to ensure the level of security to the population, and to conclude the security transition process.

### Economic and social situation

23. In the absence of external budget support due to the political crisis since the end of 2020, the FGS has been using the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights allocation (circa USD 220 Million), expected to cover for finance priority expenditures until mid-2022. According to the latest analysis by the IMF, the FGS needs over USD 50 Million in external budget grants for the remainder of 2022 to maintain current expenditure levels, including to pay the salaries to either civil servants or the security forces. Continuous engagement with the International Financial Institutions and other donors to ensure a positive outcome of the ongoing HIPC process is among the top priorities of Somali President HSM.



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24. Somalia remains one of the least developed countries in the world with 77% of its population living in poverty. Vulnerability to shocks is exacerbating and perpetuating poverty and has led to massive displacement of people within and beyond Somalia's borders. With an annual urban population growth of around 4%, the WB estimates that the majority of Somali people will be living in urban areas by 2040. This shift is putting considerable pressure upon State services, including on security and the rule of law.
25. Over 70% of the population is under 30 years of age and most of them have not received proper education and/or training. Overall unemployment is estimated at 54% in Somalia. This presents a particular risk of young men being attracted to illegal and violent livelihoods, such as piracy, illicit trafficking of different sorts and/or to violent extremism. Somalia ranks as one of the worst countries worldwide for women. Gender-based Violence (GBV), female genital mutilation and discrimination against Somali women are widespread. Women face challenges in access to politics, decision-making, economic resources and justice. Somalia is also one of the countries with the highest number of grave violations committed against children, documented by the UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. Although the majority of those violations are committed by AS, a significant number of violations are also attributed to Somalia's security and defence actors, including recruitment and use of children, sexual violence, detention, killing and maiming of children.
26. Somalia's GDP was estimated at about USD 7.3 billion in 2021/22. Economic growth is insufficient to significantly address poverty and unemployment. The private sector, however, is showing some resilience with trade and communications growing and strong livestock exports. The largest investments come from the diaspora, whose contributions play a central role in Somalia's economy. Annual remittances of about USD 1 billion have been a key factor in keeping the economy afloat, particularly at household level.
27. With a coastline of over 3,000 km, Somalia has an opportunity to reap the benefits of the Blue Economy, if managed properly. So far the FGS has been seeking only "quick wins" in terms of revenue generation, issuing licenses for fishing without proper fisheries sector management policy or enforcement capacity, or licences for oil exploration.

#### Humanitarian situation

28. The humanitarian situation in the country further deteriorated in 2021 and since the beginning of 2022, following the triple threat of the desert locust infestation, localised floods and

droughts, and the health and socio-economic effects of COVID-19. As of the end of June 2022, the severe drought has affected more than 7 million people in Somalia, an increase from 6.1 million in May, with over 918,000 displaced. Disease outbreaks continue to emerge with over 5,830 suspected cholera cases reported since January. Food security conditions are unlikely to improve until mid-2023, at the earliest.

29. Food prices are spiking. In some parts of Somalia, prices of basic food items, such as red sorghum, have exceeded the levels seen during the 2011 famine. This is particularly critical in areas isolated by the ongoing armed conflict or where MSR are no longer viable due to taxation of non-state armed groups. All the above issues have major societal consequences and can lead to further instability. Security and political stability cannot be achieved without addressing these massive humanitarian needs as well. However, access to areas with highest needs remains a significant challenge, and the humanitarian response is only 29.9% funded as of end-June 2022.

### **III. EU POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND SOMALIA**

30. In line with the Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa: a geostrategic priority for the EU, adopted in May 2021, the EU's intention is to further strengthen and deepen its strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa and its countries, notably with a view to reduce instability, promote democracy and sustainable growth. The EU's aim is to reinforce a joint approach to democracy and regional peace and security, revitalising multilateralism and the rules-based international order, strengthening commitment to social and human development, boosting post-COVID socio-economic recovery and trade, as well as regional integration, including supporting maritime security in the Red Sea, which remains crucial to the EU as a trade and connectivity artery. The EU will support cooperation, dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes around the Red Sea and offer privileged relations with regionally-owned initiatives, and will also explore synergies – on land, air, and at sea – in the field of peace and security and beyond.
31. The **EU's Integrated Approach** in Somalia and the Horn of Africa includes political dialogue, security engagement, including through three CSDP Missions/Operation, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. A new multiannual indicative framework was

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approved in December 2021 (EUR 257 Million from 2021-2024), with a clear commitment to support state-building efforts, economic and private sector development and increase resilience of most vulnerable populations while reducing the effects of the climate crisis. EU engagement in Somalia under the Integrated Approach is based on a thorough understanding of the local context and conflict sensitivity, active diplomacy with political dialogue, support of political transformation, development assistance and humanitarian aid. The EU is one of Somalia's key development partners, providing comprehensive support to the country in different areas such as state building efforts, basic services and job creation. At the same time, the EU is committed to helping Somalia develop a strong, sustainable economy, with a strong private sector, which can support the country's peace-building processes. The EU implements a number of crisis response measures, aimed at strengthening the local governance and building the resilience of local communities impacted by conflict, climate change and environmental degradation. Our security engagement is aimed at supporting Somalia to take progressive ownership over its own national security. The capacity building support through the CSDP Missions coupled and synchronised with the delivery of the equipment funded by the European Peace Facility (EPF) remains essential for Somalia to be more in control of its security both on land and sea. The EU also remains an important humanitarian partner – the EU and its Member States – as Team Europe - recently pledged EUR 633 Million (humanitarian and development funding combined) for the drought response in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. A robust Integrated Approach among multiple EU actors (see Annex A for more details) continues to be required in order to ensure a consistent and coherent approach, in cooperation with the UN and other international actors.

32. The EU continues to support state-building and security transition in Somalia from the AU presence to Somali security responsibilities through various actions, including CSDP Missions and the African Peace Facility (APF)/European Peace Facility (EPF). The EU has also been the main donor of AMISOM/ATMIS since its establishment in 2007. Somalia also benefits from a number of regional EU-funded maritime security programmes, such as MASE, CRIMARIO and the Programme for the Maritime Security in the Red Sea (Red Sea Programme). Several EU Member States are also actively involved in the support of Somali security sector reform, justice and the rule of law.
33. **Annex A** provides additional details on the EU's Integrated Approach in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and an overview of engagements of other international actors.

**IV. SOMALI SECURITY AND DEFENCE CONTEXT**

To date, progress in the STP implementation remains far from delivering on Somalia's commitment to be in control of its security both on land and off shore. Achievements in the security transition over the past two years have been limited primarily due to the political situation and protracted electoral crisis. Agreement between the AU and the FGS in March 2022 on the reconfigured AU presence in Somalia (ATMIS) that should enable a gradual conditions-based transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces and institutions, in line with the revised STP, has been a major development of the past year. A reinforced commitment both from the new FGS, which appears to be better coordinated and demonstrating enhanced ownership to move the transition forward, as well as the Somali international partners will be essential to achieve this. It can however be already anticipated that the Phase 1 of the security transition from ATMIS to the Somali security responsibilities will be delayed, as the required capacities and capabilities for both the SSF and ATMIS will not be available by that time.

In this context, core challenge for the FGS is to generate its own capable forces, as well as ensure proper management and control of current forces so that a transition can be conducted without negative implications on the security situation. Command & control remains a critical challenge. Notwithstanding some positive reforms, supported by Somalia's international partners over the last years, SNAF still suffers from major structural and institutional weaknesses and remains dependent on ATMIS and international partners for essential enabling assets and capabilities. Rightsizing of the force also remains to be achieved pending the implementation of the Pensions and Gratuity Bill. Similarly, development of the SPF has also registered only limited results and SPF remains weak in its ability to establish and project clear political guidance, ensure effective command and control, and coordinate actions with the FMS. In response to the pressing force generation needs for the implementation of the STP, the Darwish Concept was developed in 2019. Currently the Concept, notably the organizational and structural aspects, as well as overall status of the Darwish Force are subject of discussion between the FGS and the FMS and need to be clarified. On a more positive side, further progress has been achieved in developing Federal Police functions, such as international relations with the INTERPOL. The INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) in Mogadishu has reached its initial operational capability and is now in the process of certification by INTERPOL.

To date the FGS has not demonstrated resolute commitment to take decisions on the organization of the maritime security architecture and the development of maritime law enforcement capabilities at federal and FMS levels. Furthermore, the previous FGS rejected any further renewal of the UNSC

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Resolution 2608 (2021) on anti-piracy even though Somalia remains dependent on international navy presence to deter and prevent piracy and maritime crimes.

### **a) Assessment of the Somali transition strategy**

34. Achievements in the implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP), remain far from delivering on Somalia's commitment to be in the lead for its own security, notably due to the limited capacity of the FGS to generate the needed forces in a tensed political environment. The STP remains a “living document”, which the FGS intends to update as required. To date, STP implementation progress has been limited to the handover of the National Stadium and the Jalle Siyad Military Academy in Mogadishu from AMISOM/ATMIS to Somali authorities in 2020, and limited military operations carried out in Lower and Middle Shabelle, through Operation BADBADOO. Liberated territories in Lower and Middle Shabelle have often fallen back in the hands of AS due to the FGS’s inability to “hold” the territory and “build” through follow on stabilisation activities. Delivery on objectives, such as further force generation and integration, planning for the clearance of the Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR and the convening of the Security and Justice Committee, a FGS-led body supposed to guide the STP implementation process in coordination with the FMS, remained on hold during 2021-2022.
35. Following a strong push by the donors, the AU and the FGS finally reached an agreement on the reconfigured ATMIS that should enable a phased transfer of security responsibilities to the SSF and security institutions, in line with the revised STP. The UNSC endorsed the mandate of ATMIS, replacing AMISOM as of 1 April 2022. Core objectives of ATMIS’ mandate are to conduct jointly planned and targeted operations with SSF to degrade AS, support SSF by holding populations centres and deliver security, support the capacity development of SSF with priority given to force generation, operational competencies and logistical support capabilities. The ATMIS mandate emphasizes mobility and agility as its core military principles, but, as long as the ATMIS Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) do not generate the desired enablers and force multipliers, it is estimated that there is little difference from the previous mission, even if small adjustments were made, including an increased C2 authority under ATMIS’ force commander. ATMIS should reduce the number of its troops and capabilities during four phases, while the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) and the Somali Police Forces (SPF) should gradually take over security responsibilities.

36. Core challenge for SNAF and SPF is to generate their own capable forces, as well as ensure proper management and control of current forces (command & control remains a critical challenge), so that a transition can be conducted without negative implications on the security situation. To achieve this, political agreement between the FGS and the FMS on implementation of the NSA remains critical. It can already be anticipated that the Phase 1 of the security transition from ATMIS to the SNAF security responsibilities, expected to be completed by the end of December 2022, will be delayed, as the required capacities and capabilities, both for ATMIS and the SNAF, will not be all available by that time. A draw down of ATMIS troops combined with a push for more mobile ATMIS posture, will lead to closure of Forward Operating Basis (FOBs), which the SNAF cannot take over. It will be however important that the FGS - AU relations remain stable and based on a certain level of trust. Even if the completion of Phase 1 is delayed, the FGS appears to be committed to implement a conditions-based strategy that paves the way for the SSF to progressively take over security responsibilities from ATMIS by the end of 2024.

**b) Assessment of the Somali Defence sector**

37. Fundamental progress in Somalia's security sector reform largely depends on the political settlement between the FGS and FMS. Finalisation of the Constitutional Review Process, which also entails agreements on power and resource distribution, would generate trust amongst political actors and pave the way for the full implementation of the NSA, as agreed by the FGS and the FMS in 2017. As per the NSA, the SNAF should consist of 18,000 soldiers excluding the Danab Special Forces, Navy and Air Force. The land based SNAF should be distributed across existing sectors, based on military and geographic needs. According to the latest reported estimates, the SNAF stand at around 23,000, but the capacities and capabilities, as well as C2 arrangement for large portion of the force remain rather unknown and/or not respected. Rightsizing of the SNAF also remains to be achieved pending the implementation of the Pensions and Gratuity Bill whose status has been on hold for more than two years, as well as development of adequate human resources management systems.

38. Development of Air Force and Navy are in an embryotic state. The SNAF mainly consists of light infantry units with limited combat power and mobility. Following the EU funded support, it is expected that the SNAF units will demonstrate some initial capabilities to

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implement enabling functions, such as combat engineering, logistics and communications. However, the SNAF's ability to operate independently is still embryonic.

39. The main structural challenge for the SNAF to act as a capable force is its inability to exercise an effective command and control. Far from having a clear structured organization, it is assessed that clan affiliation still prevails as a fundamental norm. Deployment of the SNAF units is often centrally directed by the Chief of the Defence Forces (CDF) via a messaging platform (WhatsApp), while the role of the Land Force Commander and the Sector Commanders is often unclear. The control of the SNAF units once deployed to the FMS remains unclear.
40. The SNAF's ability to operate in joint and/or combined operations with ATMIS is limited due to the lack of coordination and a limited degree of mutual trust between ATMIS and the SNAF, despite several UNSCRs requesting establishment of joint bases in FMS, joint planning and operations. The SNAF remain dependent on international equipment donations and is not able to ensure its sustainable maintenance nor logistics. The SNAF have no availability of air power and integrated ISR platforms. Most critical enabling functions, such as logistics (transport & maintenance), medical care and combat engineering (Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)) are not yet fully available to support military operations and transition ("clear"-“hold”-“build” concept). Currently the SNAF are not able to comply with operational demands for agility and rapid mobility, essential prerequisites of ATMIS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) due to lack of appropriate means, such as aerial assets and Quick Reaction Forces.
41. The Danab Special Forces are the advanced infantry battalions, comprising up to 1,500 troops. It is trained, equipped and mentored by the US and kept largely separate from the rest of the SNAF. The Danab are considered as the only multi-clan and meritocratic units, capable of conducting sustained offensive operations against AS, including to a large extent on their own. Reportedly the end state is to train 3,000 Special Danab Forces, but the exit strategy for the mission has yet to be defined. Another available force in the “clear” phase of the transition operations is the Gorgor brigades - Somali commando Force trained by Turkish military assistance, both in Somalia and in Turkey. Reportedly up to 5,000 Gorgor troops have been trained so far. Some of the Gorgor Forces have been deployed to politically motivated operations by the previous FGS administration instead of fighting AS. In their support to

these Forces, Turkey and US focus on immediate results and engage in a comprehensive process of selection, recruitment, providing equipment (including lethal) and vehicles, salaries and maintenance, in conjunction with training. The US model also incorporates a high level of mentoring as part of their training doctrine for the Danab Special Forces, whereas Turkey considers mentoring contradictory to the values of the South-South cooperation. Additionally, the Turkish model includes the educational pillar combined with training in Turkey, which is likely to leave a deeper footprint in the long run. There are also around 5,000 Somali troops recently trained in Eritrea, which could be an important asset in force generation, if integrated, vetted, equipped and used properly, which is not a given. Finding resources for equipping and deploying these troops remains a challenge for the FGS, which is expecting support from non-traditional donors.

42. In conjunction with the Defence Forces, Somalia has established a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Control over NISA is frequently disputed between the President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Internal Security, especially when it concerns the appointment of its Director and commanding officers. The NISA is closely intertwined with the SNAF and regularly cooperates with them in combined security operations. NISA operations focus on counter terrorism (CT). NISA officers are trained by the US in support of CT actions against AS. The role and position of NISA in Somali society is criticized due to alleged misbehaviour of officers during security operations (e.g. harassment of women, clan-related protection and targeted assassinations).

**c) Assessment of the Somali Police Forces**

43. Development of the SPF, similarly as the overall security sector reform, has registered only limited results during the past years due to the ongoing political challenges. The SPF has aimed and relatively succeeded in keeping a certain level of neutrality during the electoral turmoil. Fractures along the clan lines have been less evident than with the SNAF. The SPF was also part of the task force with ATMIS to ensure the provision of security during the electoral process. However, the Parliament's security during the presidential elections has been an exclusive responsibility of ATMIS, with only limited collaboration with the SPF.
44. The Federal Police remains weak in its ability to establish and project clear political guidance, ensure effective command and control, and coordinate actions with the FMS while the State police forces are still at an embryonic stage. The SPF remains highly dependent on



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international partners' support and cannot sustain its force generation or the operations. Low capacities, absence of a unified C2 structures continues to hamper the effectiveness of the SPF and thus its service delivery to the population. The Force remains overly centralised with the Federal Police Commissioner holding the decision authority.

45. The SPF shall, as agreed in the NSA, grow to a number of 32,000. The distribution of police between federal and State level, as well as the question of how many of these should be robust police, the so-called Darwish Forces, is yet to be determined. As per the latest estimates, at the federal level the Banadir Police (SPF) strength stands at around 9,000 with additional 1,200 Turkish-trained Haramcad forces, 370 in the Federal Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and 250 in the Traffic Department. The FMS (namely Puntland, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Galmadug and South West State) State Police Forces stand at around 4,260 but with significant variations in numbers and capacities between the five FMS.
46. The Darwish Force is a special police force that can be used in situations where more robust policing is needed. The New Policing Model (NPM) has set out the duties of the federal and State Darwish police forces, which include, among others, protecting the national borders, fighting terrorism and tackling armed insurgency in their respective territories. The previous FGS administration has been rejecting the NPM as part of its broader posture towards a federal security architecture. In response to the pressing force generation needs for the implementation of the STP, the SPF has developed the Darwish Concept, endorsed by the Somali Police Commissioner in October 2019. The organizational and structural aspects as well as overall status are currently subject of discussion between the FGS and the FMS and need to be clarified.
47. Currently the strength of Federal Darwish Force stands at 800. Part of that force has been deployed to security operations in Lower Shabbelle, jointly with the SNAF. There is only limited information available on the performance of these Darwish Forces once deployed to the field, as well as on the level of their coordination and inter-operability with the SNAF. The overall force generation and deployment of the Federal Darwish has been challenging so far, including the provision of weapons for the force.
48. The FGS MoIS has the oversight responsibility especially in terms of strategy development, budget planning and introduction of the concept to the coordination mechanisms dealing with police reform and establishment in Somalia.

49. The Joint Police Programme (JPP), a multi-donor coordination mechanism, mainly funded by the EU and several bilateral donors (DE and UK) is considered as a successful attempt to systemize and better coordinate international donor support to the SPF. The JPP aims to support to the implementation of the New Policing Model. The current phase of the JPP has been extended until the end of 2023, in order to allow for the completion of infrastructure works (police stations, a training academy, CID) and the delivery of further equipment. In parallel, the next phase of the JPP is being prepared and with the planned start in the first half of 2023. The key challenge for the JPP has been to reduce the payment of stipends for the increasing number of FMS police officers. It is expected that the new FGS will aim to strengthen the fiscal sustainability and that the FMS will be able to plan for taking over stipends' payments to state police forces in the medium to long term.
50. There has been some further progress in developing the Federal Police functions, such as international relations with the INTERPOL. The INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) in Mogadishu has reached its initial operational capability and is now in the process of certification by INTERPOL (it has currently fulfilled 11 out of 19 INTERPOL quality standards). The INTERPOL NCB has also reformed its structures and increased its cooperation with the most relevant national law enforcement agencies, such as the Somali Immigration and Naturalisation Directorate. With the international partner support, notably the EU's Programme for the Maritime Security in the Red Sea and the US State Department Programme GEMINI, Somalia's seaports of Bossaso and Mogadishu will be linked to the INTERPOL information sharing system (I/24/7).

**d) Assessment of Somali maritime security posture and architecture**

51. During the past two years, the FGS have not demonstrated resolute commitment to act on maritime security issues, resulting in the pending political decision on the model of a Federal Coast Guard, lack of engagement by the FGS with the UN and other international partners, including EUCAP Somalia, to conduct an assessment of the Somali Navy and Coast Guard (SNCG) capabilities, as well as the development of maritime law enforcement capabilities at the FMS level. Internal politics linked to the overly delayed electoral process, as well as disagreements over the maritime resource sharing have further exacerbated the complexity of decision-making both within the FGS and involving the FMS.

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52. As part of its broader posture to demonstrate autonomy and opposition to any perceived interference in Somalia's internal affairs, the previous FGS rejected any further renewal of the UNSC Resolution 2608 (2021) on anti-piracy. In the UNSC negotiations, the FGS stated, contrary to the assessment of the latest UNSG Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery off the coast of Somalia, that "piracy has been largely suppressed and the Resolution has successfully achieved its intended objective after nearly 15 years, and that Somalia was ready to fully take over responsibility of its maritime security". Even if such FGS statements demonstrated its willingness to take over maritime security responsibilities, questions however remain over Somalia's ability, especially given the state of the Somali maritime law enforcement capacity and capability, as well as weak legal framework.
53. The election of the President HSM, who indicated maritime security among his numerous priorities could change this dynamic. In his letter of August 2022 to the EU High Representative, the Somali President HSM has indicated a wish to strengthen cooperation with the EU on matters regarding maritime security, including capacity development of maritime capabilities. Somalia seeks advanced and renewed assistance from key partners, in particular the EU, in addressing Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, illicit arms smuggling and illicit charcoal trade and the possible dumping of toxic waste. Any executive role of Operation ATALANTA in the domains requested by the FGS remain problematic due to the absence of an appropriate legal framework. The letter does not provide sufficient legal grounds for Operation ATALANTA's return to fight piracy and protect the WFP deliveries in Somalia's territorial sea.
54. Revenue generation from granting fishing licenses is likely to be one of the first areas of interest for the new FGS. Countering IUU fishing represents a major challenge for the FGS. An overarching national policy and seagoing enforcement mechanisms have to be put in place in order to sustainably manage the fisheries sector. The Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation has set up a Somali Maritime Administration in October 2019, which has now reached initial operational capability, and is moving to ratify the important international conventions. The establishment of Maritime Crime Unit within the Federal Office of Attorney General is meant to strengthen the criminal justice chain in the maritime domain.
55. The FGS remains yet unable to exercise control of its territorial sea and EEZ in order to address immediate maritime threats, despite a decade of international support to the maritime

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security sector in Somalia. The maritime capability is limited to eight boats, out of which four are reportedly non-operational, in the possession of the SNCG. To date, only limited progress has been achieved in developing maritime capacities in Somalia, mainly with regard to localised maritime police units (MPUs).

56. In Mogadishu, the MPU, renamed as the Somali Police Force Department of Coast Guard, exercises some basic command and control capacity, is able to perform basic Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations, secure and transport crime evidence, seize cargo and detain people. With the EU-funded and EUCAP Somalia facilitated project, finalised in March 2022, which included the infrastructure upgrade for the MPU Headquarters in Mogadishu Port, as well as provision of a floating jetty and training, the working conditions for the MPU has improved and should enable further development of the operational skills. Nevertheless, the boats that was procured under this project were not fit for purpose. The operational coordination between the SPF MPU and the Bossasso Port MPU has registered some limited improvements, as registered during the Force Integration Training for the Cutlass Express Exercise in 2021 and 2022.
57. In Puntland, the PMPF remains the most capable maritime force, however its status within the Puntland's security architecture is still unclear. Political sensitiveness due to the governance framework of the PMPF and its links to the UAE need to be as well addressed. It could be also important to understand the ambition of the UAE to support the improved transparency and accountability of the PMPF, which could be a benchmark for any potential EU cooperation with this maritime force, and present an opportunity for cooperation with a non-traditional donor. In addition, Bossasso Port MPU has only rudimentary maritime capacities.
58. The Somaliland Coast Guard development has seen the most visible improvements. The SLCG is now able to conduct the Search and Rescue (SAR), patrolling and direct operational tasks combating illegal activities at sea, such as against human smuggling and fisheries enforcement. The SLCG has improved its organisational structures and delivery of coast guard functions at all SLCG stations. The SLCG is now able to further strengthen its operational skills. However, maintenance of the SLCG base and equipment requires further international donations. The EU in 2021 donated equipment worth EUR half million to the SLCG to complement EUCAP Somalia's efforts.

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59. The education level among the recruits of the civilian maritime law enforcement entities across Somalia remains basic. Capacity building support and the provision of technical assistance and equipment remain necessary for their further autonomy to take over more security responsibilities in that important area.

**V. MISSION ASSESSMENT AND MANDATE EVALUATION OF OPERATION ATALANTA**

**a) End state, transition and exit strategy**

60. The desired end-state is the eradication of piracy to a level where the Pirate Active Groups no longer have the capability or the intent to conduct piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and the international deterrence posture is no longer needed to ensure the freedom of navigation across Bab el-Mandeb, from the West Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal. Additionally, the illicit activities at sea do not threaten the stability of the coastal states of the West Indian Ocean, which are part of a regional maritime security architecture.
61. Conditions for a successful transition for Operation ATALANTA would require the development of a Somali maritime law enforcement capability, able to ensure the control of its vast coastline, suppress the potential activities of the PAGs and cooperate with the regional coastal states in addressing illicit activities at sea. In addition, a regional maritime security architecture would be able to address issues related to maritime security and freedom of navigation.
62. To date, desired end-state is unlikely to be achieved in the short term.

**b) Assessment of the Operation's overall impact**

63. Operation ATALANTA continued to demonstrate the EU's ability to enforce a rules-based order in the Western Indian Ocean. It is also a pragmatic and direct opportunity to showcase, in line with the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan, the EU's engagement in addressing maritime security challenges in the region.
64. Operation ATALANTA succeeded in its task to deter piracy and to protect the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable shipping. Incidents, such as that of MV ANATOLIAN in August 2021 and FV ALMAHADI in March 2022, which although per definition due to ambiguities are not classified as Pirate Attacks, are a reminder that the presence of Operation ATALANTA remains necessary until the FGS is able to assume its own responsibilities in this domain.
65. The Operation also succeeded in its secondary executive task to fight against narcotic drugs trafficking, following the activation of the task by PSC in February 2022. The negotiations

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with the Seychelles of an agreement to facilitate transfers by EU Member States is at its final stage.

66. The relationship with the Maritime Industry (MI) at the strategic level remains fundamental and critical in gaining and maintaining its confidence and high commitment in the BMP. The implications of the announced suppression of the High Risk Area (HRA) by the Shipping Industry as of the 1st of January 2023, should be carefully monitored to detect any dramatic drop in BMP compliance (ship protection measures and MSHOA registrations) and to detect any decline in the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP), which is widely recognized to have played an important role, together with BMP and international navies, in the suppression of piracy in the Horn of Africa.
67. To note that Operation ATALANTA has not yet been able to act within the full remit of its mandate, as one of the executive tasks of fighting arms trafficking in support of the UN arms embargo on Somalia has not yet been activated. To achieve that, a FGS notification to the UN Secretary-General is needed and it has been pending for almost two years. This possibility seems more and more compromised in view of the recent declarations of the President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud indicating that Somalia will ask to lift UN arms embargo.

### **c) Review of Operation progress**

68. Elements of success of Operation ATALANTA:
  - the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) is critical to establish and maintain the strategic link with the MI and a comprehensive operational picture;
  - new agreements, essential to achieve a legal finish for the secondary tasks, are negotiated between the EU and third states (finalised and soon to be signed with the Seychelles) to facilitate the transfer by EU Member States of suspected drug/weapons smugglers. Bilateral agreements with the Seychelles and/or other third states will also have to be concluded by the EU Member States (Troop Contributing Nations) deploying assets to Operation ATALANTA;
  - close coordination with other counter-piracy forces, notably CMF and Independent Deployers;
  - the SHared Awareness and DEconfliction (SHADE) mechanism;

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– the Voluntary Registration Area (VRA) mechanism.

69. The Cooperation Concept for Operation ATALANTA (COCOA) plays a significant role in complementing the assets and, as demonstrated by the operations against narcotic drugs trafficking in March-May 2022, these assets can have an impact on the operational performance.

### *Executive tasks*

70. **Protection of the WFP and other vulnerable shipping** remains central in Operation ATALANTA objectives. WFP's operational footprint in the Horn of Africa is still growing significantly and could be expected to increase further due to ongoing humanitarian emergencies. As long as a legal framework for Operation ATALANTA to access Somali territorial sea is absent, the Operation's ability to offer protection to the WFP shipping is only possible on the high seas. Operation ATALANTA is reaching out to Independent Deployers to outsource WFP protection duties whilst securing its role as a primary point of contact for the WFP. Growing tensions in the wider region increases the uncertainty of the continued availability of EUNAVFOR partner assets for this task.

71. **Deter, Prevent and Repress Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea** can be qualified as a success in itself, as no piracy attack has been reported since 2019. Operation ATALANTA was also engaged in preventive measures. Operation ATALANTA continued to pursue its counter-piracy mandate, although outside the Somali territorial sea since 3 March 2022, contributing to the free flow of commerce throughout the Area of Operations and protecting the WFP and other vulnerable vessels in the high seas, whilst reassuring merchant shipping. This is performed against the backdrop of an absence of any capable Somali maritime law enforcement infrastructure leaving a vacuum of insecurity along almost all coastal domains of Somalia and the regional States.

72. Due to the absence of notification from the Somali authorities to the Secretary General of the United Nations of the European Union's intent to **contribute to implementing the arms embargo** in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014), no progress has been reported.

73. **Countering trafficking of narcotic drugs:** following the activation of task by PSC on 3 February 2022, Operation ATALANTA conducted several successful operations against



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narcotic drugs trafficking by exploiting French assets in direct support to the Operation under the “catch and release” modality, seizing up to 12 tons of narcotic drugs destined to countries on the Western Indian Ocean coast. The estimated economic impact of these actions is more than EUR 200 million and this money will not feed the criminal and terrorist networks in the region.

### *Non-executive tasks*

74. **Monitoring of fishing activities:** Operation ATALANTA contributes to the monitoring – within its means and capabilities – of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia by using seagoing assets, as well as Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA). All the evidence of fishing vessels suspicious of performing IUU Fishing collected by Operation ATALANTA are shared on a monthly basis and presented in quarterly reports to the DG MARE, which subsequently shares them with the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).
75. **Support to other EU actors:** As long as Operation ATALANTA was able to access Somalia’s territorial sea, it provided direct support to EUCAP Somalia in Mogadishu, Berbera and Bossaso ports, facilitated by Operation ATALANTA’s liaison officer. Operation ATALANTA contributes to the implementation of relevant EU programmes, in particular the Regional Maritime Security programme (MASE), Red Sea Programme and CRIMARIO through logistical support, provision of expertise or training at sea, upon their request and within the means and capabilities. More generally, Operation ATALANTA is supporting all the relevant EU programmes related to maritime security. In this context, the AOO of Operation ATALANTA does not include all the Red Sea. Given the ongoing discussions in the context of the Red Sea Programme, as well as the interest expressed by Egypt for developing a cooperation with the EU, an extension of the AOO of ATALANTA in all the Red Sea would be relevant.
76. **Special link with Operation AGENOR.** This link, set as a non-executive task, has been established on a step by step approach to exchange information, optimize the use of the assets and conduct activities when possible. Beyond the AGENOR – ATALANTA link, the implementation of the CMP in the North Western Indian Ocean should be taken into account. In this context, the link would go beyond the operational level to the diplomatic level, notably with synergies expected to be implemented between the EU Senior Coordinator for maritime security in the NWIO (CMP) and the Senior Civil Representative of EMASOH.

**d) Gap and needs analysis, and challenges for Operation ATALANTA**

77. Enhancing the EU's diplomatic influence: Operation ATALANTA could develop its status further and be perceived as a corner stone of the EU Indian Ocean approach for all international initiatives and a platform of cooperation both in the Red Sea and in the Western Indian Ocean.
78. The Operation will gain enough flexibility to address all types of challenges (extended INFOPS in Somalia, counter disinformation, extension of cooperation, and optimisation of port calls of the assets used in the Operation).
79. To enhance the EU's role as a maritime security provider and preserve the freedom of navigation in the region, an executive task of the Operation ATALANTA should remain counter-piracy. Following the expiration of the UNSCR 2608 (2021) as of March 2022, this task is limited to the high seas on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Operation ATALANTA could resume its operations in Somalia's territorial sea, in order to prevent, deter and repress piracy and armed robbery, and to protect the WFP deliveries and other vulnerable shipping, provided there is an appropriate legal framework to do so.
80. The "Legal finish" is the weakest element of success of the Operation. The Seychelles is a key partner for the EU by hosting the "Legal Finish" for Operation ATALANTA regarding piracy. A similar transfer agreement exists with Mauritius. This scheme could serve as an example in the wider region (Djibouti, Mauritius, Madagascar, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania) in order to build, in the medium term, a specific regional agreement under the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The EU could support discussions among regional states on such potential regional agreement, raising its profile as a security actor in the region. A positive outcome of the negotiation with Seychelles would constitute a good example of cooperation for regional states.
81. The EU could play a bigger role in the development of the regional maritime security architecture, as it has a unique position to develop a reliable link between the two regions of the South-Western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. There is an opportunity to further develop synergies between the two regions in order to build relevant regional maritime awareness continuity. The Red Sea Programme, IGAD and the Red Sea Council offer opportunities for this engagement, potentially through the EUSR HoA.

82. At a strategic level, the step towards a regional maritime architecture in the Western Indian Ocean would be a first step towards a global maritime security approach in the Indian Ocean, with links to be made with the EU ongoing actions in the Eastern Indian Ocean. In this scenario, the Seychelles is a key EU partner, as well as Djibouti.
83. INTERPOL remains a key partner for the EU in the area. An amendment to the mandate in December 2018 allowed Operation ATALANTA to share additional information with INTERPOL and EUROPOL, including personal data gathered on illegal activities other than piracy during the course of its counter-piracy operations. The exchange of non-personal data on suspected illegal fishing is possible towards INTERPOL. The INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Mogadishu, supported by EUCAP Somalia, could be used as a leverage to enhance the links with the FGS.
84. There is a widely held belief within the coastal communities of Somalia that Operation ATALANTA is not contributing to the monitoring of fishing activity, but actually protecting IUU fishing activity. This is one of the areas of strategic communication Operation ATALANTA has been seeking to counter and will need to keep addressing with support of all relevant EU actors, who in general would benefit from more joint communication and quicker counter narratives. Operation ATALANTA currently has CJSOR tailored to be the very minimum to cope with the tasks it has been given. The constant lack of air assets is affecting the Operation's ability to fully execute its mandate. This has especially affected the capability to collect intelligence in support of many intelligence driven operations. Furthermore, the inability to access Somalia's territorial sea and associated airspace has made it more difficult for the Operation to conduct some of its monitoring tasks.

## **VI. MISSION ASSESSMENT AND MANDATE EVALUATION OF EUCAP SOMALIA**

### **a) End state, transition and exit strategy**

85. The end-state is the development of capable maritime law enforcement entities, notably the national Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, able to deliver the coast guard and policing functions at federal and FMS levels and the establishment of a criminal justice chain, thus creating the necessary conditions for the sustainable governance of the maritime sector. The end state also entails the SPF, notably the Darwish Force, being able to contribute to the Somali owned and led security, following the drawdown/ exit of ATMIS on the basis of the

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STP. INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu has reached its IOC and is linked with the Immigration, Criminal Investigation and Explosive Ordnance Departments.

86. The long term transition strategy is the build-up of maritime law enforcement capacity and capabilities, notably the national Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, capable of delivering the coast guard and police functions at federal and FMS levels. This also involves the establishment of capable institutions to develop policies and ensure necessary horizontal coordination to govern the maritime sector, as well as criminal justice chain, in order to reap the benefits of Somalia's vast and largely untapped marine resources and the development of the Blue Economy. On police, the Darwish concept should be further developed and implemented in support of the STP. Additionally, INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu should reach IOC and be linked with the Immigration, Criminal Investigation and Explosive Ordnance Departments.
87. To date, desired end-state is unlikely to be achieved in the short term.

**b) Assessment of the Mission's overall impact**

88. EUCAP Somalia has progressed gradually in line with its mission objectives. The Mission continued to support the build-up of Somali maritime law enforcement capacities and capabilities at federal and regional levels in Somaliland, and to a much lesser intensity in Puntland, as well as to support the development of the SPF Federal Darwish Concept and strengthening the interoperability between the Somali Security Forces for the implementation of the STP. As part of its overall efforts, the Mission aimed to ensure that SPF reform is anchored in a broader Rule of Law perspective. The Mission has also devoted due attention to strengthen the criminal justice chain, notably in the maritime domain. Security sector reform dynamics and priorities have differed at federal level and in Somaliland and Puntland, necessitating the Mission to adapt, sequence and tailor its engagements.
89. The turbulent political environment has been one of the main factors impeding mandate implementation, in particular as it relates to the provision of strategic advice, support to the establishment of horizontal policy decision-making, as well as policy coordination mechanism across different line ministries of the FGS and involving the FMS. The COVID-19 pandemic also had an impact on the Mission's operational activities. Restrictions imposed in response to the pandemic delayed the opening of a presence in Berbera, Somaliland, where activities of the Specialised Team were also interrupted and renewed only in the beginning of 2022;

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pandemic-related restrictions also required the relocation of Mission members from the Field Office Garowe.

90. Notwithstanding these constraints, EUCAP Somalia has been able to progress in the implementation of its mandate with some noteworthy achievements, which now remain to be further consolidated. Some significant examples of the Mission's achievements are as follows:
- with EUCAP Somalia support the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Mogadishu has reached its initial operational capability and a reasonable level of sustainability;
  - strengthened capabilities of the Somaliland Coast Guard (SLCG), which are now able to move into a higher level of capacity building. The SLCG could be expected to reach its full operational capability in next 24 months;
  - a Maritime Crime Unit has been established within the Office of Attorney General, which will be important in fostering the police-prosecution cooperation;
  - the Mission's advice to the SPF has tangibly advanced their capacities regarding the Federal Darwish force generation.
91. Experience has shown that a certain level of flexibility of the mandate is required so that the Mission could sequence and adapt its engagement, pending the reform dynamics and priorities at federal and regional levels. National ownership remains essential for any tangible impact and sustainable effect. The Mission's advisory and mentoring activity achieves more traction when coupled with the provision of equipment and means, as well as support to the Somali infrastructure needs. Embedding Mission's advisor(s) within the Somali security structures (e.g. advisor in the HQ of the SLCG in Berbera port), security conditions permitting, and ensuring a regular interaction and follow up with the Somali counterparts has been of significant value, as it not only helps to build stronger partnerships, but also to identify the needs and gaps to be addressed in the future.
92. EUCAP Somalia has increasingly focused to integrate human rights and gender aspects into its capacity building activities. At federal level, the Mission, jointly with UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), continued to support the Women in Maritime Sector (WiMS) initiative. The main achievement in this area was the start of a dialogue between the Federal ministries and representatives from respective Federal Member States (FMS) in order to ensure implementation of the WiMS National Action Plan at federal and regional levels. In

the police sector, the Mission continued its support to the SPF, in particular in relation to providing Human Rights Due Diligence training to the Federal Darwish. In Somaliland, the Mission has established connection with the Somaliland National Human Rights Commission to identify options on how the Mission could contribute to the Human Rights Training for Somaliland's law enforcement agencies. In Puntland, the Mission supported local authorities in addressing the Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) and has continued discussions relating to the support to the Office of the Puntland Human Rights Defender (OPHRD) capacity to investigate cases of potential human rights violations in the maritime environment.

93. External perceptions of the Mission are mixed, and there is a need for a targeted and better articulated communication to the local authorities and international partners about EUCAP Somalia's mission and its precise mandate. The Mission has been actively communicating on its activities, including on social media platforms. The Mission's external perception among the relevant segments of the Somali population is influenced by their interest in the maritime security, police and the rule of law, which are often not among the first priorities, thus gathering moderate levels visibility and reaction. A more integrated approach to communication under the EU umbrella should help to increase overall visibility for CSDP actions.
94. The situation with regard to staffing in EUCAP Somalia has gradually improved. However it remains difficult for the Mission to attract the Maritime and Coast Guard Advisers. The deployment of the Specialised Teams have partially addressed this Mission's lack of capacity in this area.

**c) Review of the Mission's progress and impact across the Lines of Operation**

*Line of Operation (LO) 1 – Support the Development of Maritime Security Capacities within the Somali Law Enforcement System.*

95. The Mission's engagement at the strategic level with the Somali interlocutors has been rather challenging. Discussions, however, could proceed at a more technical level. The Mission has not been able to generate the sufficient impact in supporting the definition and implementation of the maritime security strategies, policies and legal frameworks. Nevertheless, the Mission has continued to support the accession of prioritised international maritime conventions into the legal framework at federal level in Somalia, by advising the Somali Maritime Administration (SMA) Legal Office.

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96. The Mission has further supported the Somali maritime law enforcement agencies and institutions in definition of maritime responsibilities and competencies, including enhancing legal capacities and civilian oversight mechanisms. At Federal level, the Mission has been developing a coast guard functions matrix in order to enhance the understanding and the division of the responsibilities and functions among the relevant FGS actors. Furthermore, the Mission has been mapping the existing SNCG capabilities, together with the UNSOM and the Somali Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD and the SNCG together with the international partners have agreed to set up the Comprehensive Approach to Security 2A Somali Navy and Coast Guard Working Group (CAS 2A SNCG-WG). The first meeting of the SNCG-WG took place in May 2022. The Mission has also been supporting the Somali Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS) in conducting a mapping of the existing Maritime Police Units in Mogadishu and in all the FMS.
97. At Federal level, the Mission supported the operationalisation of the Somali Maritime Administration, which has now reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC), as well as the development of initial operational capacity of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), including the identification of the necessary areas for the operationalisation of the coast guard functions.
98. The Mission also supported the SPF MPU and the Bossaso Port MPU participation in two US-led Cutlass Express exercises in 2021 and 2022, focusing on the basics of VBSS procedures and on operational coordination. The Mission jointly with Operation ATALANTA facilitated the first seagoing SPF MPU exercise, focusing on basic boarding exercises.
99. In Somaliland, the Mission has embedded a Maritime advisor into the Somaliland Coast Guard (SLCG) on a bi-weekly basis. Such direct engagement has helped the Mission to both better understand the work and organisation of the SLCG, and has had a positive impact on the Mission's overall advising and mentoring activities. The Mission has supported the SLCG organisational structures and the development of operational procedures for the coast guard functions at all SLCG stations. The Mission has implemented regular trainings for the SLCG skill and operational development, such as seamanship, first aid, basic navigation awareness and SAR operations, among others, and provided a VBSS training facility (ship-in-a-box). As a result of this engagement and the provision of material support, the SLCG is now able to move into a more advanced level of capacity building.

100. In Puntland, the Mission's absence in Bosasso port hindered the possibility to increase the scope and quality of actions in the maritime security domain, notably in the development of the coast guard skills of the Bosasso Port MPU. The Mission has also been exploring ways of possible engagement with the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), one of the most capable maritime force across the Somali coast. A Special Report on possible cooperation of EUCAP Somalia with the PMPF was presented to EU Member States in June 2021, suggesting that the EU could benefit from the PMPF's knowledge of the Gulf of Aden dynamics. However, any possible engagement with the PMPF should be led by transparency. During 16 months of the current mandate, the Mission had been confronted with both operational and political difficulties to operate effectively in Puntland. The situation has improved since March 2022 when the President of Puntland finally granted the right for the Mission to access the PMPF. Following this agreement, EUCAP Somalia conducted a Fact Finding Mission from 31 May to 5 June. The mission found the Force to be well organized, possessing substantial operational capabilities and able to perform all its defined tasks. The PMPF displayed interests to cooperate with the EUCAP Somalia.
101. The Mission also aimed at supporting the establishment of maritime coordination mechanism albeit with limited achievements, primarily due to political context and continuous friction between the FGS and the FMS. In collaboration with UNSOM, the Mission has been aiming to further build the capacity of the National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC).

*Line of Operation (LO) 2 – Contribute to the Development of the Somali Police Force in the Framework of the Implementation of the Somali Transition Plan*

102. At Federal level, the Mission has assisted the SPF to reinforce and operationalise police functions, to develop suitable polices, concepts and legal frameworks. The level of achievements can be assessed as moderate, considering the political challenges with regard to the development and the implementation of the SPF Federal Darwish Concept. The Mission has continued to support the review of the Federal Darwish Concept, in partnership with UNPOL, in particular, in order to improve the definition of the HQ functions and to better include the State Darwish capacity for the implementation of the STP. The Mission has gained some traction in the development and organisation of the SPF Federal Darwish Pre-deployment training and has been supporting the SPF FD deployment (planning and conduct) to the security transition operations (up to 800).



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103. On the SPF institutional reform, the Mission has been supporting the establishment of the SPF Public Information Office. As in many other areas, due to delayed electoral process and shifting priorities by the SPF leadership, the SPF institutional reform process has slowed down considerably.
104. One of most tangible achievements in the Mission's policing activities has been the operationalisation of the SPF EOD. As a result, the SPF has become more proficient and able to conduct an EOD awareness training, including a series of sessions conducted for the SNAF and the Federal Darwish with the support from EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia. With the Mission's support, the SPF and the SNAF are exchanging relevant information on IED/C-IED matters, although not yet in a structured manner, as well as procuring the same type of C-IED equipment.
105. EUCAP Somalia has also continued to support the INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu, which is currently in the process of certification by INTERPOL. The INTERPOL NCB has also increased its cooperation with the most relevant national law enforcement agencies, and is in the process of signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Somali Immigration and Naturalisation Directorate. It will be a milestone for Somalia, as it will enable the INTERPOL screening services to be available at all border-crossing points in the country.
106. In Somaliland, the Mission has restarted cooperation and support to the Somaliland Police (SLP) which would pave the way for consolidation of the Mission's work in the police sector. Substantial progress has been achieved increasing the SLP and the SLCG training capacity through a series of Train the Trainers events, including on election security. The Somaliland authorities possess a reasonable level of capacity to plan and conduct the independent training of their own staff, which is considered a positive tangible achievement.
107. In Puntland, the Mission has consolidated its relation to the Puntland State Police (PSP), supported the development of the organisation and structure, and helped to develop the Information Management System of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Only some limited achievements have been recorded PSP capacity on investigative techniques and knowledge of forensic evidence methods. With the Mission's support, criminal justice chain actors have increased their awareness of investigating Sexual and GBV crimes.
108. Finally, through Mission advisory activities with the Federal Attorney General Office (AGO), a Maritime Crime Unit (MCU) has been created, representing a potential breakthrough in

enhancing the maritime criminal justice chain. The Mission has been advising the prosecutors working in the MCU on how to prosecute maritime crime cases. Initial steps towards interaction with the law enforcement agencies, including the SPF MPU have been established. With the support of the Mission, AGO has developed knowledge in the maritime domain, and has tested it in EUCAP Somalia organised Maritime Criminal Justice Chain Exercise (MACRILEX), which addressed maritime law enforcement situations and collaboration efforts among different entities during the investigations of maritime crimes and oils spills. MACRILEX aims to foster the inter-agency cooperation and to identify the needs and actions required to further improve the police-prosecutors collaboration. Through an oil spill scenario, MACRILEX has contributed to identifying the gaps and the steps to be taken to improve the situation.

**d) Gap and need analysis, and challenges for EUCAP Somalia**

109. Capacity building support in the maritime domain remains highly relevant for Somalia, as the country remains unable to exert full control neither over its large coastline, nor in the territorial sea or the EEZ, and holds only a basic/rudimentary maritime law enforcement capacity. Stability on land and at sea off the Somali coast remains to be closely interlinked and should be seen from a holistic perspective, as an operational continuum. Illicit activities at sea feed the criminal and terrorist networks that continue to pose the main security challenge for the State-building and security transition in Somalia. Furthermore, Blue Economy development could offer opportunities to generate the needed resources for the country's economic development in the medium to long term, and for the sustainment of its Security Forces. Possible toxic waste dumping is an issue for the FGS. The institutional and policy level coordination in the maritime domain across different federal entities and involving the FMS remains very weak, and does not allow for an effective and sustainable maritime domain governance.
110. The new President announced maritime security as part of his priorities, which would suggest that some pending political decisions for the development of maritime security capacities at federal level, notably the SNCG, could be expected in the near future though this would require considerable investment of international partners. Achievements in developing the maritime law enforcement capacity in Puntland and Somaliland need to be also further consolidated.

111. Capacity building support to Somali security forces and institutions remains relevant in order to support the gradual transition from ATMIS to Somali security responsibilities. Interoperability within the SSF need to be further strengthened, as well as the joint planning of the security transition operations. Further support is therefore needed for the Somali Police Force to be a capable enabler for the takeover of security responsibilities from ATMIS. In that regard, further Mission engagement is required in consolidating a Somali Police Darwish Concept, involving not only the Federal, but also the State level Darwish, clarifying their C2 structures, as well as the inter-operability with the SNAF in the HQ and regional HQs, foreseeing infrastructure and training, equipment and other necessary resources. The status of the State Darwish in the overall Somali National Security Architecture needs to be clarified as a first priority. The Joint Police Programme (JPP), funded by the EU together with Germany and the UK, could provide further support to Darwish Forces, including at State level, once their role and responsibilities in the security transition are clarified and agreed. The JPP has been extended for another year, until the end of 2023 and a second phase of the JPP is currently under preparation.
112. The FGS Ministry of Internal Security and the SPF lack adequate capacities, in terms of organisation, C3, human resources management, transportation and logistics, civilian oversight, to be effective and capable of ensuring the necessary provision of security to the local population.
113. Continued support is needed for the full operationalisation of the INTERPOL NCB so that it fulfils the INTERPOL quality standards, extends its scope and capacity, including to the FMS, and is able to provide the screening services across all the border-crossing points in the country.

## **VII. MISSION ASSESSMENT AND MANDATE EVALUATION OF EUTM SOMALIA**

### **a) End state, transition and exit strategy**

114. The desired end state consists of a self-sustainable and effective SNAF, operating within a sound legal framework and under civilian oversight, capable to maintain and ensure Somali owned and led security, following the drawdown and exit of ATMIS on the basis STP.
115. Conditions for a successful transition would require Somalia to be capable of maintaining defence capabilities which are both effective and accountable with a clearly defined role,

providing the necessary level of security to the local population, operating within a sound legal framework in accordance with IHL, international standards and complying with principals of the rule of law under civilian oversight.

116. To date, desired end-state is unlikely to be achieved in the short term.

**b) Assessment of the Mission's overall impact**

117. EUTM Somalia has made progress in several areas, despite the challenging security, political and COVID-19 situation in the country, and chronic staffing shortfalls within the Mission. The overall Mission's impact, however, remained limited primarily due to recurrent challenges to Somalia's state-building and security transition.

118. EUTM Somalia has sustained its three pillar approach, focusing on strategic advice to the MoD and the SNAF General Staff (SNAF GS), targeted training and mentoring. The Mission has refocused its training activities to the SNAF from basic (Light Infantry) training to enabling functions, such as the C-IED, medical support, and logistics/mobility, in order to better complement ongoing International Community's efforts.

119. The development of the Somali Owned Training System (SOTS) has been at the core of EUTM Somalia's focus and has benefited from the support of the three pillars. Even though there has been some improvements, the conditions for a transfer to SNAF have not yet been achieved. However the SNAF has made significant progress by autonomously organising training activities and improving the management of the MoD Training Branch, the General Staff J7 (training), and the tactical training unit at the General Dhagadaban Training Centre (GDTC).

120. Since its establishment, EUTM Somalia has provided training to over 8,528 Somali troops (officers, NCO's and soldiers) for basic military skills (infantry,) and specialised (enabling) capabilities (non-exhaustive), such as C3, leadership, code of conduct, C-IED, medical care, intelligence, combat engineering, military police and CIMIC. During the current mandate, 46 courses for 1,517 trainees were provided. In all trainings and workshop, also at MoD and SNAF GS levels, humanitarian and legal aspects were addressed (human rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Law of Conflict (ILOC), gender, children and armed conflict, among others).

121. The complex security situation and the recurrent staffing shortfalls have hampered the Mission's ability to extend the training activities beyond Mogadishu to the SNAF regional HQs. The Mission has faced difficulties in establishing a Knowledge Management Mechanism (KMM), as EUTM Somalia personnel in accordance with the security situation in the country, is not able to follow the trained SNAF personnel when deployed to the field. The vacancy situation in the Mission (45 % Special Staff, 55% Advisory Team, and 42% in the Training Team (all average %)) has hampered the effectiveness of EUTM Somalia. Even though the increase in Force Protection assets has facilitated a greater number of activities outside the AAIA, a decrease in the Training Team and, above all, very low coverage in the Advisory Team, as well as lack of Special Staff (Political, Gender, Human Rights, Legal and StratCom Advisors) have not allowed the Mission to fulfil the full breath of its mandated tasks.

**c) Review of the Mission's progress and impact across the three pillars**

122. The Mission has refocused its training activities on enabling functions and advisory activities to the MoD and SNAF GS. EUTM Somalia has aimed to ensure that its activities respond to the Somali needs and complements the international partners' efforts by coordination through the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Strand 2A framework, led by the US. Within this coordination framework, it is clear that EUTM Somalia is one of the main service providers with a long-term horizon, focusing on educating individuals in specific skills (leadership, staff courses, C2, code of conduct, among others) and training on specialised enabling functions as force-multipliers, such as C-IED, combat engineering, intelligence, logistics, military police or medical care.

***Strategic Advice***

123. Strategic advice was provided to the MoD and the SNAF GS for developing doctrine, drafting and implementing policies and a sufficient C2 structure (MoD Vision 2027, human resource management, finance, training, organisational aspects). The MoD is now structured according to the approved MoD Guide, equipped with an appropriate infrastructure (Villa Gashandiga) though not fully functional due to the lack of proper human resources and regular absence of personnel. The structure of the SNAF GS is consolidated and there is a continuing progress in the development of basic functions (planning, operations, communications and intelligence). There is an increase of staffing observed in the SNAF GS.

124. For the SNAF GS, focus was set on establishing and functioning of an Operations/Situation Room, required to command and control all deployed units and conduct joint/combined security operations with ATMIS. The improvements in this area have been rather moderate due to contextual and structural weaknesses in the Somali security sector. Essential in the SNAF GS structure (J1-J9) is the establishment, functioning and manning of the Operations/Situation room functionality, where all advised capabilities together should prove a functioning and effective planning, C2, execution and sustainment of the Somali-led operations against AS. This aspect includes also the development of the C2 functions at Regional HQ's and Joint Operation Centres (JOCs).

### ***Training***

125. Training is the area with the most tangible and visible results achieved so far, even though it has been hampered by the extensive delays in the delivery of the APF-funded non-lethal equipment (June-September 2022). It will be important to ensure that the delivery of the EU EPF non-lethal equipment donations to the SNAF and the EUTM Somalia training calendar are well synchronised, in order to better respond to the operational needs of the SNAF, and to enhance the activities and credibility of EUTM Somalia.

126. In combination with advising the MoD and the SNAF GS on personnel and training policies, responding to the SNAF training needs, mentoring the organisation of the GDTC and creating opportunities in personal development (trainers, teachers), EUTM Somalia is facilitating and preparing the handover of the SOTS to the SNAF.

127. The Mission's Training Team is continuously involved in drafting syllabi, preparation and conduct of (specialized) training activities for enabling functions. Courses for Military Police, C-IED, intelligence, medical care, CIMIC and maintenance were developed and provided. Within the current mandate period, more focus was aimed at educating individuals in specific skills, such as leadership, staff courses, C2, as well as the train-the-trainer and train-the-teachers courses. In addition, Somali Mobile Training Teams have been created to spread the drill capabilities out to the sectors.

128. EUTM Somalia's Training and Advisory Teams work in close synergy, in order to deliver all training manuals and necessary documentation to safeguard the training syllabus, policies and methodology, as well as with a view of keeping the developments in line with actual training needs. The Mission's Training Team remains ready to assess and respond to additional

training needs, if so required, following the delivery of the APF and EPF-funded equipment. The Mission has also supported several workshops on maintenance, human rights and good governance, organized by the EU Delegation in Somalia.

***Mentoring***

129. EUTM Somalia mentoring activities have been primarily focused on MoD and SNAF GS and have succeeded in consolidating the leadership of the training organizations (MoD/Training Branch, GS/J7) and its senior staff. The mentoring work on the SNAF tactical training unit at GDTC has been more impactful, improving the skills of the GDTC staff, establishing procedures that allow the organization and management of the training centre to be more autonomous. Mentoring of EU trained units and individuals deployed to the operations outside Mogadishu area has not been possible due to limited freedom of movement, the security situation and lack of SNAF transparency on the whereabouts of units. To support the mentoring task, and to close the training evaluation cycle, the design and implementation of a KMM was requested as an outcome of the last Strategic Review. EUTM Somalia has advised the MoD and SNAF GS to implement measures to get proper information on performance and whereabouts of EU trained units and individuals, but did not succeed in its realisation.

**d) Gap and need analysis, and challenges for EUTM Somalia**

130. The challenge for Somalia's security partners, including EUTM Somalia, will be on how to most effectively support the phased security transition. In concrete numbers, according to the STP and ATMIS CONOPS, the SSF is expected to generate capable 10 SSF Battalions (5 SNAF and 5 SPF) already by the end of Phase 1 (December 2022), and in total 30 Battalions, including C-IED teams and logistic support, by the end of Phase 4 (December 2024). This will be difficult to achieve. So far the international partners' efforts have been concentrated on the "clearing" forces with a relative success, which managed to achieve some objectives, but has yet failed to consolidate them due to the absence of capable "holding" forces. Moreover, the lack of "fire power" and enablers in both ATMIS and the SNAF, limits their ability to launch effective "clearing" operations against AS.

131. Continued EUTM Somalia engagement remains relevant to reach a sufficient and effective level of C2 of the SNAF, which persists as one of the weakest factors hampering the effectiveness of the security transition operations. There are a number of structural factors that remain difficult to overcome, notably the lack of well-educated and trained Somali

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commanding officers, the lack of trust between the officers and commanders with different clan background, or the lack of commitment by the Somali commanders. For many international partners, including EUTM Somalia, it remains difficult to gather credible information and situational awareness from the security transition operations in the regions.

132. Furthermore, the SNAF's capacity to autonomously plan, conduct and sustain the security transition operations, as well as ensure the level of coordination within the SSF and with international partners, remain limited and thus requires continuous external support. It should be noted that the APF and EPF support packages contribute to the strengthening of the Asset Management System for the EU-funded equipment, and could be an opportunity for the development of KMM.
133. Though there has been some moderate improvements to date, the MoD remains weak in exercising its ability to ensure the civilian oversight and proper coordination with the SNAF GS.
134. For the Mission support to have a more tangible impact, it is crucial to increase the local ownership. In that respect, to gather more leverage for the EUTM Somalia's engagement, it is paramount that the Mission's training activities are complemented by the provision of equipment, funded by the EPF, which arrives timely and in conjunction with EUTM Somalia's training calendar.
135. For reaching an IOC status for the SOTS, the main gaps remain the lack of capacity of professional and educated staff-officers in the SNAF GS Training Branch and the readiness of qualified trainers and teachers with a long-term position.
136. To safeguard EUTM Somalia's credibility and mandate delivery, as well as gain confidence of Somali key leaders, appropriate staffing of the Mission with a sufficient number of specialised staff, advisors and trainers remains a critical driver for success.

### **VIII. MAIN PARAMETERS FOR FUTURE CSDP ACTIONS**

**Applicable to all CSDP actions:**

137. **Consolidate the mandates and enhance the EU's role as a security partner/provider in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.** This parameter is crucial as the CSDP Missions and Operation need to build and consolidate their successes, with potentially reinforced local



ownership and determination to advance reforms in the security sector. Following the finalisation of the electoral process in Somalia and the formation of the new government there seems to be a momentum to reinvigorate the EU's CSDP actions in Somalia. The FGS has indicated a wish for a more comprehensive EU engagement and support, including on maritime security, to build the required capacity and capability for the takeover of security responsibilities. The EU should present its overall engagement in Somalia, linking the CSDP Missions and Operation, comprehensive support to the security and justice sectors, as well as to ATMIS, ensuring a strong EU profile as a security partner/provider in Somalia and the region. The mandates of **EUCAP** and **EUTM Somalia** should thus be based on continuity and consolidation of success, prioritising capacity and capability building support to the Somali Security Forces for the security transition. **Operation ATALANTA's** mandate has been largely extended in 2020. It appears necessary to further consolidate and give resilience to this extensive mandate.

138. **Support the STP implementation and the capability development of the Somali Security Forces.** With the launch of ATMIS and the agreement on an ambitious drawdown schedule of the AU presence in Somalia, the implementation of the STP and the upgrade of the Somali Security Forces' – SNAF and SPF, including Darwish – capabilities will be the number one priority for the coming years. It will be important to prioritise the development of an accepted, established and functioning C2 structures of the SSF.
139. **Support to maritime security.** Maritime security should also not be overlooked in the security transition, as illicit activities at sea fuel the instability on land while the Somali maritime law enforcement capacity and capability remain rudimentary. The EU has a strong self interest in ensuring freedom of navigation to Europe. The new FGS administration appears to be genuinely determined to build Somalia's own maritime law enforcement capacities in order to reap the benefits of developing a Blue Economy. It is therefore important that maritime security aspects are addressed in the implementation of the NSA and the STP. For that, pending decisions on the organisation of the maritime security architecture should be taken at the political level. **EUCAP Somalia's** maritime mandate thus remains of significant relevance. The Somali administration constantly demands a more intensive commitment by **Operation ATALANTA** to support fisheries enforcement and control, and sharing the collected monitoring information more directly with the FGS. It would thus be important that Operation ATALANTA supports within its means and capabilities EUCAP

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Somalia and EU-funded programmes, to provide **local capacity building support** to the SNCG and/or maritime police units, ensures more regular key leader engagement with the Somali authorities and supports the FGS in fisheries enforcement and control through sharing more directly the collected monitoring information with the FGS. A contributing role for **EUTM Somalia**, in support of capacity building of the SNCG could eventually be also considered.

140. **Local ownership and political leverage.** To maximize the local ownership and be able to respond to Host Nation requirements, a more regular exchange of information between the Missions and Operation with the local authorities at the political level, **facilitated and coordinated by the EU Delegation**, in full respect of their own chain of command and responsibilities, **is necessary**. The FGS has requested information on Missions' activities in Somalia to be shared on a regular basis with the Office of the President and the Office of the Prime Minister. For the Missions it would be an opportunity to assess the progress and agree on the immediate priorities, as well as raise the pending issues that require FGS political attention. Such a mechanism would not only be the basis for fostering the Somali ownership but also a forum for coordinating the EU's support, where the Somali needs and requests are confronted with the EU supporting offers and projects.
141. **Better coordination of EU actors.** The CSDP actions contribute to the capacity building of the SSF and institutions, in support of the STP implementation and the takeover of the security responsibilities from ATMIS, as well as strengthening of the regional maritime security architecture. Coordination between the CSDP Missions and Operation in Somalia and the HoA, and with the EU Delegation(s) and the EUSR for the HoA, as well as bilateral efforts of the EU Member States need to be further reinforced, as well as the wider overall coordination between the political, security and development instruments, including on mutually reinforcing strategic communication, and, where appropriate, communicating under the EU umbrella, to ensure coherence and complementarity between all the actions. The Missions, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia, would benefit from an enhanced political support of the EU Delegation in Somalia and could further expand their role as advisers to the EU Delegation in assessing the needs and defining proposals for the support to the SSF and institutions. Close coordination with the main international partners engaged in Somalia's security sector should also be pursued.

142. **Human Rights.** The EU CSDP Missions in Somalia should continue to mainstream the IHL, Human Rights Law (HRL), SGBV, Women, Peace and Security, and Children and Armed Conflict agendas in all of its training and advisory activities, including in cooperation with the EU Delegation and EU MS, who have been actively involved on these issues. The Missions should provide the sex-disaggregated data regarding the SSF they support. In addition to mainstreaming, Missions could also identify some targeted activities to increase compliance of Somali actors with IHL and HRL, and to prevent HRL, IHL, women’s and children’s rights abuses and violations. Considering the dire situation of children’s rights violations, the Missions could step up actions to support the UN in the implementation of the children and armed conflict agenda. The Missions should also take into account the relevant climate sensitivity and environmental aspects, in line with EU policies.
143. **Flexibility.** A certain level of flexibility and adaptability in the mandates are also required in order to adjust and sequence the approach, depending on the overall security sector reform dynamics and priorities. Furthermore, in the volatile political and security context, and given at times limited capacities within the CSDP Missions, it is suggested that some activities/tasks can be temporarily postponed or de-activated, and that the use of temporarily deployed teams is being further explored.

**IX. POSSIBLE FUTURE CSDP ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA AND THE HOA**

**a) For Operation ATALANTA**

144. **The EU strategic objectives for Operation ATALANTA should be further consolidated.** Operation ATALANTA should continue to ensure the freedom of navigation and maritime security across Bab el-Mandeb, from the West Indian Ocean, through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal, an area of critical strategic interest for the EU, particularly in the current geopolitical context, in order to protect the sea lines of communication and deter, prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery, protect vessels of WFP and other vulnerable shipping off shore HoA. Operation ATALANTA should also contribute to the build-up of regional maritime security architecture and the fight against illicit activities at sea, notably trafficking of weapons and narcotic drugs, and to the implementation of the EU’s Integrated Approach in Somalia and the HOA. To ensure the freedom of navigation and sustain the needed deterrence posture, as well as enhance the EU’s role as a maritime security provider, an important task of

the Operation ATALANTA should remain counter-piracy. The two other executive tasks of fighting narcotic drugs trafficking, as well as fighting arms trafficking in support of the UN arms embargo on Somalia, should be consolidated as a first step, to give resilience to the mandate of the Operation.

145. **The EU's central role in enabling maritime security awareness** in the region could be synergistically enhanced between the implementation of the CMP concept in the North West Indian Ocean (NWIO) and Operation ATALANTA, as well as with Operation AGENOR as relevant. Notably, the path of exchanges of information and synergies between ATALANTA and AGENOR should expand and accelerate, while the AGENOR exit strategy is being considered.
146. **An extension of the AOO of Operation ATALANTA** could be considered in order to develop coherence of operational continuity between the Mediterranean area and the Strait of Hormuz, especially in the Red Sea.
147. Operation ATALANTA could contribute to increasing the EU maritime situational awareness and to provide specific analysis in its Area of Intelligence Responsibility to EUTM Mozambique, in coordination with the EU-funded Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and in cooperation with potential Member States' maritime actions.
148. **The name of Operation ATALANTA** and its branding should be amended, as the mandate is no longer focused on the Somali coastline only.

**b) For EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia**

149. **The overall EU strategic objectives should be focused on support to the STP implementation.** The Missions should contribute to improving capacity and capability of the Somali security forces and institutions, namely the SNAF and SPF, including maritime law enforcement capacity, to build-up effective, accountable, acceptable and sustainable forces, able to take over security responsibilities from ATMIS.
150. **EUCAP Somalia**, which was initially established as an "exit strategy" for Operation ATALANTA and which embodies and complements the EU's Integrated Approach in the maritime security domain, should maintain the balance between maritime and police activities. The Mission should: i) support development of the coast guard functions (despite which entity

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will ultimately carry out those functions); ii) contribute to the build-up of maritime law enforcement capacity both at federal and regional levels, enabling Somali authorities to start controlling their territorial waters and EEZ through effective maritime governance and to enable conditions for sustainable development of the Blue Economy; EUCAP Somalia should be doing so through a phased approach: as a first step, consolidate achievements in Mogadishu, as well as in Somaliland, in order to reach full operational capability of the Somaliland Coast Guard and prepare for the transition before the end of next mandate, and assess realistically the possibilities of engaging with the maritime law enforcement entities in Puntland – Bossaso Port Maritime Police Unit and the PMPF. Should the conditions not be in place of this engagement within 6 months, suspension of activities of the Field office in Puntland should be considered. Subsequently, explore opportunities for possible engagement with the maritime law enforcement entities in other FMS; iii) support the Somali Federal Police, with particular focus on the INTERPOL NCB and the development of Darwish Concept at federal and state levels, including C3 arrangements and the interoperability of the SSS, in close coordination with EUTM Somalia and in complementarity of the support under the JPP. However, until the C2 structures and the Status of the State Darwish are clarified, EUCAP Somalia’s engagement should be limited to the Federal Darwish; iv) promote the rule of law and strengthen criminal justice, notably in the maritime domain.

151. It could be considered to **refocus the Mission’s presence** from the FMS capitals Hargeisa and Garowe to the ports of Berbera and Bossaso, in order to have a more regular and direct engagement with the maritime law enforcement entities.
152. EUCAP Somalia could further **expand its role as an adviser to the EU Delegation** in defining proposals for development cooperation support to the Somali internal security forces and institutions, in particular in the maritime domain, as well as enabler/facilitator in the implementation of the current programmes, notably the Regional Programme on Maritime Security in the Red Sea area and CRIMARIO II.
153. EUTM Somalia should: i) support through strategic advice the development of the MoD and the SNAF GS with the priority on the latter, in particular the C2 structures, civilian oversight and conduct of operations; ii) continue support to complete implementation of a SOTS and consider towards initiating a mentoring/monitoring trajectory with a view to ensure that the SOTS becomes self-sustainable under the SNAF responsibility iii) provide advice to the

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SNAF GS on the planning and conduct of joint operations with ATMIS in the framework of the CAS 2A; iv) support the SNAF force generation and build enabling functionalities: additional training for enabling functionalities (such as C-IED or logistics) and individual skills (such as leadership or staff courses) to support the Somali capability building to comply with the STP requirements. Train the trainers or train the teachers courses should also be continued as much as possible; v) within means and capabilities support the EU's Integrated Approach in Somalia, in particular advising on the identification and planning of the delivery of the equipment and assistance to the SNAF, funded by the EPF; be ready to provide in close cooperation with the SNAF and harmonized with the EPF delivery plan, refreshment training, as needed, to SNAF units.

154. **Knowledge Management Mechanism (KMM).** It is imperative to collect information on the level of performance, location and feedback from EU-trained units and individuals. Within the construct of the C2 structure, EUTM Somalia should promote the establishment of a Somali owned knowledge awareness flow in order to support an effective KMM. In addition, EUTM Somalia should consider supporting of a dedicated logistic unit, possibly in Mogadishu, following PSC authorisation, once the security conditions allow and matching resources are provided.

## **X. RECOMMENDATIONS**

155. **It is recommended to:**

- a. Extend the mandates of Operation ATALANTA, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia for another 2 years, until 31 December 2024 as part of the EU's Integrated Approach in Somalia and the Horn of Africa;
- b. Establish a regular information sharing mechanism with the Somali authorities at political level facilitated and coordinated by the EU Delegation;
- c. Continue seeking synergies and coordination between the Missions/Operation and with the EU Delegation, as well as coordination with the relevant international partners;
- d. Mainstream and integrate the Rule of Law, Human Rights, IHL, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and Children and Armed Conflict, as well as climate change into the activities of the CSDP Missions and Operation.

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156. For **Operation ATALANTA**, it is recommended to:

- a. Consolidate and adapt the mandate of the Operation, as part of the overall EU efforts as a global security provider, especially in the maritime domain, in line with the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan;
- b. Continue contributing to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy, and the protection of WFP deliveries and other vulnerable shipping on the basis of UNCLOS, outside Somalia's territorial waters. Resume operations in Somalia's territorial waters, as soon as an appropriate legal framework is granted;
- c. Stand ready to contribute to the implementation of the arms embargo and continue fighting against narcotic drugs trafficking;
- d. Increase the AOO of Operation ATALANTA to include all the Red Sea;
- e. Establish a mechanism of information sharing related to IUU fishing towards the FGS through INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu;
- f. Increase the support to EUCAP Somalia to provide local capacity building support to the SNCG and/or maritime police units and ensure more regular key leader engagement with the Somali authorities and support the FGS in fisheries enforcement and control;
- g. Further strengthen links and mutual support with the European Maritime Awareness Mission (AGENOR) in the Strait of Hormuz, in line with their respective mandates as part of Operation ATALANTA's transformation into a broader maritime security operation;
- h. Explore all options to increase synergies and interactions with CMP NWIO;
- i. Enhance counter narrative to protect the EU and the Operation ATALANTA against disinformation campaigns;
- j. Rename and rebrand "EU NAVFOR SOMALIA - ATALANTA Operation" into "EU NAVFOR ATALANTA Operation".

### *Structure*

157. Pending further operational planning, the CJSOR is not expected to be increased, as the recommendations above aim to optimise the use of existing assets and provide the appropriate framework to further incentivise cooperation with the Independent Deployers, and increase the opportunities of Associated Support.

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158. It is recommended that **EUCAP Somalia**:

Continue the balanced approach of maritime and police activities to respond to the Somali-owned and led security agenda priorities and needs.

On **maritime aspects**, EUCAP Somalia is recommended:

- a. Continue to reinforce, through capacity building support and the provision of equipment and infrastructure, maritime police units in and around the four main Somali ports, with a focus on Mogadishu, Berbera and Bosaso ports. Subsequently, the Mission could explore opportunities for a possible engagement with the maritime police unit in Kismayo port;
- b. In Somaliland, taking into account the positive results achieved, prepare a transition strategy by mid next mandate. In Puntland, if conditions are not met within 6 months for an engagement with the PMPF, consider closing the Field Office;
- c. Contribute to the development of the Somali Coast Guard functions, supporting the civilian capacities/activities, regardless of the entity in charge;
- d. Continue to advise and mentor, as appropriate, the relevant FGS ministries, including the Somali Maritime Administration on the development of Coast Guard functions and the establishment of the relevant inter-agency coordination mechanisms in the maritime sector;
- e. Provide advice and capacity building support to the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources in relation to the fisheries control and enforcement, in close coordination with the EU Delegation/DG MARE and other relevant partners; facilitate, as relevant, the exchange of monitoring data between Operation ATALANTA/DG MARE and the FGS/INTERPOL NCB in Mogadishu;
- f. Provide advice on the best practices in tackling toxic waste related issues, including on access to reliable analytical products, and promote among Somali interlocutors a regional approach in the remits of Djibouti Code of Conduct.

On **police and law enforcement**, EUCAP Somalia is recommended:

- g. Focus on the provision of advice and mentoring as well as project support to the FGS MoIS and SPF on the development of the Somali Police Darwish Concept at federal and FMS levels, including C3 arrangements for the implementation of the STP in complementarity of the support under the Joint Police Programme. Until the C2



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structures and the status of the State Darwish are clarified, focus on engagement with the Federal Darwish;

- h. Support strengthening of the inter-operability between the Somali Security Forces, notably the SPF and the SNAF, for the implementation of the STP, in coordination with EUTM Somalia;
- i. Support further operationalisation of the INTERPOL NCB network, linking it with the Immigration departments at the Mogadishu port/airport, as well as with the Criminal Investigation Departments (CIDs) in FMS and the SPF EOD Department. Define transition strategy for the handover of this task before the end of the next mandate;
- j. Strengthen the police-prosecution cooperation and the interaction within the whole criminal justice chain, with a focus on the maritime domain.

### *Structure and budget*

159. Pending further operational planning, the implementation of the Strategic Review recommendations and consequent adaptation of current means and capabilities should not entail an increase in the overall resources required for the Mission. The budget for the next mandate is estimated to approximately EUR 81 million.

160. For **EUTM Somalia** it is recommended to:

- a. Finalize support, training and advice activities to the Somali-Owned Training System (SOTS) and initiate mentoring/monitoring with a view to ensure that the SOTS becomes self-sustainable under the SNAF responsibility within the coming mandate;
- b. Continue training activities on enabling functionalities (such as C-IED and logistics) and aim at educating individuals in specific skills (such as leadership, staff courses, C2, as well as train the trainer and train the teachers courses), based on SNAF needs in support of the STP implementation;
- c. Support, advise and mentor the SNAF on establishment of a functioning C2 structure, operational planning, and enabling functionalities in the SNAF chain of command as of the level of SNAF GS, and down to Regional Headquarters and Joint Operations Centres (JOC's);

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- d. At strategic level, focus on the development of an effective SNAF GS organization and command and control structure through advice and mentoring activities and de-activate the support provided to MoD;
- e. Support the establishment of a KMM within the C2 structure of the SNAF GS;
- f. Support of a logistic unit in Mogadishu, in support of STP implementation;
- g. Support and advise the SNAF on the planning, identification, implementation and delivery of the EPF Assistance Measures to the SNAF;
- h. Support and advise the SNAF, according to the STP, in the preparation to replace ATMIS in the medium term.

### ***Structure***

161. Pending further operational planning, the CJSOR is not expected to be increased significantly, as the recommendations above aim to optimise the use of available resources and personnel. Tasks related to EPF support might require additional resources.

## **XI. PLANNING PROCESS – NEXT STEPS**

162. It is recommended that PSC agrees to extend the mandates of Operation ATALANTA and the Missions EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia for two years as part of the overall EU effort in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and to adapt the mandates in line with the recommendations contained herein.
163. The revision of Operation ATALANTA, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia operational planning documents will be developed during the subsequent operational planning phase under the direction received from the PSC, providing all details required for the implementation of the recommendations included in this holistic Strategic Review.
164. Thereafter, revised Council Decisions will be required to extend Operation ATALANTA, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia for another 24 months, until 31 December 2024, within the framework of the adapted operational planning documents.
165. It is recommended that the PSC:

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- a. Agrees with the situational assessment, the findings in the holistic Strategic Review, and the recommendations to consolidate, adapt and focus the mandates of the Missions/Operation;
- b. Invites CIVCOM and PMG to provide Joint Advice/Recommendation on the Review;
- c. Invites the EUMC to provide Military Advice on Op ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia;
- d. Requests the EEAS to revise the Information Strategies of the Missions/Operation.

**ANNEX A**

**Overview of the Integrated Approach in Somalia**

**a) EU engagement**

1. The EU's Integrated Approach in Somalia and the Horn of Africa includes political dialogue and security engagement, including through three CSDP Missions/Operation, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. A new multiannual indicative programme was approved in December (EUR 257 Million from 2021-2024), with a clear commitment to support state-building efforts, economic and private sector development and increase resilience of most vulnerable populations while reducing the effects of the climate crisis.
2. The EU also remains an important humanitarian partner for Somalia - the EU and its Member States – as Team Europe - recently pledged EUR 633 Million (humanitarian and development funding combined) for the drought response in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The EU humanitarian aid funding to Somalia amounts to EUR 61 million so far in 2022, and is mostly used for the drought response. A robust Integrated Approach among multiple EU actors, including the CSDP Missions and Operation, continues to be required in order to ensure a consistent and coherent approach in Somalia, in cooperation with the UN, the AU and other international actors.
3. The EU has also been one of the main security partners to Somalia, supporting AMISOM/ATMIS with about EUR 2.25 billion since its establishment in 2007. Continuation of support to ATMIS military (EUR 120 million) and civilian/police (EUR 20 million) components until 31 December 2022 from the EPF and APF has been recently agreed by the Council.
4. The EU also continues to support the security transition from the AU presence to Somali security responsibilities through direct non-lethal support to the SNAF, in conjunction with the capacity building activities of EUTM Somalia. This support under the APF (EUR 20 million), implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) between January 2019 and August 2022 (pending for extension), has included the essential non-lethal military equipment, such as communications equipment, ground transportation and non-lethal basic equipment for eligible soldiers in four SNAF battalions, previously trained by EUTM-S and operating alongside AMISOM/ATMIS in the context of the STP implementation, as well as the communication equipment for the Land Forces Command Operations Room. The handing over

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of this equipment to the SNAF had to be postponed until the conclusion of electoral process. In September 2022, the equipment is in its final stage of the process of being handed over in Mogadishu to the selected battalions that have been trained by EUTM Somalia. In addition, and in conjunction with EUTM Somalia, the APF support allowed for the partial rehabilitation of the GDTC in Mogadishu, which helps to ensure that trainees have a safe and well-equipped facility in which to be trained.

5. Following the establishment of the EPF, in November 2021, EU Member States agreed to another (EUR 20 million) package of support to additional SNAF units and soldiers trained by EUTM Somalia. The implementation process, managed by UNOPS, started on 1 January 2022 and is expected to last until 30 June 2023. The support notably includes: (i) further rehabilitation of the GDTC, including possible construction of a shooting range, and the payment of the camp's running costs, (ii) support to the operationalisation of the Operations room in SNAF Sector 60 and to the Land Force Command HQ, (iii) provision of essential personal equipment, communications equipment, ground transportation, basic engineering equipment, as well as (iv) support to the SNAF on C-IED units and soldiers trained by EUTM Somalia. This support will also contribute to reinforcing accountability of the SNAF units benefiting from it, notably by strengthening the SNAF Asset Management System.
6. An additional EPF support package benefiting the SNAF may be proposed later this year, that could be delivered in 2023 and 2024, in addition to the ongoing processes. Furthermore, support to the SNAF under the EPF might include a lethal equipment component to EUTM Somalia (EUR 1,5 million.), to be discussed later this year.
7. The EU also supports the deployment capacity of the SNAF in the regions, notably Galmudug and Hirshabelle, through the construction and rehabilitation of the SNAF regional headquarters and the relevant infrastructure.
8. On police, the EU remains one of the main donors to the JPP, which supports the increase of police presence and visibility through provision of infrastructure, procurement of non-lethal support equipment and payment of electronic stipends, provision of training and support to policy development. The JPP also considers support to the Somali Police Force Darwish at federal and State levels.

9. The EU also support a number of stabilization initiatives, aimed at strengthening the local governance structures and supporting the local communities impacted by conflict, violent extremism, as well as climate change and environmental degradation.
10. The EU-funded project to the Mogadishu MPU, which included the construction of MPU HQ, provision of floating jetties, communication equipment and training has been finalized in March 2022. The EU also provided equipment to the Somaliland Coast Guard in Berbera in conjunction with EUCAP Somalia capacity building activities.
11. Somalia also benefits from a number of regional EU-funded maritime security programmes, such as Regional Maritime Security (MASE) Programme and Regional Programme for Maritime Security in the Red Sea Area (Red Sea Programme). MASE Programme included, among others, support to alternative livelihoods and reinforced maritime coordination mechanisms in Somalia, support to strengthening regional capacity to disrupt financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers, improvement of regional coordination and information exchange. The programme has been implemented by IGAD, East African Community, Indian Ocean Commission, COMESA, INTERPOL, UNODC and FAO. Launched in March 2021, the Red Sea Programme seeks to enable national maritime law enforcement agencies to efficiently prevent, repress and respond to maritime threats, improve compliance with port security and safety of navigation standards and improve the levels of cooperation and dialogue across the region and the overall maritime policy environment of the Horn of Africa. The Programme is implemented by IMO, INTERPOL, IGAD Taskforce on Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and UNODC.
12. In addition, the EU-funded Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) project, initiated in 2015 with the aim to enhance the maritime domain awareness through information sharing, training and capacity building in the Western Indian Ocean. This was approached through the creation of an Information Sharing and Incident Management tool amongst others. IORIS, a neutral and secure information-exchange platform has been developed, which is now being used by a number of Djibouti Code of Conduct Signatory States and two regional centres in the Seychelles and Madagascar. CRIMARIO II aims to continue to engage with its traditional partners and seek to build new partnerships with countries in South and Southeast Asia.

**b) EU Member States:**

13. Several EU Member States are engaged in support to Somali security sector reform, justice and the rule of law. An enhanced coordination of EU Member States support remains important for a robust EU's Integrated Approach in Somalia.
  
14. Under the new multiannual indicative programme, the EU and a number of EU Member States have identified a Team Europe Initiative (TEI). TEI 1 Green Deal envisages to increase access to clean energy across Somalia and strengthen Somalia's climate adaptation and resilience systems. A second TEI on Governance, Peace and Security – Reconciling Somalia is currently under discussion, seeking support from MS. If endorsed, it will cover key areas of engagement of the EU and MS in Somalia that are yet to be defined.

**c) Engagement of other international actors**

**United Nations**

15. **The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia's (UNSOM)** current mandate is valid until 31 October 2022. The UNSCR 2592 (2021) requested the UN Secretary-General, following consultations with the Somali federal government “after the election process has concluded” to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM and submit a report on its findings to the Security Council by 30 September.
  
16. **The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)** is active in the region through its Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) in support of strengthening the regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates, as well as those associated with facilitating piracy. **UNODC** has set up the following priorities for its activities in Somalia for the coming year: 1) anti-corruption; 2) fighting financial crime/illicit financial flows; 3) maritime security and criminal investigation programme; and is willing to strengthen the coordination and information sharing with the EU missions.
  
17. **The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)** has long worked in the fisheries sector, supporting artisanal fishing by the Somali coastal communities, including through EU funded programmes. FAO has been involved in fisheries law revision and institution building, establishment of fisheries monitoring centre in the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, and is willing to strengthen coordination with the EU, including through the fisheries donor working group.

18. The UN **World Food Programme** (WFP) in Somalia aims supports basic food needs, strengthens coping mechanisms and supports the efforts to achieve food security of vulnerable Somalis so they can cope more effectively with hardships. Support of Operation ATALANTA has been critical for WFP humanitarian operations. As of 3 March, WFP had to switch to the PAST on board the WFP vessels, which has been very impactful to the humanitarian operations. WFP has reportedly raised the need for continuous Operation ATALANTA AVPD teams on board its vessels with the Somali President, which is a relevant entry point for a possible return of the Operation in Somalia's territorial sea.

**African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)**

19. The UNSCR 2628 (2022) established the mandate of ATMIS on 31 March, replacing AMISOM as of 1 April 2022. Core objectives of ATMIS' mandate are to conduct jointly planned and targeted operations with SSF to degrade AS, support SSF by holding populations centres and deliver security, support the capacity development of SSF with priority given to force generation, operational competencies and logistical support capabilities.

20. ATMIS' personnel strength as of 1 April 2022 stands at 19,626 uniformed personnel, including a minimum of 1,040 police, as well a small civilian component (70), until 31 December 2022, end of phase 1, which very much mirrors the strength of AMISOM. ATMIS forces are present in all SNAF sectors with standard military structures (force HQ and sector HQs, brigade, battalion, companies). Core capabilities of ATMIS, more or less copied from AMISOM, are focused on military infantry, supported by a range of enabling functions as intelligence, transport, C2, communications, and staff. ATMIS' mandate emphasizes mobility and agility as its core military principles.

21. In essence, ATMIS strength from 19,626 troops should be gradually downgraded until zero (0), while SNAF and SPF should be upgrading and replacing the ATMIS capabilities in 4 phases, with a planned conditions based full exit strategy by end of December 2024.

**d) Bilateral activity**

22. **United States of America** (US) continues its support - training, mentoring, accompaniment, as well as equipment, vehicles, weapons, C-IED - to the Somali special Danab forces, and has recently requested more mentors to be deployed to the South West State. So far around 1,500 Danab forces have been trained. The end state is to train 3,000, and no exit strategy has yet



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defined. US is currently looking into how to engage with the SNCG and the Air Force, as well as how to strengthen the institutions, notably the Ministry of Defence.

23. US also support Somalia in countering transnational organized crime, notably trafficking of narcotic drugs. The US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) assists Somalia in delivering justice by strengthening the Somali police capacity, courts and correction systems. INL's current efforts focus on building the capacity of the SPF CID, addressing the gaps in the investigation and prosecution process, improving the skills of Somalia's legal community and supporting reforms in Somalia's correctional sector.
24. **United Kingdom (UK)** is currently reviewing its integrated engagement in Somalia and looking into ways how to make its support to the SNAF better suited for the fight against AS. UK's training mission Tangham in Baidoa, South West State has been training SNAF infantry companies and is advising and mentoring ATMIS at the Force HQ level. UK has embedded civilian advisers into the Offices of the PM and the NSA, which it considers an invaluable asset in pressing legislative issues, policies and STP implementation. Similarly as the EU, UK has challenges with the Knowledge Management Mechanisms and uses local staff to ensure monitoring and reporting from the field. UK also funds the Joint Police Programme and contributes to ATMIS troop allowances.
25. **Turkey** remains 100% committed to support the fight against AS, implementation of the National Security Architecture and building institutions, considers increasing its support to the SNAF, both lethal and non-lethal. TURKSOM has so far trained 5,000 Gorgor troops, as well as the NCOs and Navy officers in Turkey, provided 4 boats to the Somali Navy. Turkey has also trained special police (Harmacad) forces, which are considered to be effective in CT operations. Turkey demonstrated interest in EU's support to ATMIS and Darwish police force. Beyond security engagement, Turkey has built a big hospital in Mogadishu and is training Somali doctors. To note that Turkey is not providing mentorship to the deployed Gorgor forces as it considers this to contradict the values of a South-South cooperation. Turkey expressed its discontent with the employment made by the previous administration of some Gorgor forces (political motivated operations), with little results.

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26. **China** has recently appointed a Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and has stated its intent, for a first time, to play a "more important role" in promoting peace and security in the Horn of Africa, in addition to its economic engagement through trade and investments. Beijing is also willing to play a mediator's role in regional disputes. China has a military base in Djibouti, its only one in Africa, as well as a port aimed at securing its vast economic interests in the region.
27. In 2022, China has delivered some vehicles and equipment worth of EUR 5 million to the SNAF – first such donation to Somalia's security sector. However, China's role in Somalia's security sector remains limited and for the time being is not expected to increase.
28. Arab **Gulf countries** continue to play an important role in the domestic politics of Somalia. The first foreign visit of new Somali President HSM has been to the **UAE**, a country which has significant interests, among others, in developing infrastructure across the main Somali ports. Qatar was the favoured partner of the previous administration. The new President HSM is aiming to rebalance and normalise relationship with the UAE and Qatar respectively, including to avoid proxy conflicts on Somali soil.

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