Externationalization of European Borders

There have been a lot of conversations and discussions recently about exnternalizing European borders to places far away from Europe. First of all, what does it mean to externalize EU borders?

European control over external borders can be defined as a set of processes whereby European actors and member states complement immigration control policies with initiatives that achieve this control outside regional borders and through other countries and agencies rather than their own. This phenomenon has multiple dimensions. The spatial dimension captures the overlapping geographical distance between the position where force is applied and the observation position. But there is also a relational dimension, regarding the multiplicity of actors involved in the project through bilateral and multilateral interactions, usually through coercive dynamics of reward, incentives, or conditional punishment. These are very functional and useful dimensions, with regard to the cost-effectiveness of creating the distance (as regards moral and rights) for unwanted immigrants. What should be a matter of state concern is delegated towards  a group of foreign policy organs in terms of purpose, shape , and the final delivery and control service .

Thus European borders (re) appear as ubiquitous, multimodal and expressively coercive systems - as an interconnected network which creates distance, both physically and ethically, and which is used to transfer associated responsibilities .

The main steps in externalizing European immigration policies, and its more serious consequences for violations of fundamental human rights

The topic of " internationalization abroad", that is, the transfer of border management to third countries, was the subject of heated discussions after the implementation of the readmission agreement between the European Union and Turkey, which was strongly criticized. In exchange for 6 billion euros for Erdogan's government, the deal guaranteed that all those who had arrived in Greece "illegally" would be returned to Turkey, thus delegating control of the Balkan borders to the Turkish authorities. This has clear and precise implications for human rights violations .

This is not new in the sun . The deal between the European Union and Turkey was just an important step (and certainly not the last) in a long-term process, which has witnessed an alarming acceleration recently, and under the pressure of the so-called "refugee crisis" especially in Sudan and North African countries from Egypt in the east to Morocco in the west through Libya, Tunisia and Algeria.

The main thing in the process of external transformation is that negotiations, in their context, start with other countries without first assessing human rights standards in those places or the way in which local governments deal with migration issues. We are talking about states - we might even call them dictatorships - like Sudan, where former President Omar al-Bashir before the popular movement had a wonderful arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court .

The only factor to be considered is the geopolitical interest, in the sense that negotiations open with States "key"-based on their proximity to Europe . Historically, dealing with countries that matter because of their geographical location, regardless of their respect for human rights, has been a model element in the practice of outsourcing. Libya in times of Gaddafi was a model.

However, there is a new component, which is equally dangerous: while funds for development assistance have always been used in a strategic manner, they have now become formal incentives or penalties for cooperation or failure to cooperate with deportation and repatriation procedures. Development funds have become a tool for implementing border control policies in countries of origin and transit, and this is wrong and clear.

This approach highlights a number of wrong political assumptions, starting with the concept "helping them at home". Assuming that migration can be prevented by strategically allocating development funds: this "truth" is that nothing is further from the truth . This point was made very well by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau . Numerous studies have shown that development assistance does not reduce the number of departures from countries of origin, and therefore dispels the validity of any reason based on this hypothesis .

We must also reject the idea that these policies are justified because their stated goal is to reduce the number of deaths at sea, as it is clear that migrants continue to take risky journeys and die at sea, and will not stop doing so until safe and legal access channels are guaranteed . Apart from temporary improvements, this situation will actually worsen due to the external approach, which gives a major role to countries like Eritrea and Libya, where prisoners are systematically killed and tortured .

The final element that should be highlighted is the harmful rationale behind all these policies: On the one hand, there is enormous interference in the African continent, where Europe requires the implementation of control systems in countries that must allow free circulation within the ECOWAS space . On the other hand, negotiations are taking place with African countries at the expense of hundreds of thousands of people .

The main European steps in the strategy of externalization in Africa are the Khartoum process, which began in 2014, and the 2015 European Summit in Valletta. Border externalization has been a founding strategy in European politics a decade ago, but only recently have we seen this acceleration with "development funds" beong used for criminalizing migration . This is especially true in Africa, starting with the Khartoum Process and the Valletta Summit .

The Khartoum and Valletta measures, shaping relations between the European Union and sub-Saharan and North Africa, came in the wake of the foreign policy of border control, which had already been adopted during the 2006 Rabat process. Then, in 2007, the European Union negotiated bilateral treaties in managing migration with some Maghreb countries .

Since Khartoum, the logic applied to control the Moroccan-Spanish border was extended to the Horn of Africa, which gave an important role to countries such as Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, and Niger : dictatorships that were previously excluded from negotiations with the European Union, suddenly became major actors in managing migration issues. Also, conditional allocation of development funds has become a regular practice. This is in line with the growing political will to stem the flow of migrants to Europe and facilitate the forced return of those who have arrived in Europe "illegally".

A really important element of the Valletta Summit is the provision of trust funds for Africa (1.8 billion euros) during the negotiations, for distribution to countries along the Central Mediterranean route : the Sahel region (Libya, Mali, and Niger ) and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, next to Egypt). The summit reaffirmed the key role that repatriation plays in immigration control policies . At the same time, there was the agenda for establishing contact points - or rather adopting a "hotspot approach" to facilitate identification of migrants upon arrival and thus ensuring their forced return within a short period of time.

Of particular concern is the key role played by European Union member states such as Germany, France and Italy, such as the proposal by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gentiloni to revitalize the 2008 treaty during the Italian-African Ministerial Conference in May 2016. One cannot help but notice how the interest of these countries in maintaining economic relations with African countries has affected discussions. However, economic interests in Africa cannot be developed at the expense of protecting basic rights in immigration matters .

The four axes of economic, security, development and immigration interests are seriously integrated into conditional and interconnected relations during negotiations with African countries. These should be kept strictly separate .

In this context, it is also important to highlight one last fact : In Europe, there is a lack of transparency surrounding these agreements and the accompanying negotiations. All of these are informal agreements, signed during initiatives such as the Khartoum process, without the control (and without endorsement ) of parliaments, with clear consequences regarding the risk of deviations. For example, Egypt in 2017 signed  agreements with Germany - in exchange for various forms of economic development and security cooperation, and the training of the police. In the center of these agreements were "migration management" strategies, and cooperation in the militarization of the border.

In short, this is a clear example for the externalization of  borders and the regulations that give up any form of concern for human rights, at the initiative of the European Union.