Monthly Press Review November 2025

This monthly press review covers Eurafrican migration control, migration, social movements and displacement in African countries, and news on the European border regime.

The selection of these articles is somewhat rough and contingent, and biassed on our interest in popular uprisings, and social and migration movements, but also border politics, and militarization of social relations. The main topics of this month were

• Developments in Sudan after the Fall of El Fasher
• Mali under siege
• The EU New Pact for the Mediterranean.

The main sources are News from AJE, Guardian, New York Times, and others., but also newsletters from various sources. As we know, all the more after the Gaza experience, it is necessary to complement the European, and especially the German news landscape with articles from abroad. If anybody would like to contribute from other sources, let us know (contact[at]migration-control.info).

For a more sophisticated way of doing press reviews, and more fokused on European developments, please Also see migreurop Press Review July 2025, and the ERCE Press Review.

We also recommend the SWP Web Monitore, especially Nahost/ Nordafrika, and Subsahara-Afrika.

World

29.11.25 NYT: Where Hundreds of Undocumented Migrants Have Died in Custody: Malaysia does not grant political asylum to migrants, but it allows those who arrive illegally to live and work if they have been granted refugee status by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Similar to what has happened in the United States, officials in Malaysia have carried out more raids this year in immigrant communities.Officers have been arresting about 7,000 migrants a month, more than double the rate in recent years, said Yap Lay Sheng of the human rights group Fortify Rights. “Many are held for prolonged periods in overcrowded facilities with filthy sanitation, poor ventilation, inadequate access to clean water, food and medical care,” he said. “Detainees face severe torture, both physical and psychological.”

27.11.25 France 24: Trump suspends migration from ‘third world countries’ after National Guard shooting: US President Donald Trump said Thursday he would suspend migration from what he called "third world countries", a day after an Afghan national allegedly shot two National Guard soldiers in Washington, killing one.
His social media post, which also threatened to reverse "millions" of admissions granted under his predecessor Joe Biden, marked a new escalation in the anti-migration stance of a second term that has been dominated by Trump's mass deportation campaign.

All Africa

Follow the Money: The scramble for Africa: [Website] Europe has major financial and political interests in Africa, but also an uncomfortable colonial history. Follow the Money investigates how European governments and companies navigate the tension between past and present. (11 articles so far)

01.12.25 Guardian: Aid cuts have shaken HIV/Aids care to its core – and will mean millions more infections ahead: The Trump administration abruptly cut all overseas aid spending in January, with only piecemeal restorations to funding since then. Other countries, including the UK, have announced their own cuts. It has been estimated that external health assistance over 2025 will be between 30% and 40% lower than it was in 2023.
The UN agency’s report finds that services working to prevent HIV infections were particularly likely to be donor-funded and are among the hardest hit In Burundi, for example, the number of people receiving preventive HIV medicines fell by 64%.
A separate series of country-level reports from the British charity Frontline Aids, covering Angola, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, highlights similar issues.

11.11.25 FA: A Hidden Hunger Crisis Is Destabilizing the World: Every dollar spent on preventing extreme hunger saves many more that might have to be disbursed in response to crises. The persistence of hunger is not inevitable. It is a policy choice. Reversing it is not only a moral duty; it is a strategic necessity.

04.11.25 Guardian: ‘They take the money and go’: why not everyone is mourning the end of USAID: [Opinion] One evening a few months into my stay, I was invited to a planning session at a consultant’s home, a gated white house with gleaming floors and new leather couches. On behalf of Sierra Leone’s government, a small group of us were to outline, in just a few hours, a city-wide programme that would be paid for by foreign donors and be endorsed by the highest levels of the ministry of health. The programme would start the next day.
Food was ordered and champagne opened to help us get through the night. On a personal level, I liked my colleagues. They were hard-working and seemed to genuinely care about creating a better healthcare system. Still, I had an out-of-body feeling for much of the evening, thinking: a group of five foreign people, drinking champagne and sketching, on a white board, a plan for Sierra Leone’s ministry of health? This can’t be right.

North Africa:

Egypt

EC 22.10.25: 1st EU-Egypt Summit (Brussels, 22 October 2025) - Joint Statement: oday’s Summit marks a significant milestone in the deepening of EU–Egypt relations, building on the Association Agreement, our Partnership Priorities and the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership (SCP).
Acknowledging the socioeconomic impact of regional crises on Egypt, the EU reaffirms its commitment to supporting Egypt’s efforts towards achieving macro-economic stability and resilience, through a support package of EUR 7.4 billion.
18. … The EU and Egypt will continue supporting migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and host communities in full respect of international law and in line with national frameworks.

Libya

17.11.25 APANews: Libya, Chad joint force under Saddam Haftar’s command: The Armed Forces of the General Command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar have announced the creation of a joint force with the Chadian Army to secure the border between the two countries. .The new structure will reportedly be placed under the supervision of the deputy commander of Eastern forces, Saddam Haftar, the same sources said.
[As for the Haftar’s LNA, Jeune Afrique observes that it is also eager to ensure stability in territories under its control, which host three Emirati military bases—one of which was used to deliver a ransom, including arms, to al-Qaeda militants in Mali in exchange for freeing a member of the Emirati royal family at the end of October. Chad and the UAE also support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in neighboring Sudan.]

05.11.25 Guardian: Libyan general accused of crimes against humanity arrested in Tripoli: A Libyan general wanted by the international criminal court (ICC) for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity has been arrested in Tripoli.
Osama Almasri Najim, the former chief of Libya’s judicial police, was arrested over allegations of torturing prisoners, leading to the death of one, at Tripoli’s main prison, Libya’s prosecutor’s office said on Wednesday.
The Italian government came under fire in January after Najim was arrested in the northern city of Turin on the ICC warrant only to be released two days later and flown back to Tripoli on an Italian air force plane.

Mauritania

07.11.25 AJE: Inside Mauritania’s mass deportation campaign targeting African migrants: [Lo0ng Read] Mass crackdown on migrants follows deal signed with the EU to stem migration from source countries in Africa.

Also see Eldiario 06.10.25: La UE abre en Mauritania, con la colaboración de España, dos cárceles para migrantes inspiradas en los campamentos policiales de Canarias

Morocco

13.10.25 MedaFrica: Fishing Deal: EU planning talks with Rabat after UNSC recognition of Autonomy Plan under Moroccan sovereignty: The EU decision to open negotiations with Morocco on new fisheries accord comes two weeks after the UN Security Council adopted historic resolution 2797 endorsing Morocco’s autonomy plan for the Sahara under the Kingdom’s sovereignty. Last month, the European Union has renewed a farming trade deal with Morocco including the Sahara products.

30.10.245 Spiegel: Marokko klagt nach Protestwelle 2480 Menschen an: Die regierungskritischen Demos zählen zu den größten in Marokko seit Jahren, angeführt werden sie von jungen Menschen. Hunderte von ihnen werden nun von der Justiz verfolgt – es drohen lange Haftstrafen.

Also see The New Arab 18.10.25: Arab Reform: Gen Z protests against corruption and inequality are shaking Morocco. Here's what to know;16.10.25: Gen Z 212 Earthquake Youth Shaking Morocco’s Politics [Analysis];

28.07.25 (!) Follow the Money: Reportage] [Pollution, poverty, protests: On the toxic trail of Morocco’s phosphate giant: The world’s largest exporter – the state-owned OCP – faces growing criticism from human rights campaigners and local communities over the dangers to their health and the environment.

Tunisia

23.11.25 AJE: ‘Enough repression’: Thousands of Tunisians protest against Kais Saied: Thousands of protesters have taken to the streets of the Tunisian capital to protest against what they call President Kais Saied’s escalating authoritarianism and the jailing of government critics.
At least 2,000 people, wearing black and carrying whistles and red ribbons, marched through Tunis on Saturday, chanting slogans, including “the people want the fall of the regime” and “no fear no terror, the street belongs to the people”.

Also see AJE 14.11.25: Rights groups decry Tunisia’s ‘injustice’, crackdown on activists: “Tunisian authorities have increasingly escalated their crackdown on human rights defenders and independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through arbitrary arrests, detention, asset freezes, bank restrictions and court-ordered suspensions, all under the pretext of fighting ‘suspicious’ foreign funding and shielding ‘national interests’“

Also see: Solidarity with the FTDES and Tunisia’s civil society!

06.11.25 Amnesty: Tunisia: “Nobody hears you when you scream”: Dangerous shift in Tunisia’s migration policy: [Report] Officials carry out life-threatening collective expulsions in violation of the principle of non-refoulement, following often reckless sea interceptions or racially targeted arrests, frequently accompanied by torture and other ill-treatment, including dehumanizing sexual violence. Access to asylum has been suspended, while organisations providing protection to refugees and migrants have faced severe repression. Tunisia is therefore neither a place of safety for disembarkation nor a “safe third country” for the transfer of asylum seekers.

Also see Infomigrants 11.11.25: "La Tunisie est devenue plus dangereuse que la Libye pour les Subsahariens" : témoignage d'un migrant à Tripoli

14.10.25 AJE: Dozens hospitalised in Tunisia’s Gabes amid environmental crisis: The latest hospitalisations are part of spike in reported cases of respiratory problems that residents blame on fumes from the Tunisian Chemical Group’s (CGT) phosphate headquarters – a site authorities pledged to gradually close in 2017 but have yet to follow through on. Years of frustration over the site’s emissions erupted on October 11, when residents stormed the complex demanding its closure.

East Africa

Ethiopia

06.11.25 AJE: Tigray fighters enter Ethiopia’s Afar region, stoking fears of new conflict: Ethiopia’s Afar region has accused forces from neighbouring Tigray of crossing into its territory, seizing several villages and attacking civilians, in what it called a breach of the 2022 peace deal that ended the war in northern Ethiopia.

Sudan

29.11.25 France 24: How did chlorine imported to Sudan for water purification end up being used as a poison gas?: Barrels containing chlorine gas were used as a chemical weapon near an oil refinery in Sudan in September 2024, as shown by the first part of an investigation by the FRANCE 24 Observers. In this second installment, we trace how the barrels were imported into the country by Ports Engineering Company, a Sudanese company with links to the army, under the pretext that they would be used to produce potable water.

Also see France 24 29.11.25: Exclusive: The first proof of the use of chemical weapons in Sudan’s civil war

27.11.25 UN-OHCR: UN experts call for urgent action to combat trafficking in El Fasher: UN human rights experts* today expressed concern about reports of trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation and sexual slavery and children for recruitment and use as fighters in the escalating violence in El Fasher.

Also see Guardian12.11.25 : Dire warnings over aid and hunger following RSF’s capture of Sudanese city: Fears rise for displaced civilians as UN reports deteriorating situation and MSF warns of ‘staggering’ malnutrition

20.11.25 France 24: Trump pledges to end Sudan war, marking major shift in US stance: US President Donald Trump pledged Wednesday to intervene in Sudan’s brutal civil war after a request from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, marking a sharp shift for a conflict he admitted had been “not on my charts” until now.

Also see SWM 24.11.24: Sudan’s Military Ruler Attacks Trump’s Envoy in Fiery Speech; Spiegel 24.11.25: Sudans Machthaber lehnt US-Entwurf zu Waffenruhe ab; France 24 06.11.25: Sudan's RSF paramilitary group agrees to US-backed proposal for humanitarian truce: Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces agreed to a proposal from the United States and Arab powers for a humanitarian ceasefire and is open to talks on a cessation of hostilities, it said on Thursday in a statement; NYT 20.11.25: At Saudi Behest, Trump Vows to Seek Peace in Sudan, a Goal He Had Spurned: “His Majesty would like me to do something very powerful having to do with Sudan,” he told a forum of business leaders on Wednesday. “We’re going to start working on it.”

19.11.25 SWM: Widespread Fighting Engulfs Kordofan Region: The three states of the Greater Kordofan region have witnessed some of the heaviest fighting of the year, as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—supported by the Joint Force movements of Darfur and allied militias—clashed on multiple fronts.
The fighting involves both sprawling mobile warfare on the plains of North Kordofan, and intense urban combat in the besieged city of Babanusa. The latest escalation follows the RSF’s seizure of the Sudanese army’s 6th Infantry Division in El Fasher, North Darfur’s capital, late last month, freeing substantial RSF manpower for redeployment into Kordofan.

01.12.25 SWM: Sudanese Army Base in Babanusa Overrun After Protracted Siege: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Monday seized control of the headquarters of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ 22nd Infantry Division in the town of Babanusa, West Kordofan State, after a two-year siege, dealing the military another major reversal, only weeks after the fall of El Fasher. [Next stop will be El Obeid – decisive victory for RSF]

Also see AJE 28.11.25: RSF military push for Kordofan leaves Sudan at risk of partition; Spiegel 26.11.25: »Wir sprechen von extremer Erniedrigung, sexueller Folter und Sklaverei«: Die krisenerprobte Uno-Chefin für den Sudan sagt, Brutalität in diesem Ausmaß habe sie noch nie gesehen; AJE 09.11.25: Sudan medics accuse RSF of burning, burying bodies to conceal ‘genocide’; Guardian 07.11.25: UK rejected atrocity prevention plans for Sudan despite warning of possible genocide; 06.11.25 Spiegel: „Die Menschen starben vor unseren Augen“: Überlebende berichte von den Massakern; AJE 06.11.25: Where are tens of thousands of people in Sudan fleeing to?; 06.11.25 WOZ: Schutzlos ausgeliefert; AJE 05.11.25: Sudan’s army captures two areas in North Kordofan as RSF burns more bodies: The government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have recaptured two territories in the North Kordofan state from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as the paramilitary group continues burning and burying bodies in Darfur’s el-Fasher to hide evidence of mass killings.05.11.25 RFI: Le Tchad observe avec attention l’évolution du conflit au Soudan voisin: Outre un probable afflux de réfugiés s'ajoutant à près d'un million et demi de Soudanais sur son territoire, la prise de la capitale du Darfour Nord par les FSR du général Hemedti risque d’accentuer les tensions internes et les facteurs externes de déstabilisation.; AJE 05.11.25: The families forced to pay ransoms to free loved ones in Sudan’s el-Fasher; Guardian 03.11.25: At least 36,000 Sudanese have fled since fall of El Fasher to RSF, says UN agency: The people, most on foot, headed to Tawila, a town west of El Fasher that is sheltering more than 652,000 displaced people, the UN said; SWM 03.11.25: Investigation: The Killing Fields of El Fasher.: Homes and hospitals were raided, patients were wounded and killed, and many were executed in cold bloods – much of it was documented in trophy videos published by RSF soldiers touting their victory. As families fled on foot in an effort to reach humanitarian aid in the town of Tawila, hundreds were taken hostage, the men were separated from their families, and many were blackmailed for ransom.

19.11.25 Untergrundblättle: Sudan: Die Unterstützung der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate für die Rapid Support Forces (RSF): [Analysis] Nach dem Ausbruch des Massakers der Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in El-Fasher und dem Beginn einer neuen Phase des Völkermords in Darfur (durch die gleichen Kräfte wie zuvor) erfordert der Widerstand gegen diesen Völkermord natürlich, Druck auf die unmittelbaren Unterstützer der RSF auszuüben, insbesondere die Herrscher der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE).

Also see: Entries fur UAE

04.11.25 Swissaid: Vereinigte Arabische Emirate mehr denn je Drehscheibe für Konfliktgold: Die VAE importieren weiterhin Gold aus Schmuggel- und Konfliktgebieten, insbesondere aus dem Sudan und seinen Nachbarländern. Im Jahr 2024 importierten die VAE 29 Tonnen Gold aus dem Sudan, gegenüber 17 Tonnen im Jahr 2023, sowie erhebliche Mengen über Nachbar-länder: 27 Tonnen aus Ägypten, 18 Tonnen aus dem Tschad und 9 Tonnen aus Libyen. Aus den beiden letztgenannten Ländern wird Gold geschmuggelt, das von den Rapid Support Forces (RSF) kontrolliert wird.

Also see; NYT 29.11.25: The Sheikh Who Conquered Soccer and Coddles Warlords: The Emirati vice president is best known as the owner of Manchester City, a top English soccer team. Behind the scenes, he has been described as the “handler” guiding his country’s secret foreign wars; Africa Report 27.11.25: Drones, gold and covert networks: Foreign hands fuelling Sudan’s relentless war [Paywall] From clandestine Emirati airlifts to Turkish drones and Sudanese gold moving through murky Gulf networks, foreign governments and arms brokers are propelling a war Sudan’s commanders do not control. We map the external actors – and weapons, wealth, fuel and diplomatic cover – shaping its course. Jungle World; Tagesspiegel 21.11.25: Eigentümer von Manchester City: Welche Rolle spielt Scheich Mansour beim Bürgerkrieg im Sudan? [Paywall]; 20.11.25: »Die Misere des Sudan ist auch ein Erbe der Nazis«: Sudan-Analyst Roman Deckert über die Eroberung von al-Fashir durch die RSF-Milizen, das Erbe der osmanischen Sklaverei und die historischen Verwicklungen Deutschlands in die Militarisierung des sudanesischen Staats; SWM 05.11.25: Investigation Links Top Emirati Official to Supplier of Mercenaries in Sudan: Ahmed Mohamed Al Humairi, the secretary general of the UAE’s Presidential Court, founded and once fully owned the security company that is supplying Colombian fighters to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Despite efforts to publicly distance himself from the company by divesting his shares, he remains closely linked to its current CEO, suggesting an ongoing relationship.Forbes 27.10.25: This Gulf Nation Is Powering Trump’s Moneymaking Machine: The president has already made hundreds of millions abroad, much of it stemming from a single Middle Eastern nation. His most lucrative foreign deal may be about to begin

04.11.25 Guardian: As criticism grows, is UAE ready to walk away from Sudan’s RSF militia?: he United Arab Emirates’ diplomatic machine is for the first time admitting to mistakes in its Sudan policy after suffering reputational damage over its support for the Rapid Support Forces,

28.10.25 Abuhureiah: Sudan at the Crossroads of Empire: Revolution, Counterrevolution, and the UAE’s Subimperial Ambitions: [Analysis] Sudan sits at the fault line of contemporary capitalism. Its gold fields, farmlands, and Red Sea corridors make it a strategic extraction and transit zone; its working-class, neighborhood-based Resistance Committees constitute one of the most advanced experiments in bottom-up governance since the Arab uprisings. The present war is not reducible to “two generals.” It is the violent unravelling of a post-colonial accumulation model and the transnational counterrevolution against a credible popular alternative.

West Africa and Sahel

11.11.25 TNH: COP30: The cautionary tale of the Sahel’s Great Green Wall: [Long Read]“Where is this money going that is announced every year but doesn't reach us?”

04.11.25 IOM: IOM Launches New Initiative to Enhance West Africa’s Response to Missing Migrants: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has launched a landmark initiative with the governments of The Gambia and Mauritania to strengthen national capacities to respond to migrant deaths and disappearances along routes connecting Africa and Europe.
The initiative – the first of its kind in West Africa – will leverage IOM’s decades-long expertise in missing migrants data and migration management to strengthen national coordination on missing migrants in both countries. The project aims to achieve a whole-of-government response to the complex challenges that arise once migrants have died or gone missing.

03.11.25 APANews: AES : Le Colonel Dabiré prend la tête de la Force unifiée: La Force unifiée de l’AES dont il hérite du commandement, regroupant le Burkina Faso, le Mali et le Niger, a été créée dans le but de renforcer la coopération régionale dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
Elle dispose d’un effectif initial de 5 000 soldats et a pour mission principale de conduire des opérations coordonnées sur l’ensemble des territoires des États membres.

Also see APANews 20.11.25: 1,900 persons killed in 450 terror attacks in West Africa – ECOWAS

Burkina Faso

16.11.25 RFI: Burkina Faso: le pays veut lutter contre la mendicité dans les rues: Au Burkina Faso, le gouvernement déclare la guerre à la mendicité. La brigade Laabal, chargée de lutter contre le désordre et l’indiscipline a interpellé cette semaine une dizaine de mendiants des rues de la capitale, Ouagadougou. Ces mendiants ont été conduits sur un chantier de l’initiative « Faso Mêbo » (« construire le Faso »), où ils participent aux travaux de pavage et de curage des canalisations.

Also see RFI 20.11.25: Burkina Faso: des marchés de Ouagadougou et Bobo Dioulasso bouclés pour lutter contre le terrorisme

13.11.25 RFI: Le Burkina Faso s'accorde avec le Fonds Monétaire Internationale pour de nouveaux financements: Près de 61 tonnes d’or sont sorties des mines l'année dernière au Burkina Faso. Les exportations en augmentation cette année conjuguées à la récente flambée des prix internationaux de l'or favorisent cet essor économique en permettant plus de recettes. Le FMI salue les réformes. Celle du Code minier notamment, ainsi que la bonne gestion des déficits budgétaires.

Chad

12.11.25 RFI: «Tchad Connexion 2030»: Mahamat Idriss Déby juge «réalisable» l’objectif de 30 milliards de dollars sur cinq ans: Du 10 au 11 novembre, les autorités tchadiennes ont tenté de mobiliser des financements lors de tables rondes et de rencontres à Abou Dhabi, aux Émirats arabes unis.

Guinea-Bissau

27.11.25 NYT: Guinea-Bissau Installs Military Ruler After Claims of a ‘Fabricated’ Coup: The opposition has accused the president of putting a general in charge of the government so that he could stay in power and lead by proxy.

Ivory Coast

17.11.25 AfricaNews: La Côte d'Ivoire renforce la sécurité après l'afflux de réfugiés maliens: La Côte d'Ivoire a déclaré qu'elle renforçait la sécurité le long de la frontière qu’elle partage avec le Mali au nord en réponse à un « afflux inhabituel de réfugiés ». Ces déplacements semblent liés aux attaques menées par des groupes armés contre des civils au Mali, pays en proie à une insurrection djihadiste.

12.11.25 adf: Burkina Faso Volunteer Militias Create Problems in Côte d’Ivoire: Burkina Faso’s volunteer militias were created to supplement the government’s fight against the growing terrorist threat. Along the border with Côte d’Ivoire, however, those militia members are threatening the safety of civilians on both sides of the boundary.
Nearly 70,000 Burkinabe citizens have fled their communities to shelter in northern Côte d’Ivoire. Many of them are Fulani herders, the ethnic group being targeted by militias known as Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP, using the French acronym) because many terrorists operating in the countryside also are Fulani.

Mali

11.11.25 RFI: Mali: léger répit dans l'embargo jihadiste sur le carburant: Au Mali, les écoles ont rouvert leurs portes après deux semaines blanches, ce lundi 10 novembre. Les cours étaient suspendus dans tout le pays depuis le 27 octobre en raison de la pénurie de carburant orchestrée par le Jnim, lié à al-Qaïda, depuis début septembre. Les jihadistes maintiennent la pression, mais des camions-citernes ont pu passer entre les mailles du blocus et apporter un répit aux habitants, en particulier à Bamako.

Also see Afrik.com 24.11.25: Mali : sous escorte militaire, 82 camions-citernes déjouent le blocus du JNIM: L’arrivée à Bamako, samedi dernier, de 82 camions-citernes d’hydrocarbures offerts par le Niger passe pour un moment clé dans la crise énergétique qui secoue le Mali depuis plus de deux mois; Spiegel 21.11.25: Eine Millionenstadt im Würgegriff der Dschihadisten; AJE 06.11.25: Is Mali about to fall to al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM?; Conversation 06.11.25: Le Mali bientôt sous contrôle djihadiste ? Analyse d’une rhétorique alarmiste: Au Mali, Les djihadistes parviennent à s’emparer de petites localités rurales et à commettre des attaques meurtrières. Ils arrivent aussi à incendier une partie des camions-citernes destinés à Bamako. Mais à ce stade, ils sont loin d’avoir les moyens de prendre la capitale; AP 05.11.25: Senior US official praises Mali’s military junta in fight against armed groups as pressure mounts; Guardian 01.11.25: How al-Qaida-linked jihadist group JNIM is bringing Mali to its knees: Should the city fall, the west African country would be on its way to becoming an Islamist republic with strict interpretations of sharia law.

03.11.25 AA: Mali: le Président Goïta inaugure la 2ᵉ grande mine de lithium du Mali: Avec un investissement initial de 65 millions de dollars, la première phase du projet permettra la production annuelle d'environ 120 000 tonnes de concentré de spodumène.
Développée par Kodal Mining UK Ltd et Hainan Mining Co. Ltd (filiale du groupe chinois Fosun), en partenariat avec l’État malien et des investisseurs locaux détenant 35 % du capital, la mine de Bougouni s’inscrit dans la Vision Mali Kura Ɲɛtaasira ka bɛn san 2063 ma. Cette stratégie nationale vise à transformer les ressources naturelles en leviers de croissance durable et inclusive.

Niger

25.11.25 Arab News: Islamic coalition organizes media training in Niger: Specialized media programs organized by the Saudi-backed Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition kicked off in Niamey, Niger. The initiative focuses on developing media and TV messaging to strengthen the role of security and traditional media in combating terrorism as part of the coalition’s efforts in the Sahel region.

18.11.25 MedaFrica: Niger Suspends Activities of Numerous NGOs Amid Compliance Drive: Humanitarian sources warn that these suspensions are likely to hinder aid delivery across Niger, particularly in areas where access is already difficult. International NGOs frequently rely on local partners to implement their programmes, meaning the enforcement of financial disclosure rules could disrupt ongoing projects and affect vulnerable communities.
At the end of 2024, Niger counted more than 300 international NGOs and over 3,000 national associations, indicating that a significant proportion of organisations could be impacted by the ministry’s compliance measures.

Also see BBC 23.11.25: Pourquoi le Niger a suspendu des centaines d'ONG, et les conséquences sur les populations bénéficiaires

31.10.25 Sahel Intell: Niamey : Coopération renforcée entre le Niger et l’Italie: Au centre des discussions : le renforcement des liens bilatéraux et une évaluation de la situation sécuritaire au Sahel. M. Tajani a souligné, à l’issue de la rencontre, l’importance stratégique du Niger pour l’Italie. « Le Niger est un pays ami de l’Italie, et nous souhaitons intensifier notre collaboration dans divers secteurs, notamment dans la coopération militaire, l’agriculture, l’industrie et les investissements, notamment à travers les entreprises italiennes », a-t-il déclaré.

30.10.25 DW: Niger : de nouvelles taxes pour consolider le budget: Les autorités militaires ont annoncé jeudi (30.10) une série de onze taxes allant de 10.000 à 100.000 FCFA. L'une d'elle est intitulée "contribution mensuelle à l’effort de guerre" et touche les ONG et les associations.
Après la récente dégradation de sa note souveraine par l'agence de notation Moody’s, l’État nigérien rencontre beaucoup de difficultés à payer ses fonctionnaires… et même une partie de ses militaires. Les caisses de l’Etat se vident et la tension monte dans la fonction publique. Dans plusieurs régions, des enseignants, des militaires et des agents de santé n’ont pas touché leur salaire depuis près de deux mois.

Nigeria

31.10.25 Africa Report: Sahel terror group JNIM hits Nigeria for the first time – a sign of expansion plans: Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed its first attack in Nigeria on 28 October. The strike, in the north of Kwara State near the Benin border, left one soldier dead. The Sahel-based group says it seized weapons, equipment and cash.

Senegal

20.11.25 Follow the Moeny: Senegal’s EU-funded migration crackdown puts innocent people behind bars: Senegal has launched a crackdown on migrants leaving the country to reach Spain’s Canary Islands. Tens of thousands of people were intercepted in 2023 alone, and thousands prosecuted.

Also see Infomigrants 06.11.25: Atlantic route: Spain and Senegal join forces against irregular migration, IOM launches West Africa initiative: Spain and Senegal’s intensified cooperation combatting human trafficking and smuggling networks has prevented 3,500 irregular migrant departures this year, according to Spanish Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska.
Speaking after a bilateral meeting with his Senegalese counterpart, Mouhamadou Bamba Cissé, during the Ministerial Meeting of the International Alliance for Security in Abu Dhabi, Grande-Marlaska praised Senegal’s "daily and ongoing preventive effectiveness" and the close cooperation between the two nations’ security forces.
Surveillance efforts have reduced irregular arrivals in Spain from Senegalese coasts by more than 90 percent compared to 2024, Spanish news agency EFE reported on Tuesday, November 4.; Statewatch 04.11.25 : Exporting carceral migration “management”: €30 million from the EU to Senegal for migration control: The funding will come from the EU’s “Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement in Subsaharan Africa Action” (pdf), part of the EU’s almost €80 billion Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).
Most of it will be distributed through the second phase of the Common Operational Partnership (pdf) (Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint), a police cooperation project. While the first phase of the POC project focused on the fight against criminal networks tied to smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, the second phase now also includes efforts to curb terrorism.

13.11.25 Reuters: Senegal's bonds fall to record lows as debt concerns build: The latest losing streak for Senegal's bonds came after a team of officials from the IMF completed last week's mission to Dakar without outlining a new support package.

Sub Saharan Africa

DRC

26.11.25 GFP: Der Lobito-Korridor: EU-Afrika-Gipfel soll die geschwächte Position Berlins und Brüssels auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent stärken und den Zugriff auf Rohstoffe verbessern. Die EU greift dazu auf eine alte Kolonialbahn aus Südkongo nach Angola zurück.

10.11.25 TNH: Mining interests and missed deadlines: Why Congolese see little hope in M23 peace talks: It has been several months since the signing of a US-brokered peace deal between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and a separate ceasefire and declaration of principles agreed in Doha between Kinshasa and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.
Yet neither track has altered the battlefield situation – even as Donald Trump says the war has been “settled” – and Congolese civil society remain sceptical of deals they view as externally imposed and part of a long-term pattern of exploitation.

Also see AJE 26.11.25:US group sues Apple over DR Congo conflict minerals; AJE 15.11.25: DRC, Rwanda-backed M23 sign framework deal for peace after talks in Qatar: The two sides have been holding mediated talks for months, and signed a truce deal in July that must still be subjected to more negotiations over exactly how it will be implemented.; TNH 13.11.25: UN faces scrutiny over refugee transfers from rebel-held DR Congo to Rwanda

Kenya

25.11.25 Africa Report: Kenya: Gen Z protesters traumatised into silence by state-sponsored bloggers: More than a year after the Finance Bill uprising, young Kenyans say intimidation, smear campaigns and coordinated digital harassment have left them fearful of ever protesting again.

14.11.25 NYT: Kenyan Workers Get Abused Abroad. The President’s Family and Allies Profit.: The reports were piling in, one worse than the next. Kenyan maids working in Saudi Arabia had their passports confiscated, wages denied and food withheld. Some were beaten by their bosses for offenses as minor as not knowing how to operate a washing machine. Others were killed.
Instead of demanding that the Saudi government protect these women, President William Ruto of Kenya pledged to send even more workers to Saudi Arabia.

Also see NYT 14.11.25: Kenya’s Key Export Used to Be Coffee. Now It’s Cheap Labor.; Spiegel 12.11.25: Angriffskrieg gegen Ukraine: Russland rekrutierte offenbar 200 Kenianer

Tanzania

18.11.25 AJE: Tanzania arrests senior opposition figure as hundreds face treason charges: Police in Tanzania have arrested a senior opposition official after more than 200 people were charged with treason over a wave of protests against last month’s general election.

05.11.25 AJE: Tanzania election failed to comply with democratic standards: African Union: The bloc says ballot stuffing, internet blackout and politically-motivated abductions compromised the vote’s ‘integrity’.

Also see AJE 01.11.25: Tanzanian President Hassan declared winner of disputed vote with 98 percent

West Asia

24.11.25 Al-Monitor: Trump starts process to designate Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organization: The order, which was announced by the White House but does not yet constitute a designation, mentioned the Brotherhood's chapters in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt as "relevant" to the action. The US Departments of State and Treasury will submit a joint report to the president on the issue within 30 days and will take any relevant action on designations within 45 days, according to the White House statement.

Afghanistan

14.11.25 bpb: Flucht und Vertreibung aus und in Afghanistan seit 2021: [Long Article] Seit die Taliban 2021 die Macht in Afghanistan übernommen haben, sind hunderttausende Menschen von dort geflohen. Allerdings ist die Aufnahmebereitschaft gesunken, vielen droht die Abschiebung.

Iraq

05.11.25 ACLED: Leaders tighten control as repression shapes Iraq’s 2025 elections: While violence in Iraq is at its lowest levels since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the relative stability ahead of the 11 November vote is the result of repression by political leaders whose legitimacy is eroding.

Israel

25.11.25 DAWN: [Analysis] The Coming of the Obliteration Doctrine: In "The Obliteration Doctrine," however, I use the term in a specific way to define the lethal mix of scorched earth policy, collective punishment and civilian victimization, coupled with massive indiscriminate bombardment and systematic use of artificial intelligence (AI). As Professor William Schabas, a leading scholar of genocide, notes, "the Obliteration Doctrine" understood in this way, "adds a new term to the lexicon on genocide, notably in the application of international law and its judicial mechanisms."

25.11.25 NYT: U.S. Plans Compounds to House Palestinians in Israeli-Held Half of Gaza: The Trump administration is pushing for the rapid construction of a number of residential compounds to provide housing for Palestinians in Israeli-controlled parts of the war-ravaged Gaza Strip, an effort that is fraught with risks and potential pitfalls.

12.11.25 Guardian: Israeli president condemns ‘serious’ attack by settlers on West Bank villages: Israeli settler violence has surged since the war in Gaza started two years ago, with at least 1,001 Palestinians killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem by settlers and Israeli soldiers. According to the UN, 260 attacks took place in October, the deadliest month for settler violence since it started keeping track in 2006.

Also see AJE 05.11.25: Israeli army, settlers strike 2,350 times in West Bank last month: Report

10.11.25 FA: How Netanyahu Survives. Divide and Conquer in Gaza and at Home: The prime minister may be able to build support by pointing to the war. His aggressive style of fighting, after all, found wide support among the country’s Jewish majority. Mainstream opinion viewed the devastation of Gaza—the killing of more than 68,000 Palestinians, razing of entire cities and villages, and preparations for mass expulsions—as justified responses to Hamas’s atrocities.

07.11.25 ACLED: Middle East Overview: November 2025: The ceasefire in Gaza held in October as low-level violence continued, while the ceasefire in Lebanon approached one year under strain, and settler violence against olive harvesters in the West Bank reached a record high.

Pakistan

30.11.25 NYT: Fed Up With the Taliban, Pakistan Expels Masses of Afghans: As Pakistan and Afghanistan have escalated military clashes and closed their borders, the Pakistani authorities have intensified mass expulsions of Afghans, saying they can no longer accommodate the decades-old refugee community.
So far this year, about one million of the three million Afghans living in Pakistan have been deported or forced to return

28.11.25 FA: Pakistan’s Quiet Coup: The Making of a New Model of Military Rule: [Long Article) Under the Army Chief watch, Pakistan secured new International Monetary Fund loans, revived diplomatic channels with the United States, and opened high-level lines of engagement with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and China that have unlocked fresh investment commitments. The military-led Special Investment Facilitation Council has become the government’s central vehicle for fast-tracking foreign investment, particularly in energy, agriculture, and mining.

Saudi Arabia

07.11.25 NYT: As Saudi Arabia Cracks Down on Drugs, Executions Near a Record High: Facing an influx of amphetamines, the kingdom has put hundreds of people to death, many of them foreigners convicted of low-level smuggling.

UAE:

05.11.25 SWM: Investigation Links Top Emirati Official to Supplier of Mercenaries in Sudan: The United Arab Emirates’ top bureaucrat has close ties to the company that is sending Colombian mercenaries to Sudan, according to a new investigation by The Sentry, a research organization that tracks corruption.

04.11.25 Swissaid: Vereinigte Arabische Emirate mehr denn je Drehscheibe für Konfliktgold: Die VAE sind mit 748 Tonnen Goldimport, ein Anstieg von 18 Prozent gegenüber 2023, erneut das wichtigste Ziel für afrikanisches Gold.
Die VAE importieren weiterhin Gold aus Schmuggel- und Konfliktgebieten, insbesondere aus dem Sudan und seinen Nachbarländern. Im Jahr 2024 importierten die VAE 29 Tonnen Gold aus dem Sudan, gegenüber 17 Tonnen im Jahr 2023, sowie erhebliche Mengen über Nachbar-länder: 27 Tonnen aus Ägypten, 18 Tonnen aus dem Tschad und 9 Tonnen aus Libyen. Aus den beiden letztgenannten Ländern wird Gold geschmuggelt, das von den Rapid Support Forces (RSF) kontrolliert wird.
Die Schweiz ist direkt in diesen problematischen Handel verwickelt, da sie Gold aus den VAE importiert, dessen ursprüngliche Herkunft unbekannt ist. Zwischen Januar und September 2025 importierte Bern 316 Tonnen Gold im Wert von 27 Mia. Schweizer Franken, mehr als doppelt so viel wie im Jahresdurchschnitt.

Mediterrean and Canary Route

EU Crimes Against Humanity
New Website on European officials suspected of Crimes Against Humanity against ‘migrants’ in the Central Mediterranean route with Executive Summary, Databases and Timelines

27.11.25 ecre: Atlantic Route and Spain: Hundreds of people have been rescued from small boats trying to reach Europe via the Atlantic migration route in recent weeks.
A media investigation has accused the EU of being complicit in a crackdown on people trying to leave Senegal in order to travel to Europe.

26.11.25 migreurop: Preliminary Statement of the 56th Session of the Permanent’s People Tribunal on Human Rights Violations against Migrants in Maghreb States: The evidence presented before the tribunal was the result of several years of documentation by researchers and human rights defenders, including the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) and the Federation of Tunisians for Citizenship on Both Shores (FTCR), both members of Migreurop. They meticulously documented the violence and rights violations suffered by migrants in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, allowing to highlight the responsibility of the Maghreb states, the European Union, and several member states.

16.11.25 nd-aktuell: Frontex fliegt jetzt vor Westafrika: Die EU-Grenzagentur Frontex will zukünftig Flugzeuge zur Aufklärung im Atlantik auf Kap Verde stationieren. Die seit Monaten verhandelte Vereinbarung soll die EU-Migrationsabwehr in Westafrika verbessern: Die bei privaten Firmen gecharterten Luftfahrzeuge werden mit Überwachungstechnik ausgerüstet und halten in den Such- und Rettungsregionen von Senegal, Mauretanien und Gambia Ausschau nach Booten mit Geflüchteten auf dem Weg zu den zu Spanien gehörenden Kanaren. Bei einer Sichtung informiert die Besatzung die in Westafrika zuständigen Behörden. Diese sollen die Menschen abfangen und zurückholen. Ein solches Pullback-System praktiziert Frontex bereits seit 2017 mit der Küstenwache in Libyen.
Die Mission von Kap Verde soll eine Lücke schließen, die gescheiterte Verhandlungen mit Senegal und Mauretanien hinterließen: Frontex wollte ursprünglich Statusabkommen mit diesen Ländern schließen, um auch in deren Hoheitsgewässern oder an Land Personal oder Ausrüstung stationieren zu dürfen.

16.11.25 APANews: Mauritanie : sauvetage de 227 migrants au large de Nouadhibou: L’opération de secours de 227 migrants en détresse au large des côtes mauritaniennes a été déclenchée après la découverte, mercredi, d’un bateau parti de Gambie au début du mois de novembre. Le communiqué précise que la traversée a duré plus de dix jours, au cours desquels les passagers, issus de plusieurs pays africains, ont été exposés à des conditions extrêmes.
Selon les garde-côtes, les équipes médicales et sécuritaires dépêchées sur place ont immédiatement procédé à l’évacuation et à la prise en charge des migrants, dont une grande partie souffrait d’épuisement sévère dû au manque de nourriture et d’eau. Les autorités indiquent que les soins d’urgence prodigués ont permis de stabiliser la plupart des personnes secourues.

12.11.25 NYT: Many Displaced Sudanese Feared Dead After Shipwreck Near Libya: Forty-two migrants were presumed dead after a rubber boat capsized off the Libyan coast this month. Many of the presumed victims were fleeing a raging conflict in Sudan.

12.11.25 CivilMRCC: Echoes # 19: The Brutalization of the Border Regime Over the past ten weeks, the Central Mediterranean has once again revealed itself as a deeply contested space, a theatre of repression, violence, and impunity at Europe’s maritime frontier.

07.11.25 Guardian: Civil rescue groups in Mediterranean cut ties with Libyan coastguard: More than a dozen NGO rescue vessels operating in the Mediterranean have suspended communication with the Libyan coastguard, citing escalating incidents of asylum seekers being violently intercepted at sea and taken to camps rife with torture, rape and forced labour.

Europe

Balkans

E-ERIM is a repository of short texts on the European irregularized migration regime at the south-eastern periphery of the EU.

The e-ERIM strives to present critically-structured, as well as empirically and theoretically based concepts, agents, places and objects, events and everyday expressions shaped by proscribed and criminalized migrant movements through Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia.

Germany

28.11.25 taz: Haushalt des Entwicklungsministeriums: Wo der Rotstift angelegt wird: 2026 stehen dem Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) 10,06 Milliarden Euro zu Verfügung und damit 251 Millionen Euro weniger als dieses Jahr. Gegenüber 2022 ist es ein Rückgang von über 30 Prozent.
Die humanitäre Hilfe bleibt auf dem niedrigen Niveau von 2025 bei rund einer Milliarde Euro. Das entspricht einem Einbruch von 60 Prozent gegenüber 2022.
Mehr Geld gibt es für die Wirtschaft und für die Stiftungen der Parteien.

25.11.25 Spiegel: Wadephul baut das Auswärtige Amt radikal um: Dem neuen Organigramm zufolge soll es zukünftig eine eigene Abteilung für Sicherheitspolitik und eine für EU-Politik und Geoökonomie geben. Die Abteilung für Stabilisierung, von der bislang viel Geld für humanitäre Hilfe verteilt wurde, soll hingegen aufgelöst werden. Die Mittel für humanitäre Hilfe und Stabilisierung in Krisenregionen werden künftig stärker über die für einzelne Ländergruppen zuständige Referate vergeben.

14.11.25 bpb: Ausländische Arbeitskräfte im deutschen Niedriglohnsektor: [Long Article] Schweine schlachten, Gebäude reinigen, Pakete ausfahren: Jobs im Niedriglohnsektor werden zunehmend von migrantischen Beschäftigten übernommen. Teilweise arbeiten sie unter prekären bis ausbeuterischen Bedingungen.

Also see Sächsischer Flü-Rat 03.11.25: Wie Momox mit der Angst von Geflüchteten Geschäfte macht: Hinter der Fassade des nachhaltigen Secondhand-Händlers Momox, der sich progressiv und weltoffen gibt, verbirgt sich ein anderes Bild: ein System, das die prekäre Lage von Geflüchteten ausbeutet. Seit 2012 hat sich der Umsatz des Unternehmens von 58 auf 377 Millionen Euro mehr als versechsfacht. Doch an denjenigen, die in den Leipziger Hallen den Warenstrom am Laufen halten, ist dieser Boom spurlos vorbeigegangen. Sie berichten von existentiellen Nöten, stagnierenden Löhnen und Respektlosigkeit.

04.11.25 Spiegel: Bundesregierung bietet Afghanen Geld für Verzicht auf Einreise nach Deutschland: Mehr als 2000 Personen aus Afghanistan und Pakistan warten seit Monaten auf ein Visum, um nach Deutschland einzureisen. Die Aufnahmezusage haben sie bereits. Jetzt will die Bundesregierung zahlen, damit sie doch nicht kommen.

04.11.25 Tagesschau: Debatte über Syrien-Abschiebungen Wadephul bemüht sich um Deeskalation: Wadephul sagte bei einem Treffen in Berlin, die Bundesregierung verfolge insgesamt das Ziel, die Zahl der Rückführungen zu erhöhen - auch die Zahl der Rückführungen nach Syrien.
Es gehe dabei vorrangig um eine "überschaubare Zahl" von Straftätern und Gefährdern, fügte Wadephul hinzu. Bisher seien Rückführungen nach Syrien nicht gelungen.

UK

27.11.25 NYT: The British Public Thinks Immigration Is Up. It’s Actually Down, Sharply.: Net migration to Britain has fallen by almost 80 percent from its 2023 peak, according to data released on Thursday.

17.11.25 Infomigrants: Immigration irrégulière : Londres menace l'Angola, la Namibie et la RDC de "chantage aux visas": Selon Londres, des "milliers" d'Angolais, de Namibiens et de Congolais se trouvent en en situation irrégulière au Royaume-Uni après avoir été déboutés de leur demande d'asile. Et leur pays d'origine ne coopère pas suffisamment pour les reprendre, accuse le Home office qui menace de réduire les visas d'entrée de ces trois pays sur le sol britannique.

AJE 16.11.25: UK to end ‘golden ticket’ for asylum seekers in huge policy overhaul: The United Kingdom has announced a drastic reduction in the protections for asylum seekers and refugees under a new plan aimed at slashing irregular immigration and countering the far right.
The measures, modelled on Denmark’s strict asylum system, were announced late on Saturday as Prime Minister Keir Starmer comes under pressure from surging popularity for the anti-immigrant Reform UK party.

31.10.25 Infomigrants: Le Royaume-Uni et le Vietnam concluent un nouvel accord pour lutter contre l'immigration clandestine: Grâce au partage de données biométriques et à des procédures administratives simplifiées, cet accord permettra de réduire "de 75 % le temps de traitement des documents des migrants en simplifiant les procédures administratives" et ainsi "de renvoyer plus rapidement et plus facilement ceux qui n'ont pas le droit de se trouver ici",

European Union

20.11.25 Portolan: Punitive Environments and the Anti-Immigration Authoritarian Commonsense: Migration, we can observe in the EU and the UK, but also in the US, Tunisia, and beyond, has become a key vehicle for authoritarianism

19.11.25 Greece: The Press Project: Πλεύρης: «Πρωτοβουλία με τη Γερμανία να υπάρξει κέντρο επιστροφής μεταναστών στην Αφρική»: Greek Migration Minister Thanos Plevris stated that Greece and Germany are working together on the creation of a “return center” for irregular migrants on African soil.
"Wir haben in enger Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland eine Initiative ergriffen, um ein Zentrum für die Rückkehr von illegalen Einwanderern außerhalb der Europäischen Union nach Afrika zu haben", sagte der Minister für Migration und Asyl Thanos Plevris. "Es ist bereits die Rede von sicheren afrikanischen Ländern, die illegale Einwanderer aufnehmen werden, die wir nicht in ihre Heimat zurückkehren können", sagte Thanos Plevris der ERT.
„Dies wird nicht unter der Schirmherrschaft der Europäischen Union geschehen, sondern durch die Mitgliedsstaaten. Deutschland hat eine ernsthafte Initiative ergriffen und offiziell Interesse an der Teilnahme daran bekundet. Wenn diese Zentren außerhalb des europäischen Kontinents liegen, fungieren sie als Abschreckung. Diese Zentren sind zwei Kategorien. Eine davon ist, wo illegale Einwanderer in volle Sicherheitszentren zurückkehren, in dem Sinne, dass sie von der Europäischen Union kontrolliert werden und die afrikanischen Länder kompensieren. Die andere, in Ländern, die nicht sicher sind, wie Libyen, um dort Zentren zu haben, die Migranten halten werden."

12.11.25 Infomigrants: Union européenne : 30 000 demandeurs d'asile à répartir depuis l'Italie, l'Espagne, la Grèce et Chypre: La Commission européenne a annoncé mardi la liste des quatre États membres bénéficiaires du mécanisme dit de solidarité, prévu par le nouveau Pacte asile et migration.

11.11.25 nd-aktuell: Neue Eingreiftruppe für Frontex: Die EU-Grenzagentur Frontex bereitet den Aufbau einer neuen Eingreiftruppe vor. Wie aus der Antwort auf eine parlamentarische Anfrage der linken Europaabgeordneten Özlem Demirel hervorgeht, soll diese »Quick Reaction Force« (QRF) »bei sich rasch verändernden Situationen an den Außengrenzen« flexibel einsatzfähig sein. Weitere Einsatzgebiete der robusten Truppe seien »vorgesehene Ereignisse internationalen Maßstabs«, etwa Sportveranstaltungen, Gipfeltreffen oder UN-Konferenzen.

07.11.25 Statewatch: Outsourcing Borders: Monitoring EU externalisation policy / Bulletin 11: Commission presents draft for global counter-smuggling alliance /// New plans for using visas as leverage for deportation cooperation /// UK seeks greater migration control through Balkans states

04.11.25 EU Council: Migration key facts sheet: By compiling and presenting the most relevant trends and data, this publication serves as a practical resource for all stakeholders, facilitating evidence-based reflection on migration, discussions and decision-making.
The available data show that, in recent years, the majority of migratory movements in Europe have occurred through regular and orderly channels. Additionally, there has been an increase in migrant returns from European Union (EU) member states.

02.11.25 Antipode: Frontex and the University: Positivist Dissonance and the Institutionalisation of Border Violence through Research: [Scientific Paper]: The paper examines the existing relationships between universities and Frontex, investigating and problematising the intersection between the higher education sector and the violence of the European border regime.

30.10.25 Amnesty: Closing the Door? How visa policies in Europe’s Schengen area fail human rights defenders: [Report] This report highlights the obstacles faced by human rights defenders (HRDs) from visa-restricted countries who want to access the Schengen area to fulfil their right to defend rights. It presents a picture of how racialized HRDs are particularly impacted by visa application processes and procedures.

20.11.25 EU Council: One Sea, one Pact, one Future: Council approves conclusions on the Pact for the Mediterranean: Today, the Council approved conclusions welcoming the pact for the Mediterranean. This coincides with the marking of the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, which laid the foundations for a comprehensive partnership between the EU and ten countries in the southern Mediterranean. The pact, which was put forward by the European Commission and the EU High Representative on 16 October 2025, confirms the Mediterranean region as a strategic priority for the EU, and aims to reinforce the EU’s relations with its southern Mediterranean partners, creating joint opportunities.

Find the document here.

Also see: October 2025 EC: New Pact for the Mediterranean: [Notes by CM.-All):
The Pact was developed by DG MENA following a consultation process with a range of stakeholders. This Directorate-General, established in February 2025 under the authority of the new European Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Ms. Šuica seeks to enhance political, economic, and social cooperation between the EU and North African and Middle Eastern countries.

The text of the agreement is structured around three pillars:

1. People: driving forces for change, connection, and innovation;
2. Stronger, more sustainable, and integrated economies;
3. Security, preparedness, and migration management.

Below are some preliminary thoughts based on the published text:

• In Chapter 3.1 titled “Peace and Security”, the IRINI and EUBAM Libya missions are mentioned as points of reference; both foresee collaboration and training of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, which has been responsible for violent interceptions, illegal pushbacks, and attacks against SAR NGOs and people on the move.
• In Chapter 3.4 titled “Law enforcement, judicial cooperation and border security”, cooperation between law and judicial bodies such as Europol and FRONTEX and partner countries is mentioned; it focuses also on SAR operations as crucial for a common approach to integrated border management and security;
• Unlike the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, on which the Mediterranean Pact builds, the references to respect for democratic principles and the rule of law have been removed: “Respect the principles of the rule of law and democracy, while recognising the right of each partner to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system.”
• According to the NGO EuroMed Rights, despite the “bottom-up approach” presented, the consultation of CSOs was not truly participatory, regarding the limited involvement of local NGOs and civil society actors in the partner countries.
• The terms “illegal migration” and “illegal departures” are used throughout the text, reflecting the security-based approach to migration that the EU and its Member States have pursued for years.

The Pact will receive political endorsement from the partner countries in November, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration and will be followed by the presentation of an Action Plan during the first quarter of 2026.

Please note,:

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