Frontex’s increasing role in reintegration policy and its effects in West Africa

The externalisation of European border controls to Africa has received substantial political and critical attention. The same cannot be said of “reintegration” policies, ostensibly designed to support people deported from the EU. Frontex’s role in both deportation and reintegration is increasing. The consequences of this in The Gambia and Nigeria raise questions over national sovereignty, the rights of and support for deportees, and the instrumentalisation of independent organisations.

Introduction

European policymakers try to draw a clear line between so-called assisted voluntary return and forced removal. However, as both stem from migrants’ illegalisation, these two forms of return both amount to deportation. Deportees and their communities struggle to re-establish themselves after traumatic migration and deportation experiences.

In the few cases when European countries offer them reintegration assistance, it works as a tool to convince people to self-deport, is limited in amount and is Eurocentric in its conceptualisation. Indeed, it prioritises individualised business projects based on insufficient resources and training, without addressing the economic exploitation of and mobility injustice faced by Africans.

In 2023, Frontex’s involvement in deporting third-country nationals increased by 116% in so-called voluntary return and by 58% overall. This analysis looks at the implications of this expansion in the context of West Africa.

Frontex and West Africa

Frontex has a longstanding involvement in West Africa. Operation Hera, involving maritime and aerial patrols off the coasts of Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Morocco, started in 2006. All West African countries are part of the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC), and Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania host Risk Analysis Cells. These are used to collect data on transnational crime and border crossings.

The agency also has working arrangements with Nigeria and Cape Verde, and had one with the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) until the Nigerien government ended the mission.

This type of arrangement normally involves information exchange, capacity-building on border governance and the facilitation of readmission agreements. They do not require approval by the European Commission or European Parliament, posing questions around transparency and democracy.

Beyond working arrangements, status agreements can be agreed between the EU and other states. These allow the deployment of Frontex officials in non-EU states. They are negotiated by the Commission with the country in question, and require approval by the European Parliament.

Status agreements mean that Frontex border guards can conduct border checks and surveillance, amongst other things. In Africa, the EU previously tried to sign such an agreement with Mauritania, and a deal with Senegal may still be on the cards.

These plans and the other initiatives signal a worrying externalisation trend, pose clear sovereignty issues and have the direct consequence of hindering free movement within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Deportation and reintegration

EU “reintegration” policy has received somewhat less public attention than other initiatives. Since 2018, the European Union has supported reintegration through the involvement of local service providers in its European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN).

Frontex’s Joint Reintegration Service (JRS) took over ERRIN in 2022, renaming it the EU Reintegration Programme (EU-RP). Assigning reintegration policy to a clearly securitarian actor like Frontex further underscores the link between so-called voluntary return and forced removal outlined above.

Recent policy documents indicate an intention to extend the involvement of Frontex’s liaison officers in deportation and reintegration, and to increase their funding and deployment. The aim is for Frontex to introduce more standardisation, datafication and digitalisation in deportation and reintegration.

More specifically, Frontex will increase its involvement in “return counselling” by developing counselling trainings and dedicated curricula; increase the extraction of data on the fuzzy concept of “sustainable reintegration”; and develop return and reintegration-related digital tools.

These include the Return Case Management System (RECAMAS), the Integrated Return Management Application (IRMA 2.0), and a “return data warehouse pilot.” A Mobile App for Reintegration (RAPP) will be expanded. Additionally, return counsellors should communicate through the Reintegration Assistance Tool (RIAT), a digital interface pooling information and monitoring all phases of return and reintegration.

The next sections will discuss these developments with regard to The Gambia and Nigeria.

The increasing role of Frontex and its consequences for The Gambia and migrants

Sovereignty issues

The relationship between The Gambia and the EU on the deportation of illegalised migrants is a complicated one. In 2018, the Gambian government and the EU ratified a Good Practices Document on return procedures. It includes provisions on the support from the EU for the reintegration of deportees. In 2019, however, Gambian president Adama Barrow announced a moratorium on forced returns. This led to EU sanctions, and the Gambian government eventually reversed its decision. There are thus clearly already certain sovereignty issues in the relationship between The Gambia and the EU. EU assistance is increasingly being delegated to Frontex which, given its extensive record of human rights breaches inside and outside EU territory, further exacerbates this concern.

Deportees’ struggle for support

The extension of the mandate of the Frontex liaison officer based in Senegal means the agency is now also involved in deportation operations to The Gambia. EU-funded reintegration assistance within the context of so-called assisted voluntary return was previously given by the Gambian Catholic Development Office (CaDO, under the supervision of Caritas International Belgium, within the context of ERRIN.

As discussed above, Frontex took over the EU-RP in 2022. As a consequence, it concluded a partnership with both Caritas International Belgium and CaDo. This partnership should offer post-arrival and reintegration assistance to returnees, including temporary and long-term accommodation, start-up capital for business development, schooling and training.

Previous beneficiaries of ERRIN have lamented delays in the reception of support, inadequate follow-up and confusion with relation to the assistance offered by different partners, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The agency’s intervention in a landscape already saturated with humanitarian and development actors is an element of over-complexification.

As for Caritas, its willingness to work with Frontex confirms scholarly findings on the ever-growing embedding of so-called humanitarian actors in a mostly securitarian migration governance landscape.

Consequences for the civil society landscape

The standardization of digital tools and training curricula mentioned above may be beneficial for Frontex and officials working with it, but detrimental for recipients given the different cases, countries and circumstances in question. Furthermore, it poses risks for anonymity and privacy because of its focus on increased data and information extraction.

The pledge to increase funds to strengthen Frontex’s role in deportation and reintegration will have the additional consequence of boosting the agency’s stance vis-à-vis locally-embedded and long-standing civil society actors in The Gambia. This includes deportee-led organisations seeking independence from more powerful actors, such as IOM, which exploit them politically and financially under the banner of efficient migration management.

The deepening role of Frontex and its consequences for Nigeria and migrants

Sovereignty issues

Frontex's collaboration with the Nigerian government, particularly through the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), raises important questions about national sovereignty. The existing working arrangement (signed in 2012) and the NIS Border Management Strategy (2019-2023) highlight a structured dialogue and cooperation that may compromise Nigeria's autonomy in managing its migration policies. Nigerian authorities are encouraged to intensify their efforts to implement the agreement, potentially infringing on the country’s sovereignty.

The emphasis on Frontex's role in border management and return operations suggests a shift in control that could undermine Nigeria's ability to protect the rights of its citizens who wish to cross the border in search of protection—as many parts of the country are experiencing banditry, kidnapping and conflicts—or better economic opportunities.

Focus on deportation over reintegration

A draft EU action plan on Nigeria from September 2021 emphasised return, readmission, and reintegration, yet the focus appears to be disproportionately on facilitating deportation rather than ensuring comprehensive reintegration.

Though Frontex is involved in initiatives aimed at supporting returnees, such as the Integrated Reintegration Assistance for Returnees and Asylum Seekers (IRARA) programme, civil society organizations (CSOs) indicate that the reality often differs significantly from what is promised. Many deportees face challenges in reintegrating into their communities, leading to cycles of migration as they seek better opportunities abroad.

Non-transparent processes

The reintegration landscape in which Frontex operates in Nigeria is frequently criticised for its lack of transparency. Many deportees report confusion and a lack of information regarding the procedures affecting them. This non-transparent nature can exacerbate vulnerabilities, leaving returnees without adequate support or guidance.

As one CSO member told the authors of this article: “They [Frontex/the IRARA programme] are bringing back people... who have lost their senses. What are the arrangements down? Is there any arrangement for recuperation?” This highlights the urgent need for clearer communication and support mechanisms for returnees.

Health concerns and psychological challenges

Despite the reintegration assistance, health issues are a significant concern for many returning Nigerian migrants. Reports suggest that some returnees arrive in Nigeria with serious psychological and health challenges, having experienced trauma during their migration journey. The lack of adequate health services and psychosocial support for returnees can lead to further marginalization and mental health crises.

As emphasized by CSO representatives: “They [returnees] need further health services, health concerns. They need psychosocial services. You know some of those things must be done because there must be a recovery process that must be put in place for them.” This underscores the neeed for comprehensive health services to assist returnees in their recovery process.

Focus on Frontex’s goals over fundamental rights

CSOs in Nigeria often find themselves navigating a complex landscape where the goal of increasing deportations, with Frontex support, may not align with the EU’s ostensible values and human rights standards. The emphasis on expedited returns overshadows the fundamental rights of migrants, leading to violations. The focus on operational efficiency over humanitarian considerations raises ethical concerns about the treatment of migrants throughout the deportation process.

As one CSO member articulated:

“The kind of people they are bringing back, there is no adequate arrangement for them. They are bringing back people, somebody who has been in prison…. and the person is returned drugged. He has lost his senses. What are the arrangements down? Is there any arrangement for (the) recuperation or that these people have been brought back just to die? Because no matter the kind of support you give to such a person, it’s not going to be sustainable… some of them don’t even see it as support because they don’t know what to do with it. They have already lost their senses. That’s my concern about such a return programme with IRARA and Frontex”.

Conclusion

Recent EU discussions and legal developments seek to strengthen and expand the involvement of Frontex in deportation and reintegration. The underlying narrative points to Frontex’s potential in harmonising and standardising approaches across the EU and its member states. This, however, has severe consequences in West African countries.

In The Gambia, Frontex superimposed on an existing partnership between the Belgian and Gambian Caritas, complicating further a support landscape that returnees already find difficult to navigate.

Frontex’s emphasis on digital tools and data collection will exacerbate a securitarian trend in return and reintegration, while the pledge to increase the agency’s resources in the area will exacerbate power asymmetries vis-à-vis grassroots organisations struggling to avoid instrumentalisation and exploitation.

In Nigeria, Frontex’s emphasis on border and migration control undermines the country’s ability to protect the rights of those Nigerian citizens compelled to move. Furthermore, civil society organisations and returnees lament the lack of transparency and inadequacy of Frontex’s support to reintegration, negatively affecting the (mental) health of returnees and their communities.