

**Short Term Strategy 2016/17 for the implementation of a special support measure in favour of the people of the Republic of Sudan to be financed from the reserve of the European Development Fund**

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## **1. Introduction**

This is the **first development strategy that the EU has prepared for Sudan since April 2011**. Since then, much has happened. South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011; this represented a huge political and economic shock for Sudan which lost 10 million inhabitants, 30% of its territory and 75% of its oil revenues. Secession was followed by a period of heightened tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over a number of outstanding issues such as border demarcation, disputed territories or economic arrangements and compensations. As a result, the EU focussed on defining its policy in relation to both countries with the aim of diffusing those tensions.

However, **since 2013 the EU has increasingly looked at Sudan in its own right**, and has developed a policy that reflects Sudan's own internal political, security and socio-economic challenges, as well as its position and role within the region and beyond.

This development strategy looks at Sudan's socio-economic challenges from a political and security perspective. To that end, it has followed a **two-step approach: first, by conducting a conflict analysis jointly with EU Member States, international partners and civil society** to gain a shared understanding of Sudan's various conflict and political dynamics, as well as future trajectories; **second, by conducting a rapid needs assessment with EU Member States**, which identifies in more detail challenges, needs and opportunities for intervention in a number of sectors. The focus is in areas where either the EU or EU Member States and/or both are considered to have a comparative advantage which crucially include addressing some of the underlying governance and conflict issues.

As such, **the objectives and indicative interventions set out in this strategy are intended to guide the implementation of future European Development Fund financing from the reserve of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF for the period from 2016 to 2017 as well as to provide orientations to the EU and the EU Member States on how to better join efforts in order to address more effectively their development cooperation with Sudan**. Due to non-ratification of the revisions of the Cotonou Agreement dated 2005 and 2010, Sudan lost access to programmable bilateral funding under the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> EDF. However, it can still benefit from EDF financing originating either from the reserve of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF or from regional indicative programmes.

In line with the conclusions of the conflict analysis, it is **important to underline that sustainable poverty reduction in Sudan** can only take place once substantial progress towards an inclusive political settlement, improved governance and effective conflict resolution has been achieved. Inclusive National Dialogue is central to addressing underlying causes of conflict, in particular exclusion and the vicious circle of the use of violence to bring about change which exists in the country especially in the peripheral areas. Whilst the operating environment in Sudan is challenging from an access and security point of view, the proposed strategy will target directly the beneficiary population through direct implementation of actors so as to ensure accountability, impact and quality of actions foreseen. Drawing on past development interventions, the strategy aims at strengthening the resilience of the people in peripheral areas with a specific focus on upstream prevention but also where possible in areas affected by ongoing violence; in doing so it should contribute to tackling marginalisation and exclusion that are at the root of conflict, radicalisation, irregular migratory flows and criminality. Therefore, this strategy **establishes important links with EU recent priorities for the region** such as the Commission's new Agenda for Migration and the Support to Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE), the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative or "Khartoum process", or the Action Plan approved at the EU-Africa

Valletta Summit on migration on 11 and 12 November 2015, all of which will be implemented *inter alia* by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa). EU engagement with Sudan also has to be seen in the context of the recently approved EU Regional Action Plan on the Horn of Africa (October 2015), which focuses in particular on migration and forced displacement as well as violent extremism and implications of the broader geopolitical framework. This Action Plan provides the EU's strategic direction for our activities in 2015-20. A particular focus of the Action Plan is Peace and Security and addressing continuous conflict situations such as Sudan.

## **2. Contextual analysis**

### **2.1 Country context**

Sudan remains mired in internal conflicts. It faces popular unrest challenging the increasingly authoritarian regime and a largely dire economic and financial state. The Presidential and Legislative elections of April 2015 have re-confirmed President Bashir's mandate, but have taken place in a politically restricted environment, boycotted by the main opposition parties. They were preceded by a lack of progress of the National Dialogue which did not take off despite much rhetoric from the Government and Opposition, involvement of the African Union and encouragement from the broader international community. A deep mistrust between the parties contributed to the failure, preventing confidence-building and inclusion.

It is hard to predict what trajectory the Government of Sudan and Opposition will take regarding the National Dialogue, but the November 2014 conflict analysis concluded that the most plausible scenario for Sudan could be described as "muddling through", with a deteriorating trajectory characterised by political exclusion, restricted freedoms and inequitable allocation of resources. This could lead to greater social unrest and a higher propensity for violence. Indeed, the current political, security and socio-economic dynamics do not seem to suggest that we will see substantial improvements in the near future:

**Conflict** remains entrenched in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (with displacement, restricted humanitarian access, violence against civilians and sexual and gender-based violence being among the major concerns), and peace is fragile in the East. At a local level conflict dynamics are manifold but there are some common causes of conflict which include political and socio-economic exclusion by a central elite, exploitation of extractive resources, and inter-communal clashes caused by competition over land and other natural resources exacerbated by environmental and climatic factors. The Government of Sudan uses divide and rule tactics, and military means for the enforcement of its interests. The mandate of the hybrid AU-UN Mission for Sudan UNAMID has been extended until 2016, but it is likely that the Government will continue to push for its early exit which, if implemented, could generate heightened tensions, continued impunity and intensified conflict in the region and could cause setbacks to modest progress achieved over the years (i.e. West Darfur).

**Governance** favours a central elite at the expense of the population in the peripheral areas. The federal system and decentralised governance have been weak: those living in peripheral regions not only are excluded from public life, but also suffer from a state which does not adequately provide basic public services. As a result, the social contract between the state and the majority of its people is broken. There is not adequate accountability and the related institutions are kept deliberately weak. Resources are used to maintain the security apparatus

and hence perpetuate the rule of the NCP. This leads to the mismanagement of public resources and high levels of corruption to sustain patronage networks and buy political support. Human rights and basic freedoms suffer from serious restrictions. Until governance improves and resources are distributed in a more equitable manner, a sustainable resolution of violent conflict is unlikely to be achieved.

The **economic situation** is generally weak but has shown a certain level of resilience following the loss of oil revenues after the secession of South Sudan, failing austerity measures with lack of production and a low external investment. Sudan is now reliant on agriculture, gold mining (mainly artisanal), as well as oil production sufficient for domestic consumption (except diesel which is still imported), revenues from South Sudan for the use of the oil pipeline and export, arms exports, remittances from a large diaspora in the Middle East, and a small manufacturing sector. However, the model adopted to diversify the economy does not seem sustainable, especially in the extractive sectors, with little consideration for land tenure, community rights, environmental considerations and inclusivity. The situation is compounded by high expenditure on security and wars as well as economic and financial (US) sanctions against Sudan, and an unsustainable external debt of over \$45 billion (which in September 201[6] will be halved unless Sudan and South Sudan agree on another extension of the deadline). These factors can only be alleviated in case of political reforms, an end to armed conflict and improved relations with the International Community. The Government has adopted a number of policies to reduce poverty such as an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, but they do not amount to a commitment to poverty reduction in the absence of allocation of resources for their implementation. One positive step is the re-engagement of the Government with the International Monetary Fund through a Staff Monitored Programme to provide advice on reforms needed to move towards macro-economic stability and more inclusive growth.

The **operational development/humanitarian context** is being seriously affected by constraints on international agencies and NGOs to work in areas of need, as well as the past incidents and the threat of expulsion of NGOs both on the humanitarian and development side (2009 and 2012). Additional constraints include the government strategy of "Sudanization" of the delivery of aid, the push for exit of UNAMID in Darfur and the administrative difficulties orchestrated to impede the international donors and their implementing partners (INGOs and IOs) to access their project areas.

Tensions between Sudan and the UN have increased since late 2014, leading to the expulsion of senior UN staff and the request by the Government to the UN-AU Mission to Darfur UNAMID to prepare an exit strategy.

## **2.2 Regional context**

Sudan, not least as a result of its location, plays a pivotal role in a fragile region. Relations with its youngest neighbour, South Sudan, remain volatile and include unresolved border issues (in particular Abyei Area), and alleged reciprocal support for each other's armed opposition groups. Sudan's official position on the current South Sudanese conflict has however been one of restraint, support to, and involvement in IGAD mediation; Sudan could potentially play a key role in brokering a solution.

Looking to the Arab world, Sudan's foreign policies have most recently been marked by an outreach to Egypt (the Nile Water agreement together with Ethiopia and stopping support to Islamists forces in Libya); and with certain Gulf countries in particular through the

participation in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and distancing from Iran and the international Muslim Brotherhood agenda. Sudan recognises the Tobruk government in Libya. However, it remains to be seen whether Sudan's rapprochement to Egypt and the Gulf stems mainly from tactical and economic motivations, or whether it implies the start of a more strategic relationship.

Sudan currently has good relations with Eritrea, with Ethiopia and Chad. It is entangled in the crisis in Central African Republic.

## **2.3 Migration**

In response to the human tragedy in the Mediterranean resulting from irregular migration and human trafficking, the European Commission adopted on 13 May 2015 a European Agenda for Migration. It underlines the need for a new approach, using all policies and tools at hand to effectively address this issue. It recognizes the importance of development cooperation in tackling the root causes of irregular and forced migration such as conflict, persecution, poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment.

The genuine concern of African partners and the EU about the dramatic increase in flows of refugees and migrants within and between the continents, and the suffering, abuse and exploitation that it entails, prompted them to take decisive action. To that end, African partners, the EU and EU Member States met at a Migration Summit in La Valletta on 11 and 12 November 2015, agreed on an Action Plan to better manage migration based on principles of solidarity, shared responsibility and partnership, and launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa.

In the Horn of Africa, including Sudan, the EU Agenda for Migration and the Action Plan agreed at the Migration Summit of La Valletta will be implemented by means of a three-pillar strategy: (1) to further dialogue and enhance cooperation on migration with the countries of the region; (2) to address the needs of populations affected by long-term displacement; (3) to tackle the root causes that give rise to irregular and forced migration.

For first pillar, in November 2014 the EU and the countries of the Horn of Africa and transit countries launched a regional cooperation framework for long-lasting dialogue on migration and mobility to enhance cooperation, focusing in a first phase on human trafficking and smuggling (the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative or "Khartoum process"). This dialogue is being accompanied by the implementation of concrete projects and programmes aimed to enhance migration governance, notably by increasing capacities of governments to fight human trafficking and people smuggling. The Khartoum process is supported from a wide variety of sources, including the EU's Pan-African instrument, the DCI Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme, and the EDF regional programme for East Africa, and contributions by EU Member States.

For second pillar, in June 2015 the Netherlands accepted a leading role in the implementation of a Regional Development and Protection Programme for the Horn of Africa. It aims at providing a long term development response to the long-term needs of displaced populations as well as hosting and return areas. These challenges will be addressed through the creation of opportunities for self-reliance, in particular by providing education and livelihoods opportunities, greater access to markets, the promotion of social cohesion, awareness-raising

campaigns to inform of the perils of irregular migration, or support to voluntary return and reintegration.

The third pillar will be implemented with development cooperation instruments and in the case of Sudan through the present strategy. It will address social, economic, conflict-related and environmental factors that make people vulnerable to irregular and forced migration such as poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and marginalization. By addressing the root causes to irregular and forced migration, these efforts will also contribute to reinforcing the capacity of vulnerable populations to cope with consequences of conflict displacement, drought and the overall lack of basic services in peripheral areas of Sudan.

As a country of transit at the heart of the Central Mediterranean Route and hosting a significant number of refugees (third to Ethiopia and Kenya in the Horn of Africa), Sudan will play a role in the implementation of both the Khartoum process and the Regional Development and Protection Programme. It is key for the success of both these initiatives and this short term strategy that implementation takes place in a complementary manner, ensuring close coordination and information-sharing and regular dialogue in the design and implementation of activities.

### **3. The EU's approach to working in Sudan**

**The multiple vulnerabilities of the Sudanese population transcend borders**, and therefore their consequences have both a national and regional impact. **This is due to a number of factors**, amongst which the geographical position of Sudan is central, acting as a connector between the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa region, and with borders with Chad, Central African Republic, Libya, Egypt, South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia; the concentration of marginalisation and exclusion in the peripheral areas, notably Darfur, East Sudan and the Transitional Area; and the vast extension and porous nature of the borders, combined with limited state capacity to control them.

Consequently, **any response that aims to address the vulnerabilities in Sudan should also have a regional dimension**. The EU action implemented under this strategy will be guided by this principle, i.e. acting nationally whilst thinking regionally. **The present strategy will be linked and associated very closely with the implementation of two regional initiatives**: Support to Horn of Africa Resilience (**SHARE**), which aims to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's resilience response in the Horn of Africa both at national and regional level, **and the EU policy on migration** through the EU Agenda for Migration, including the support to the Khartoum process and the implementation of the Action Plan as agreed at the EU-Africa Valletta Summit on migration (see above). **The strategy will also link up** with other regional efforts to broker peace in Sudan and foster improved relations with South Sudan, complementing mediation initiatives at national and international level with peacebuilding initiatives at local level; and also supporting the creation of stability in border areas to foster exchanges and trade.

**The EU's approach to deliver aid in Sudan will need to be tailored carefully to meet these objectives**, in terms of selection of geographical areas and types of intervention, targeted beneficiaries and coordination with partners at national and regional level.

EU action under this strategy will be implemented in the peripheral areas of **Darfur, East Sudan and in the southern border areas**. The identification and selection of geographical

areas and types of intervention will follow a model of **concentration of multi-sectorial resilience action around selected geographical clusters**. **The selection of geographical clusters will be done on the basis of a set of criteria**, including vulnerability of communities and households to food security and nutrition; potential for increasing production and productivity of agriculture and/or livestock; existence of functional markets/potential for their setup; potential for enhanced cross-border exchanges in terms of trade and markets; potential for LRRD; existence of communities at risk of becoming radicalised or where migratory flows are common (including presence of IDPs and refugees); occurrence of inter-communal conflicts; effective access capacity of partners for the direct implementation of actions; presence of other donor partners; access to quality education/health; number of facilities for size of population and distance between facilities and communities; number of vaccinated children; number of population per doctors; number of pupils per teacher; levels of literacy; or completion rate in primary school. **The selection of specific interventions** in each geographical cluster **will be made on the basis of situational analyses of the local context and dynamics**. In this process the EU will promote joint development and humanitarian analyses with EU Member States, and will consult with IGAD, international partners and, as appropriate, with neighbouring countries.

There are an **estimated 8.9 million persons displaced in the Horn of Africa**, comprising of about 2.4 million refugees and 6.5 million internally displaced persons. The majority of the displaced are **children and women** with many female-headed households. Displacement in many cases has become protracted, lasting over 20 years, and hence is an important part of the wider challenge of achieving sustainable development with peace and security in the Horn of Africa. **In Sudan alone, there are an estimated 170,000 refugees, mainly from Eritrea and South Sudan, and over 2 million IDPs. These IDPs are concentrated in Darfur and the states of White Nile, West Kordofan and Khartoum with Darfur and Khartoum being critical transit points** in the route used by refugees from Eritrea, Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa towards Libya and Egypt, and onwards to the EU.

**EU action under the strategy will consider the IDP and refugee population in Sudan as one of its target beneficiaries**, in particular by addressing the key challenges of strengthening the resilience and livelihood skills of both refugees/IDPs and host communities, mitigating the environmental degradation and providing conflict management and resolution capacity. In doing so, it will be necessary to build **a better knowledge base** on the characteristics, needs and aspirations of the displaced and **link up with past experience of multi-year humanitarian aid and forthcoming regional initiatives** such as one being prepared by the World Bank on displacement.

The procedural restrictions stipulated by the Council Decision 2010/406/EU (for the 2011-13 Special Funds for Sudan) will remain fully in place, in particular the impossibility to work through Government structures. Funds will be implemented only by the European Commission, not by the Government of Sudan, and through civil society organisations and other non-state actors, such as the private sector, delegated cooperation with EU Member States Cooperation Agencies or International Organisations. The Government will be informed of EU efforts.

#### **4. Choice of Sectors**

The present strategy will help advance the political objectives of the European Agenda for Migration and the commitments made at the European Council of 23 April 2015 and La

Valletta on 11 and 12 November 2015. It will do so by establishing a strong connection with the political and policy dialogue on migration between the EU and Sudan in the framework of the Khartoum process, by targeting specific beneficiaries at risk of falling prey to human traffickers and smugglers, and by intervening in the areas of education, employment, livelihoods and peace-building. The EU with its extensive regional presence is in a strategic position to take a comprehensive and coherent approach to migration and conflict prevention and link political dialogue processes with action on the ground, acting as a catalyst and force-multiplier for messages and activities that may be more difficult to achieve for individual Member States.

The needs assessment has identified enormous development needs of the people of Sudan. In a context of limited donor investment, the EU will be able to add value by targeting assistance to the most vulnerable populations and focussing on sectors where there are currently particularly few donors, e.g. education.

The strategy for Sudan will also establish strong connections between development and humanitarian assistance. In a context where many crises in Sudan have become protracted, humanitarian assistance has been scaled down in recent years, and there is a need to transition to longer-term and more sustainable approaches. By doing so, the EU will seek to play a catalytic role and promote resilience approaches in Sudan.

The selection of sectors has followed a sequenced, inclusive and conflict sensitive approach, starting with a joint conflict analysis in November 2014 and continuing with a needs assessment during the first half of 2015. This process identified three sectors where the EU should focus its development cooperation:

- i. Basic services (education and health)
- ii. Livelihoods/food security
- iii. Civil society, local governance and peacebuilding

**This choice of sectors has been determined by a number of interconnected factors caused by widespread poverty, exclusion and conflict in Sudan.** It contributes to the comprehensive EU response in Sudan. **Development initiatives will complement and build on humanitarian, thematic, diplomatic and peacebuilding interventions** under other EU instruments such as the *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace* of the Thematic Programmes funded by the *Development and Cooperation Instrument*. The sectors have also been chosen due to their close links to the regional political priorities of the EU, as they tackle the root causes of conflict (which almost always implies a risk of spreading to neighbouring countries), radicalisation and forced and irregular migration, in particular through their geographical focus on the peripheral areas affected by conflict.

Overcoming these challenges is a long-term endeavour, requiring peace, a national dialogue that addresses deep-rooted grievances including political and social exclusion, and a commitment from all stakeholders to reform. The donor community has limited leverage in the process and it is essential to be aware of the limitations of aid in Sudan. The choice of sectors respond to this rationale, focusing on **strengthening the resilience of communities and the basic service delivery capacity of authorities at local level** through targeted priority interventions that, while important on their own, will **create a multiplier effect**

**across sectors of concentration** and therefore maximise the impact of EU funds and value for money<sup>1</sup>.

**Lessons learned** from past and ongoing programmes recommend that the design and implementation of future actions be guided by the need to **prioritise a limited number of cost-effective interventions**. It is essential that future implementation partners are accountable and results oriented. They must **focus on service delivery but should not neglect local systems strengthening for sustainability**; where possible, they must also **build on existing programmes** implemented by the EU, EU Member States and other international partners; and they should seek an integrated and long-term approach, **linking interventions funded by a number of instruments in different sectors**, e.g. health, nutrition, food security and education, in well-defined geographical areas.

**Upstream conflict prevention and resilience are central to the approach of the strategy.**

Experience accumulated from past and ongoing interventions highlights the need to facilitate amongst the international community **access to empirical evidence and data** collected by individual partners to inform design and implementation of actions. Moreover, it is essential to take a more focused and systematic approach to building resilience across communities and other local stakeholders by **improving the coordination and working arrangements between development and humanitarian stakeholders**.

**Cross-cutting issues:** Implementation in the sectors set out in this strategy will be reinforced by a number of cross-cutting issues, central amongst which being the need:

(1) for a **conflict sensitivity approach** to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes. The use of contextual analysis will be the cornerstone which informs the nature of our support, our stakeholders, and geographical priorities. The EU will remain committed to undertaking and regularly updating local conflict and political economy analysis to ensure that interventions 'do no harm' and have a positive impact;

(2) to identify the different needs of men, women, girls and boys; to ensure programmes encourage gender equality, recognising the role of women as a positive force for resilience, social cohesion and peacebuilding, and with a focus in particular on the youth and children;

(3) to take into account climate change, and the detrimental effects of droughts and unsustainable practices that accelerate deforestation and desertification, leading to violent conflict over scarce natural resources.

## **5. Support to basic services**

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<sup>1</sup> The potential multiplier effects shows for example in the knock-on effects of *Governance and Peacebuilding* (conflict keeps children from school and health centres closed; reduced conflict increases investor confidence; stability fosters exchanges and trade); of *Basic Social Services* (education can create opportunities for children and youth vulnerable to radicalisation and criminal networks; greater literacy, skills and a healthier workforce increase the opportunities for livelihood production; literacy can increase abilities for problem solving and conflict resolution) or *Livelihood Support* (food security reduces the likelihood of conflict for resources and thereby contributes to peace; higher incomes create opportunities to invest in education and health; economic diversification spread risks; better management of natural resources reduces conflict).

## **5.1. Support to education**

### **i. Outlook**

Since the ascent to power of the National Congress Party, the Central Government has given more importance to higher and university education, than to primary education as the foundation for further learning. The latter is guided by Sudan's Interim Education Sector Strategic Plan 2012/16, which is not appropriately budgeted and relies on external aid for its implementation. Basic education expenditure amounts to 13% of the national budget, with approximately 94% of expenditure employed to pay salaries and other recurrent costs, and the remaining 6% geared toward capital investments. Improved literacy and education have the potential to transform Sudan and bring about profound long-term social changes, such as much greater social mobility, women's empowerment, and access to global sources of information.

Significant levels of underinvestment have led to poor infrastructure, lack of textbooks and other resources, unqualified and untrained teachers and inadequate water and sanitation facilities. Although primary education is on paper compulsory and free, in reality families are required to pay fees and contribute to running costs. The result is weak demand, as families do not see the added value of sending children to school. At present, the outlook is bleak: there are an estimated three million out-of-school children in Sudan (out of a school-age population of eight million) and an additional half a million children at risk of dropping out. The most vulnerable groups are girls, children affected by war, Internally Displaced Persons, children in rural areas, children with disabilities, nomads and some ethnic and religious groups.

Therefore, support to basic education falls into three main areas: **enhancing the quality of education**, including in areas such as curricula development and teacher training; **improving equitable access for all to education services** by focusing on alternative learning programmes for the most marginalised; and **strengthening the capacities of authorities**, schools and Parent-Teachers Associations (PTAs) in planning, management and oversight.

Employment creation and investments in skills represent one of the most efficient means of distributing incomes equitably, and one of the most sustainable ways of fighting poverty. However, the process of human capital formation in Sudan is alarmingly low by regional and international standards, and provision of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) plays a marginal role compared to general and academic education. TVET in Sudan offers both technical education (through technical secondary schools' and technical colleges), and vocational training (through skills development courses run by Vocational Training Centres – VTCs – to enable youth to enter the labour market and engage in productive activities). However, TVET services, and especially VTCs, suffer from underinvestment and, critically, from a lack of equipment, poorly trained instructors and correspondingly, supply driven programs which do not link with the needs of the labour market and the private sector.

Therefore, TVET recommendations fall into four main areas: governance and equity of TVET, the responsiveness of TVET to the labour market, strengthening the capacities of the authorities in TVET planning, management and oversight, and upgrade the quality of delivery of TVET providers.

### **ii. Donor engagement**

The EU and EU Member States (Germany, UK and France) support education at primary, vocational and university level. The EU's support since 2011 focuses on primary education in Darfur, East Sudan and the Transitional areas, with actions aimed to reduce children's drop-out rates, mainly by fostering social accountability, rehabilitating schools, and providing materials, teachers' training and technical assistance to local authorities. Prior to 2011, the EU also supported TVET, setting up four centres around Khartoum in the IDP-prone localities of Kerari, Bahri, East Nile and Jebel Awlia. These TVET centres are still functioning although in need of further support.

EU Member States' support focuses on: TVET, where Germany will start a four-year programme in North and West Darfur aimed to increase both access and woman participation, as well as to align courses with the demands of the labour market; Secondary education, where France and the British Council are implementing projects to strengthen the teaching of the French and English language respectively, and update the existing curricula; and University, where France has established a bilateral governmental doctoral fellowship programme benefiting major public universities. Besides this support, France, through its cultural network of French institutes and Alliance Française centres, and the UK, through the British Council, provide language teaching to the general public and public and private institutions throughout the country.

Multilateral agencies also support education at different levels, some of them with EU and EU Member States support: the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) implements a 2013/17 primary education programme which aims at increasing the availability of text books and improving school infrastructure; the United Nations' Children Fund prioritises pre-primary, primary and secondary education, with a focus on increasing access, quality and system strengthening in conflict affected states; finally the African Development Bank has started a 2015/2020 TVET programme focused on teacher training and capacity building in the North Kordofan, White Nile, and Khartoum States.

### **iii. Priorities for future engagement:**

The EU conflict analysis report emphasises the need for support to excluded areas in the periphery which have been marginalised and neglected by government. Moreover, it is critical that humanitarian and development actors collaborate in ensuring that those most in need benefit from services provided, while at the same time not reinforcing patterns of exclusion and fuelling conflictual competition and animosity between groups. The education sector needs assessment highlighted the following objectives for future engagement:

*Objective 1:* to improve equitable access and completion of quality education, with particular attention to the most vulnerable groups, which will be pursued through the following *indicative interventions*:

- provision of learning materials, school grants, school feeding programmes and promotion of community involvement, with a view to reduce education costs to families and increase demand for education;
- support to school management and Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in order to enhance social accountability;
- provision of teacher training and training of trainers, in order to support quality of learning;

- support to development of curricula by advising and enhancing capacities of relevant state and national authorities;
- provision of alternative learning programmes (ALPs) for out-of-school children and youth;
- provision of technical advice to improve the implementation of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) especially in terms of data collection, analysis and utilisation.

*Objective 2:* to improve the quality of, and increase the access to, Technical and Vocational Education and Training, through the following *indicative interventions*:

- support to better public-private partnership and the involvement of social partners in the identification of skill needs, the planning, management, provision, and oversight of the system, in order to make TVET delivery more effective and responsive to labour market needs;
- support to a more cost effective and efficient utilisation of existing training centre;
- support to adapt/update the training curricula to ensure courses are market-oriented and in new technological areas;
- delivery of pro-poor skills training and entrepreneurship development services for IDPs, refugees and host communities;
- provision of teachers/instructors training and training to trainers so that learners can be provided with more work readiness skills;
- provision of essential equipment and raw material to the VTCs centres;
- provision of technical advice for improved management, in particular in the areas of planning and sustainability;
- support to better access to technical and vocational education of population in rural areas

## **5.2. Support to Health**

### **i. Outlook**

The health sector in Sudan is underfunded, inequitable, and inefficient; lacking coverage, basic infrastructure and qualified staff. Although the national Health Sector Strategic Plan for 2012-2016 identifies the main challenges that need to be addressed, such policy does not amount to a real commitment to improve the state of the sector. Limited funding allocated thereto is concentrated on tertiary health (specialised hospitals in urban centres), with a meagre 20% of public investments dedicated to primary and secondary health care. As a result, and despite generating own resources through fee-for service delivery, around 75% of the existing health facilities are not able to provide basic health services in the absence of essential medicines, safe water, electricity, basic sterilisation, blood banks, refrigerators or laboratory equipment. The consequence of such dysfunctional situation is appalling, in particular in Darfur and East Sudan which overall register the highest rates of maternal mortality (335:100,000 at birth), under-five mortality (105:1,000) and severe acute malnutrition in both women and children (at the root of 45% of the under-five deaths). The situation is compounded by the lack of access to drinking water (61% of the population) and improved sanitation (27% of the population).

A key challenge facing the sector is to strengthen at various levels the primary health care in order to facilitate access for vulnerable populations. On the supply side, the facilities offer incomplete minimum basic health care packages (particularly reproductive health service

delivery), and the provision of drugs is insufficient and leads to malpractices of health staff appropriating and selling drugs for their own profit. On the infrastructure side, facilities, especially in rural areas, are dilapidated and needs refurbishing, better waste management, greater water and power supply, or greater access to sanitation. On the accountability side, health staff (from nurses to health assistants to health managers) needs to be trained on processes, procedures, tools, skills and human capacity development and, in doing so, gain a realistic picture of the health system that is based on empirical evidence.

## **ii. Donor engagement**

The majority of donors involved in the sector focus on primary health care and improving the access to, and quality of, primary health services, given the massive needs and the positive impact on the most vulnerable population. This is the case of Italy, Japan, the United Nations' Children Fund, the Africa Development Bank or the US Carter Foundation.

That is also the case of the EU through its development and humanitarian assistance, and in the case of the latter also in emergency assistance with a focus on access to primary health and nutrition services on the basis of specific indicators.

The United Kingdom is implementing in East Sudan the Water for East Sudan Programme, aiming at improving drinking water, sanitation and hygiene.

Other organisations are also active in immunisation campaigns (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation - GAVI), and in the treatment of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis or HIV (the Global Fund). France is engaged in the health sector through the Global Fund.

## **iii. Priorities for future engagement:**

EU action in the health sector will focus on those areas with the poorest health indicators, inadequate health facilities, low population coverage, difficult accessibility and communities at risk of violent conflict. In particular, it will prioritise access to integrated packages of maternal, newborn and children's health services, family planning and improving safe water, sanitation and hygiene. It will build on previous experiences, filling gaps and expanding successful interventions, also for sustainability gains. It will also draw from collaboration with the Italian Cooperation Agency and will seek synergies with the Water for East Sudan programme from the UK, as well as greater coordination and LRRD with humanitarian action, both in Darfur and East Sudan.

*Objective 1:* to strengthen primary health care at local level, which will be pursued through the following *indicative interventions*:

- provision of minimum primary health care basic packages, which should include reproductive health, immunisation, nutrition prevention and treatment of malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies, treatment of common diseases and essential drugs;
- support to rural hospitals to improve their Emergency Obstetric Care and referral system;
- rehabilitation of dilapidated infrastructure in primary health centres, including waste management, water and electricity, and sanitation
- provision of technical and managerial training to health workers with a main focus on financial management, drugs, supplies and maintenance;

- provision of technical advice to improve the implementation of the Health Management Information System in terms of data collection, analysis and utilisation;
- research work into alternative pro-poor strategies on health financing, building on previous research undertaken by the EU in the context of its on-going health programmes implemented in East Sudan.
- provision of technical advice to local authorities to improve the effective delivery of services to communities (planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation and other aspects related to policy implementation).

## **6. Support to livelihoods and food security**

### **i. Outlook**

Sudan is a structurally food insecure country. Average rural poverty rates are estimated at 58%, and per capita average expenditure for the rural poor is less than \$1 per day. The most food insecure areas are concentrated in Darfur, East Sudan and the Transitional Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. For the Sudanese population, agriculture, including livestock, is a decisive element of their livelihoods. Despite this, and although agriculture represents 30% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the sector is significantly underfunded.

Of the 73 million hectares of arable land, only 16.8 million hectares are cultivated, 90% of which through traditional and, to a lesser extent, semi-mechanised rain-fed farming; the remaining 10% is cultivated through large-scale irrigation systems along the Nile riverine areas. Many parts of **rural Sudan** are desperately poor and have suffered environmental degradation, leading to crises in livelihoods. Additionally, the areas with better soils have been the target of well-connected commercial farmers. These farmers buy land leases, evict the smallholders and pastoralists who have customarily used the land, and then establish large-scale mechanized farms, which are often environmentally unsustainable.

In **Darfur**, land conflict has revolved around the migration of communities from the desert edge to more productive areas further south, and the competing demands of pastoralists and farmers. The latter has been fuelled in part by the immigration of pastoralists from Chad. Since the massive displacement of farming communities in the mid-2000s, much of the conflict has been among pastoralist groups themselves .

In Darfur, particularly East Darfur, and in the Eastern States of Gedarif and parts of Kassala traditional rain-fed farming is the main method of cultivation practiced by poor households with little capital to invest. **Production and productivity are low due to a number of constraints related to: insecurity**, which make households live under constant threat and thus unwilling to invest; **the impact and legacy of conflict and displacement**, resulting in either loss of knowledge on how to cultivate the land sustainably or lack of extension services to promote adequate techniques; **climate change and mismanagement of natural resources**, leading to land degradation and reduced soil fertility; **lack of access to suppliers of agriculture inputs and financial services**, who are few and far between the rain-fed areas; **poor market and value chain development**, especially in remote areas; **lack of crop diversification**, placing farmers at greater risk because of rainfall unpredictability leading to crop failure; **or irregular water supply and lack of water strategies** to reduce the risk of crop failure (water catchments, shallow wells, boreholes, etc.).

Livestock constitute an important component of the rain-fed sector, and is the main livelihood of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralist in the arid and semi-arid lands of East Sudan (Red Sea State and parts of Kassala and Gedarif), Darfur and the Transitional Areas. With an estimated 105 million heads of sheep, goats, cattle and camels, livestock contributes to the larger share of agriculture GDP (56% of total agriculture exports worth USD 1 billion). This notwithstanding, productivity is low, which is explained by a number of factors: **reduced access to water and rangeland resources**, explained by the secession of South Sudan (whereas livestock population fell by 28%, range and forest resources fell by 40%), poor land governance and land tenure (which had encouraged extensive and extractive modes of agriculture production), and mismanagement of natural resources (over-grazing of limited pastoral resources has led to soil degradation and desertification, adversely influencing rainfall patterns); **trans-boundary and other animal diseases**, as a result of poor detection and diagnostic capacities and lack of awareness amongst agro-pastoralist/pastoralist communities of animal health practices; **poor breeding and other herd management practices**; or **poor market development** in remote areas.

Central to both rain-fed farming and livestock are a number of issues, such as the sustainable use of natural resources. Poorly managed, agriculture and livestock systems will continue to have very low productivity as a result of growing soil degradation and inability to cope with increasing climatic variability, particularly droughts. Also, conflict between farmers and pastoralists will continue over competition for natural resources. Both farmers and pastoralists have traditionally worked alone, hence remaining a weak actor in the supply and value chain. Both have an interest in strengthening their position by organising themselves in organisations and facilitating value chain development.

## ii. Donor engagement

The EU and EU Member States, notably the UK, Italy, Spain, France and the Netherlands are active in supporting livelihoods and food security. For the EU, this constitutes the bulk of its interventions both at development and humanitarian level in Darfur and East Sudan. EU humanitarian aid focuses mainly on food assistance, nutrition and delivery of non-food items for production, in displaced and host communities. On the other hand, EU development aid aims to increase agricultural and livestock production, with a clear focus on: smallholders and establishing links between them and the private sector to promote market penetration; data collection on food security to orientate donors' interventions and sector strategies; control of trans-boundary animal health diseases; and natural resource management. The development of the EU-Africa Research and Innovation Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture is a specific case in point<sup>2</sup>.

EU Member States are active in the sector through a variety of interventions. The Netherlands has undertaken a number of studies on agricultural and livestock production and other agro-economic issues; Spain has limited funding focused on nutrition in Gedarif State; France has been funding yearly programs of food safety in Darfur; Italy has recently launched a 3-year

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<sup>2</sup> €65 million will be allocated to this R&I Partnership in 2016-2017 from Horizon 2020, EU Development funding and African and European national research budgets. It will have a focus on demonstration projects and pilot actions to bring to market R&I results through a multi-actor approach. The Partnership will enhance impact at local level and overcome the traditional donor-recipient relationship by jointly designing, owning, governing and funding it.

programme in East Sudan aimed at enhancing food security through a mix of interventions in livelihoods, education and water management; finally, the UK is implementing a number of programmes in Darfur and East Sudan. In Darfur, a key programme is the Sudan Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme, designed to improve nutrition of children. Other interventions focus on income generation and natural resources. Although directly targeting public health, the Water for East Sudan Programme implemented by the UK has clear synergies with livelihoods and food security programmes.

The enclosed map analyses the existing food security and nutrition programmes implemented by the EU and EU Member States, and shows that opportunities for an LRRD approach in the food security and nutrition sector exist in several geographical areas of Sudan, particularly where the protracted nature of the crisis is amongst the factors that limit the expected impact of the humanitarian emergency tool.

A number of international donors are also active in the sector, some prioritising mechanised and large-scale production (Japan, China, the Gulf Countries or the Islamic Development Bank), and others targeting a range of actions from delivery of food to support to small-scale farmers with a view to increase their productivity (UN Agencies, the United States or the African Development Bank).

### **iii. Priorities for future engagement**

*Objective 1:* to strengthen resilience against food crises and enhanced access to nutritional food and a dietary balanced intake through the following *indicative interventions*:

- supply of basic inputs (improved seeds and planting material, fertilisers and pesticides or animal health kits);
- provision of adequate agricultural techniques through access to extension packages, promotion of sustainable production techniques such as conservation agriculture, water harvesting, pasture management,
- facilitation of coping mechanism during the lean season, such as local storage facilities and food processing techniques;
- development of early warning and early response mechanisms for effective resilience building;
- support to safety nets schemes with conditional and unconditional transfers;
- support to nutrition sensitive programmes and improvement of nutrition knowledge to enhance dietary diversity;
- support to rehabilitation of markets;
- Income-generating activities for food insecure households in peri-urban areas (Darfur).

*Objective 2:* to strengthen the livestock sector through the following *indicative interventions*:

- improvement of the health of livestock by strengthening capacities for epidemiological surveillance and control of trans-boundary animal diseases. This includes the improvement of diagnostic and detection capacities and building stakeholder awareness/competency on how to improve animal health.
- demarcation of livestock routes through inclusive and peaceful mechanisms that bring together farmers and pastoralist stakeholders and to propose solutions, hence avoid conflict;

- provision of sustainable feed for livestock through greater availability of pasture and provision of animal feed supplements;

*Objective 3:* to improve the sustainable management of natural resources through the following *indicative interventions*:

- Renovation of dysfunctional water points, construction of water yards and surface catchments. This will facilitate farming and the movement of population and animals, as well as mitigating the negative effects of the over-exploitation of resources such as pastures and forest (e.g. cutting of wood for firewood production).
- Technical advice in the form of relevant regulatory frameworks for sustainable natural resource management, including land tenure.

*Objective 4:* to strengthen value chains in the rain-fed farming sector, giving priority to areas with markets and methods of transportation through the following *indicative interventions*:

- promotion of crops with added value and with significant nutritional components to address children's health problem;
- support to agricultural service organisations to strengthen their capacities through training of technical staff;
- conducting market research studies for specific field and horticulture crops that have a potential exit to market.

## **7. Support to civil society, local governance and peacebuilding**

### **i. Outlook**

The Sudanese Government generally regards civil society as a potential threat, responding to it through a tightly controlled legal and regulatory framework, and creating a restrictive environment that prevents civil society organisations from operating independently.

They are systematically subject to harassment by the security forces and denied fundamental rights of association, freedom of expression or access to information. This is compounded by a weak judiciary and lack of due process, which can lead to civil society activists being detained and imprisoned over long periods of time without charges. Civil society organisations operate with a high degree of uncertainty, subject to tight controls from the authorities. Their activities must be agreed by the Humanitarian Aid Commission before they can commence, and suspension and even closure of projects is common practice, and has increased in the run up to the elections of April 2015, together with closure of critical newspapers and harassment of journalists.

This context makes the relationship between civil society and the Sudanese Government extremely challenging, in particular at national level. The situation at local level is better, with greater communication between civil society organisations and the local authorities on account of the mandated role of the latter in public service delivery. The capacity of Sudanese civil society is very low, both at financial, administrative, and strategic level; often, civil society organisations lack a clear vision and are not able to position themselves in a strategic way. At national level, civil society has had access to donors' and international partners' capacity building, but new approaches are needed to make such partnerships more effective.

On paper, Sudan has a decentralised system of governance, and substantial functions are transferred to local authorities. They have competences in the delivery of basic services and in the oversight of revenue and expenditures. However, in practice they are impeded from carrying out these functions in the absence of fiscal transfers from the central level. The relationships between local authorities and the Central Government are severely hampered by lack of communication, conflict in the periphery, limited accountability and transparency, and poor infrastructure. In this context, there is a need for local authorities to be included more systematically in development processes, together with the civil society; with a view to increase their capacities to improve governance structures for service delivery.

The peripheral states of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile face major challenges of security and stability, while peace in Eastern Sudan remains fragile. The Transitional Areas have become a battleground between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N). In Darfur the Doha Peace Process is stalled, and the fighting between Government and opposition forces is intertwined with inter-tribal fighting over natural resources. In this context it is important to support peacebuilding and stabilisation activities that, by linking up with other sectors' support in livelihoods, services delivery and natural resources management, could help to address the root causes of conflicts, and contribute to the establishment of peaceful conflict mechanisms. There is a strong tradition of local peace-making and conflict resolution in Sudan, and deeply-embedded societal traditions of tolerance. A focus on community-level peacebuilding is key, in addition to a continued focus on how this can be linked to national peace processes, horizontally across the different States, and addressing common causes of conflict in a more integrated manner, such as political and economic exclusion and natural resource management.

## **ii. Donor engagement**

The EU and EU Member States are active supporters of the civil society in Sudan. From 2007 to 2013, the EU Delegation implemented the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development Programme (NSA-LA), with projects focusing on capacity building for civil society organisations and community mobilisation with a view to promote poverty reduction and access to quality public services in remote and rural areas.

This engagement currently continues under the new Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities Programme (CSO-LA), which aims at improving the cooperation of civil society and local authorities to improve inclusive governance and development processes. Through a number of other programmes and mechanisms, the EU and EU Member States also promote human rights, with an emphasis on the rights of the most vulnerable and marginalised populations, as well as gender equality and women's rights, including women's empowerment to participate in public life (e.g. through the Social Development Fund, the UN Women Fund, or direct financing through calls procedures, such as the EU Delegation EIDHR programme).

EU and EU Member States' support includes programmes focusing on media, youth leadership, human rights monitoring or social sectors, including empowerment of community-based organisations working at grass-root level, parent-teachers associations, universities or the promotion of peacebuilding initiatives and specifically aims at building the capacities of civil society in a substantial way. Such capacity building covers both financial and administrative weaknesses, as well as more strategic issues related to the setup of networks and coalitions to strengthen the voice of civil society organisations and their capacity to act.

Together with Japan, UK, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, the EU – through the IcSP – is also among the donors supporting conflict-prevention and capacity-building activities in Sudan, especially at the border between Sudan and South Sudan. The EU engagement in this sector comes in response to the negative effects that local conflicts and fragmentation between communities are producing on economic development, as well as on national and social cohesion.

At the higher political level, the EU actively contributes to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) - the only mediating body working on post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) arrangements and tensions both within and between Sudan and South Sudan. It is also supporting the ongoing mediation efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan with funding via the African Peace Facility (APF) Early Response Mechanism (ERM).

Given the limited space to act in this arena and limited number of potential civil society partners, it is essential that coordination with existing EU and Member States' interventions is particularly effective to prevent duplication and conflictual competition.

### **iii Priorities for future engagement**

In Sudan's governance and political climate, there is very little space to work on activities aimed at directly holding the Government accountable to its citizens, such as anti-corruption initiatives, public participation in budgetary processes, civil society monitoring of policies and laws, procurement monitoring, access to public information. Whilst these are all desirable outcomes, donors' support in those areas would need the development of organic processes that create a more conducive environment. At the same time, the EU and its Member States are already providing a great deal of support to the civil society in Sudan, in particular in the areas of capacity building and access to quality social services. In line with the EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with the Civil Society adopted in July 2014, the new Special Measure could help to complement and consolidate that support, especially with regard to promoting citizen and civil society participation in public policy-making and planning at the local level and supporting cooperation among civil society organisations and with local authorities through the set-up of coordination mechanisms and multi-stakeholders partnerships for public service delivery.

On one hand, the support to civil society organisations will be mainstreamed through the different sectors of the Special Measure. On the other hand, limited EU financial support will focus on the local level, in order to support inclusive and responsive local governance systems and enhanced social cohesion, through the following specific objectives:

Objective 1: to strengthen the ability of civil society to participate in public policy-making and planning at the local level, so as to improve the provision of basic public services to the needs of vulnerable populations, which will be pursued through the *following indicative interventions*:

- support the establishment/enhancement of fora/committees where CSOs can participate in public policymaking at the local, community level;
- support coordination, cooperation and communication mechanisms among civil society, in order to increase the impact CS can have in public life. This may include advocacy and participation to policy dialogue in social sectors through advocacy campaigns, capacity building, research and knowledge dissemination;

- support CSOs capacity building, especially in the areas of M&E and communication so as to promote the provision of improved CSOs service quality;
- support to basic freedoms, media, youth, women and human rights monitoring.

Objective 2: to enhance the ability of local authorities to respond to the needs of citizens through improved dialogue and cooperation with communities and local civil society with a view to better fulfil their role as providers of good governance, public space and inclusive, quality public services at the local level, which will be pursued through the *following indicative interventions*:

- improve social accountability by enhancing citizen participation in local decision-making, and thereby improving the capacity of local authorities to link budgets to social priorities and improve the use of resources for the benefit of the populations, one the one hand, as well as their capacity to engage with Central authorities, on the other hand.
- strengthen the capacity of local authorities to deliver public services through inter alia the setup of multi-stakeholder partnerships with civil society organisations.

Objective 3: to promote conflict prevention and mitigation, peace-building and reconciliation especially in those peripheral areas where the EU will invest development assistance for the improvement of livelihoods, food security and service delivery, through the *following indicative interventions*:

- promoting social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism through the provision of financial and technical support to local peace processes, peace-building institutions and community-level peace builders.
- creation of an enabling environment for community stabilisation and peaceful co-existence amongst communities mainly in border areas.
- to support community resilience to potential new conflicts, and to possible spill over effects from the neighbouring countries through specific cross-border cooperation initiatives, confidence-building measures and facilitation of dialogues.

Future EDF financing to civil society, local authorities and peacebuilding will focus on those peripheral areas where the EU will invest development assistance for the improvement of livelihoods, food security and service delivery.

Those future activities would draw from previous and on-going activities that the EU is implementing through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace and other thematic programmes such as those for non-state actors.

## **8. Geographical scope and beneficiaries**

Objectives will be pursued and actions implemented in Darfur, the Eastern States of Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref and, to the extent that access and security conditions allow, in the Southern border areas. Other areas may be targeted if their inclusion is necessary for the effective implementation of activities in those aforementioned areas. Exceptionally, a number of interventions could be implemented adjacent States, based on a detailed analysis of the costs-benefits of such interventions. For instance, the EU constructed four TVET centres in the IDP-prone areas of Kerari, Bahri, East Nile and Jebel Awlia and, whilst still operational, their state is reportedly dysfunctional. In this instance there is a case for undertaking a

detailed analysis of the state of those EU-funded TVET centres and assessing if and how they could benefit from further EU support.

The beneficiaries of EU interventions will be vulnerable populations in the above-mentioned States, in particular poor rural and peri-urban households, small-scale farmers and pastoralists, IDPs and refugees, girls, children, women and youth, as well as civil society organisations and other non-state actors such as the private sector, and local authorities. With an increasingly young population (41% of population is below 14 years old) there is a need to improve youth's access and opportunities to engage in the economy.

**9. Implementation modalities and implementing partners**

EU funding will be implemented by the European Commission through civil society organisations and other non-state actors, such as the private sector, delegated cooperation with EU Member States Cooperation Agencies or International Organisations.

In view of the crisis situation facing the country, and the common objectives pursued by this short-term strategy for Sudan and that of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, the budget envelope allocated for the implementation of this short-term strategy for Sudan will be implemented through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Given the difficult operational environment in Sudan the European Commission will take the necessary measures to require its implementing partners to effectively ensure direct implementation and monitoring of their activities.

The Sudanese Government will not be in charge of the management of EU funds and, therefore, the latter will not be channelled through Governmental

**10. Indicative budget overview**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Allocation (€M)</b>	<b>% of the total budget</b>	<b>Commitments in 2016 (€M)</b>	<b>Commitments in 2017 (€M)</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Health</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Livelihoods and food security</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>22.5</b>
<b>Civil Society, local governance and peacebuilding</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>Technical Cooperation Facility</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

## Appendix 1: Sector Intervention Framework

<b>Sector 1- Support to Education</b>		
<b>Expected results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
1. Enhanced quality of education	<p>1.1 Number of basic education teachers trained, disaggregated by state and sex</p> <p>1.2 Number of key curricula (to be defined during the identification and formulation phases) developed or updated</p> <p>1.3 Pupil –teacher ratio in rural or ethnically marginalised areas, compared to the more urbanised locations.</p>	Joint Annual Sector Review, EMIS, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports
2. Improved equitable access for all to education services	2.1 Gross and net enrolment rate in primary education, disaggregated by state, socioeconomic situation, and sex	Joint Annual Sector Review, EMIS, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports
3. Strengthened capacities of authorities, schools and PTAs in planning, management and oversight	3.1 Number of school managers and PTAs trained	Joint Annual Sector Review, EMIS, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports, UNICEF reports
4. Enhanced governance and equity of TVET and quality of delivery of TVET providers upgraded	<p>4.1 Gross enrolment rate in VTC centres, disaggregated by state and sex</p> <p>4.2 Number of reviewed or updated training programs responding to labour market needs</p> <p>4.3 Percentage of TVET programmes' completers working in relevant occupations</p> <p>4.3 Number of TVET trainers and school managers trained.</p>	EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports; employer/employee surveys
5. Strengthened capacities of the authorities in TVET	5.1 Number of training and capacity building	EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports

planning, management and oversight	workshops.  5.2 Number of public-private partnerships established.	
<b>Sector 2 – Support to Health</b>		
<b>Expected results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
1. Improved quality primary health care delivery in selected localities	1.1 Number of sublocalities with a functioning public health facility providing the full health care package  1.2 % Coverage of essential medicines	FMoH and SMOH, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports
2. Maternal and child mortality rates are reduced	2.1 Under 5 mortality rate and maternal Mortality rate	FMoH and SMOH, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports
3. Improved access to quality treatment of moderate and severe acute malnutrition ( GAM and SAM) for children under 5 years	3.1 GAM and SAM prevalence rates	SMART Surveys, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports, UNICEF Reports
4. LHA and SMOH key departments involved on health needs assessment and identification of local priorities	4.1 Number of reviewed plans and needs assessment done by LHA and SMOH	FMoH and SMOH, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports
5. Strengthened capacities of the LHA in planning, management and budgeting	5.1 Number of locality managers trained in planning, management and budgeting	FMoH and SMOH, EU-funded Programmes, Progress Reports
<b>Sector 3 – Support to livelihoods and food security</b>		
<b>Expected results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
1. Resilience against food crises strengthened and access to nutritional food and a dietary balanced intake enhanced	1.1 Number people suffering from chronic food insecurity (disaggregated by sex) 1.2 Stunting levels of <5 years children (sex disaggregated) 1.3 Average number of food insecure months (household level) per year	FSNTS reports, FEWS-NET reports, Statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture/Ministry of Health, Evaluation reports

2. Livestock sector strengthened	2.1 Value of exports of small ruminants to the Arabic peninsula (measured in number of small ruminants' exports). 2.2 State-based disease surveillance capacities for major animal diseases improved (measured using proxy indicator of number of animals tested, percentage of false positive/negative test results) 2.3 Number of conflicts between pastoralist and farmers in the project areas	FSNTS reports, Statistics from the Ministry of Animal Health, Evaluation reports
3. Sustainable management of natural resources improved	3.1 Number of people receiving formal or customary land rights 3.2 Land (hectares) where sustainable management has been introduced 3.3 Number of households with improved access to water	FSNTS report, FEWS-NET reports, Statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture, Evaluation reports
4. Value chains in the rain-fed farming sector, giving priority to areas with markets and methods of transportation are strengthened	4.1 Average household income level (per year) 4.2 Value of products (to be defined at identification and formulation stage when the location has been selected) at State level (measured in increase of number of sacks) 4.3 Number of farmers receiving agriculture advisory services 4.4 Number farmers linked to markets	FSNTS reports, Evaluation reports
<b>Sector 4 - Support to civil society, local governance and peacebuilding</b>		
<b>Expected results</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>
1. Ability of civil society to participate in public policy-making and planning at the local level strengthened	1.1 Number of CSO fora established or reinforced at community level; 1.2. Number of advocacy initiatives and dialogues held between civil society and local authorities in	Reports from NGO forum; Monitoring missions; implementation of the donor mapping on civil society, reports from implementing partners.

	social sectors; 1.3 Number of communication initiatives launched to promote the use of social services	
2. Ability of local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities of providers of public goods strengthened	2.1 Number of multi-stakeholders partnerships setup between local authorities and civil society to deliver public services 2.2 % of decisions taken by local authorities regarding social services with the consultation of civil society 2.3 Level of fiscal transfer from the central to the local level (measured as percentage of national budget to the local level), and their use for investments in education and health (as % of transfer to local level)	Reports from NGO forum; Monitoring missions; implementation of the donor mapping on civil society, reports from implementing partners, reports from the central and states Ministries of Finance., reports from local authorities
3. Upstream conflict prevention and mitigation promoted at local level	3.1. Number of local peace processes supported, 3.2. Number of community-peace-builders trained. 3.3. Number of days each year when EU funded health/ education/ livelihood projects activities are suspended due to inter communal conflict'	

*Baselines for the indicators in this sector intervention framework will be introduced at the Action Document stage at the latest.*

The results, indicators and means of verification specified in the present annex may need to evolve to take into account changes intervening during the programming period.

