Monthly Press Review September – October 2026

This monthly press review covers topics such as Eurafrican migration control, migration, social movements, and displacement in African countries, as well as news on the European border regime.

Please find it as PDF document here.

The selection of these articles is somewhat rough and contingent, biased towards our interest in popular uprisings and social and migration movements, as well as border politics and the militarisation of social relations.

The main sources are news outlets such as AJE, the Guardian and the New York Times, as well as newsletters from various other sources. As we have learned, particularly following the events in Gaza, it is important to supplement the European, and especially the German, news landscape with articles from abroad. If you would like to contribute articles from other sources, please let us know at contact[at]migration-control.info.

For a more distiguished way of doing press reviews, and more fokused on European developments, please Also see migreurop Press Review September 2026, and the ERCE Press Review.

We also recommend the SWP Web Monitore, especially Nahost/ Nordafrika, and Subsahara-Afrika.

World:

Myanmar

01.10.26 Guardian: ‘They showed no mercy’: mapping the Rohingya villages being erased by rebel forces: Nearly a decade after the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya people by Myanmar forces, satellite images show the insurgent Arakan Army is now emulating the killings and land grabs

29.09.26 NYT: The Migrants Being Shipped Back to a War Zone: On Tuesday, Malaysia began a multiphase repatriation of thousands of undocumented migrants from Myanmar, in a move that the migrants, their families and rights groups say endangers many lives. Many fear that Myanmar’s military government will conscript them — men and women — on their return and force them to fight in the country’s civil war. The Rohingya Muslims who make up a large number of the migrants have a particular plight: They are essentially stateless in their own country and have suffered what the United States has determined was a genocide conducted by the Myanmar military.

AI and Surveillance

23.09.26 Zeit: Ein System, um sie alle zu finden: Seit Beginn der zweiten Amtszeit von Präsident Donald Trump hat ICE rund 513 Millionen Dollar ausgegeben, um neue Überwachungstechnologie anzuschaffen. Und dabei waren die Ausgaben dafür vorher schon hoch. Nach Berechnungen des Center on Privacy & Technology an der Georgetown University kaufte ICE zwischen 2008 und 2021 durchschnittlich für knapp 215 Millionen Dollar jährlich neue Programme zur Überwachung, zur Datenerhebung und zum Datenaustausch.
ICE nutzt inzwischen jede nur mögliche Technik, um Menschen zu finden. Die Behörde hat Zugriff auf Dutzende staatliche und wirtschaftliche Datenbanken, von Fahndungslisten bis hin zu Standortdaten privater Mobiltelefone, die die Werbewirtschaft erhebt. Sie durchforstet das soziale Netz genauso nach Informationen wie die Bilder von Verkehrskameras. Sie analysiert Informationen des staatlichen Krankenversicherungsprogramms Medicaid.
Sie hat ein System zur Gesichtserkennung aufgebaut, mit dem Beamte für die Identifizierung Gesichter in Sekunden mit rund 200 Millionen Fotos abgleichen können. Sie setzt Künstliche Intelligenz ein und versucht, das Verhalten von Menschen und Menschengruppen gezielt vorherzusagen.

03.09.26 TNH: WFP defends new 5-year Palantir deal to staff: The World Food Programme is standing by its partnership with Palantir, telling staff that the new deal with the controversial military contractor will save the organisation millions of dollars. But some WFPers have questions.
See also TNH 05.10.26: German government questioned on WFP and Palantir: WFP has repeatedly sidestepped questions about the data and safety of people in Gaza, or its renewed relationship with Palantir, the AI analytics firm and military contractor whose work helps militaries target and kill.
This has caught the attention of several German lawmakers.
Alarmed by recent tech trends and dissatisfied with WFP’s public response, several members of The Left Party, a parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, recently questioned the government on WFP and Palantir as part of an interpellation or questions process.

17.08.26 Tech Policy: The Racial Necrotechnics That Lead to Death By Design at Automated Borders: Petra Molnar: I have spent the past eight years documenting these systems of life and death in the Sonoran desert in Arizona, in the so-called Greek asylum hotspots, and in Occupied Palestinian Territories. In my new book, Border Necrotechnics: Automation, Surveillance, and the Racial Politics of Migration Control, explicitly published in open-access so that the communities it documents can read it, I argue that we need precise language that makes visible this type of infrastructure that decides who lives and who dies. Border necrotechnics names the assemblage of automated systems, databases, and surveillance architectures through which states and corporations decide which lives are rendered killable, deportable, or indefinitely surveilled at and beyond the border.

Find the book here.

See also a review of this book, 29.09.26: Sortir des nécrotechniques des frontières

All Africa

28.10.26 AJE: Russia is selling Africa dependence disguised as partnership: [Opinion] As African leaders gather in Moscow, the Kremlin is securing resources and protecting allied rulers while failing their people.

14.10.26 TNH: Beyond the humanitarian reset: Learning from pastoralists to rethink aid: Rather than rebuilding the existing humanitarian and development architecture with less money, some radical new thinking is required. The solutions can be based on what already exists – the practices, relations, networks, and institutions that pastoralists always make use of to sustain their lives and respond to shocks and stresses.

23.09.26 Guardian: Huge El Niño projected to cause more than 450,000 deaths by February: Among the 10 most affected countries are Nigeria, Sudan, DRC, Niger, Chad.
See also AR 10.09.26: El Niño could cost Africa $20bn – here’s where it will hit hardest: evere climate disruptions expected in the coming months risk weighing on harvests, food prices and public finances.

13.10.26 AR: Tramadol in Africa: How drug trafficking thrives where pain relief is scarce: West and Central Africa account for 97% of all tramadol seizures worldwide. The illicit trade in the painkiller thrives in a region where access to essential medication remains desperately limited. Tramadol is not, in itself, an illegal drug. It is an opioid – a painkiller in the same family as morphine, but synthetic and considerably less potent. “Tramadol used for therapeutic purposes is generally dosed at between 50mg and 100mg. But what circulates in West and Central Africa is high-dose tramadol, reaching up to 225mg”.

19.09.26 AJE: Africa’s Green Revolution threatens traditional foods: The promotion of monocultures is hurting the production of much more nutritious and climate-resistant traditional crops.

02.09.26 DW: Wie neue Rechenzentren das digitale Afrika voranbringen: Die Entwicklung von Afrikas digitaler Infrastruktur schreitet schnell voran – auch an anderen Orten des Kontinents entstehen digitale Knotenpunkte, angetrieben durch massive Investitionen in Rechenzentren, Unterseekabel, Glasfasernetze, mobiles Breitband und die Integration von KI. Dabei übernehmen Südafrika, Nigeria, Kenia und Ägypten führende Rollen.
Dennoch entfallen auf Afrika nur rund 0,6 Prozent der weltweiten Rechenzentrumskapazität, heißt es in einem Bericht der Africa Data Centres Association. "Sie verbrauchen unglaubliche Mengen an Energie."

North Africa

28.10.26 MMC Quarterly Mixed Migration Update North Africa, July- September 2026: The core countries of focus for this region are Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.
Migration routes became deadlier despite declining arrivals in Europe. IOM linked the increased risks to changing departure points, severe weather, regional conflicts and policy changes.
Arrivals to Italy fell by 55% YoY, driven by declines from Libya (-60%) and Tunisia (-46%), although arrivals from Tunisia rose by 55% QoQ. Algeria stood out as the only departure country recording both annual (+154%) and quarterly (+48%) increases, reinforcing its growing importance.
Arrivals increased along both the Libya-Crete corridor and the Western Mediterranean Route, with arrivals up 25% and 20% YoY, respectively.
Eastern and western Libyan authorities expanded deportation and return operations. Sudanese nationals were also the focus of return and regularisation measures by both administrations.
European migration cooperation expanded across both eastern and western Libya. The planned Benghazi Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre marked an extension of engagement with the eastern authorities.

Algeria

03.10.26 AJE: Algeria sent fighter jets to Niger to thwart ‘coup attempt’, president says: On August 30 , the Algerian Ministry of Defence said it had sent four fighter jets to Niger following unrest. It said two patrols of four Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft had landed at Niamey airport, accompanied by an air-to-air refuelling plane.
The warplanes were deployed at the request of Nigerien authorities on “a mission to support the Nigerien army in confronting an attempt to destabilise the brotherly state of Niger,” the ministry added then.
See also taz 26.10.26: Algerien schickt Soldaten in die Wüste: Nach Berichten von Analysten stellt Niger den algerischen Streitkräften die Militärbasis Madama zur Verfügung. Madama liegt im äußersten Norden Nigers mitten in der Saharawüste unweit der Grenze zu Libyen. Unweit von Madama hält der staatliche algerische Ölkonzern Sonatrach seit 2005 die Förderrechte für die über 23.000 Quadratkilometer große Ölkonzession Kafra. Am 13. August wurden dort bei einer Feier im Beisein der Premierminister Algeriens und Nigers die ersten Bohrlöcher in Betrieb genommen. Mit Soldaten im Norden Nigers tritt Algerien auch einer befürchteten Ausdehnung des Einflussbereichs des ostlibyschen Generals Khalifa Haftar entgegen AR 23.10.26: What’s behind Algiers’ military push into the Sahel?: Algeria, encouraged by Russia, is strengthening ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES); RFI 14.09.26: Algérie: le Premier ministre se rend en visite officielle à Bamako; AR 11.09.26: Why Algeria has severed diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates

04.09.26 France 24: Mass burial reveals hidden toll of Algeria’s deadly ‘Black Wednesday’ wildfires: Algerian authorities haven’t shared new numbers since August 26. A number of Moroccan social media accounts have also been sharing disinformation about the fires.

Ceuta

10/2026 SGO: Helmut Dietrich: Ceuta als Labor: [Umfassende Darstellung der Abläufe und Analyse]

05.10.26 Zeit: Sie fürchten die Prügel des Militärs, und träumen weiter von Europa: [Reportage] Zwei Monate nach dem Massenandrang harren noch immer Tausende Migranten in Ceuta aus. Sie hoffen weiter auf Asyl – auch wenn die Stimmung in der Exklave kippt.
Siehe am gleichen Tag: Spanische Polizei räumt Lager von Migranten in Ceuta: Spaniens Polizei räumt provisorische Behausungen am Strand von Ceuta. Die Migranten müssen sich zwischen einer Rückkehr nach Marokko und einer Registrierung entscheiden; taz 09.09.26: Uringestank, Menschen als Handelsware und Verzweiflung;

15.09.26 El Dario: Dos decenas de migrantes denuncian palizas y vejaciones de militares que patrullan Ceuta: Patrullas de militares recorren Ceuta en busca de migrantes a los que agreden y roban dinero y teléfonos móviles, según una veintena de testimonios de migrantes que denuncian a elDiario.es haber sido víctimas de estas actuaciones.
See also Reuters 18.09.26: Spanish police launch operation to clear Ceuta migrants off beach

02.09.26 AJE: Thousands protest in Spain as Ceuta’s migration crisis festers a month on: Thousands of protesters have rallied across Spain against the ongoing migrant crisis in Ceuta.
Roughly 50,000 people gathered in Madrid alone on Wednesday. In Ceuta itself, residents draped Spanish and city flags over their shoulders. “Expel the invaders” and “Ceuta is not for sale, Ceuta must be defended” were among the crowd’s chants.

Egypt:

28.10.26 AJE: The next phase of military rule in Egypt is here: [Opinion] The army could attempt to defuse public anger by presenting el-Sisi as a scapegoat, forcibly removing him from power, and replacing him with someone who can preserve a measure of stability as well as secure its vast economic interests. In that context, a member of parliament said recently that he has heard el-Sisi say in private meetings that he would rather step down than wait for the military to force him out.
But a much more likely possibility deserves particular attention: el-Sisi may be preparing to leave the presidency while ensuring that Egypt’s military-dominated political system survives his departure.

Libya

20.10.26 AJE: Eastern Libya parliament approves 2019 maritime deal with Turkiye: here is talk of Ankara setting up a military presence in areas under the control of Haftar’s LNA.
This eastern pivot is designed to secure Turkiye’s long-term geopolitical and economic interests, preserving its influence in Libya regardless of future political settlements between the government and eastern authorities.
See also AJE 26.10.26: Saddam Haftar is eyeing the throne in Libya: On October 20, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Benghazi ratified the deal. The European Union condemned the vote, as did Greece, Israel and Egypt. Yet the ratification was less a Turkish triumph than the final act of a sequence choreographed by Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, the military commander who controls eastern Libya. The ultimate goal is the Libyan presidency. Reuters 24.10.26: Libya's Dbeibah says ready to address Egypt's maritime concerns

03.10.26 Guardian: Libyan unity talks upended as warlord’s son linked to drone attacks on fuel facilities: Saddam Haftar, the deputy commander of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), has increasingly been seen by the US as an important figure in its plans to unify Libyan security, judicial and political institutions.
But a round of drone attacks in August worsened electricity blackouts in the west of the country, putting intense popular pressure on the GNU led by the prime minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

15.09.26 RiL: ICC sets 4 May 2027 foropening of El Hishri trial: El Hishri is currently in ICC custody and faces 17 confirmed charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes arising from alleged crimes committed principally against people detained at Mitiga Prison and within the Mitiga Compound in Tripoli between 1 May 2014 and 30 June 2020.

Morocco

20.10.26 AJE: Morocco’s not-so-new government faces new challenges: 62 percent of eligible voters stayed away from the polls. On election day, the authorities had to call on people to go out and vote. Apart from the low turnout, there were suspicions of irregularities, but because in some cases the official election records were not released, observers and political parties were unable to obtain tangible evidence.
The new government has an ambitious agenda, indeed, but its tenure will be shaped by difficult circumstances – both at home and abroad – that are largely out of its control.
See also taz 24.09.26: Des Königs müde Untertanen; Tagessp. 21.09.26: Die Jugend stimmt nicht ab – sie flieht

03.10.26 Business Insider: Russia-backed Burkina Faso and UAE back Morocco’s plan for disputed territory as Algeria throws its weight behind heavily armed Polisario Front: During recent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, international backing continued to build for Morocco's autonomy initiative regarding the Western Sahara territory.

01.10.26 Amnesty: Morocco: “We start with the verdict”: Inside Morocco’s surveillance machine: This report documents the surveillance ecosystem that enables the Moroccan authorities to use repressive tactics to harass, discredit and ultimately silence human rights defenders. It outlines the role of Morocco’s domestic intelligence service, the Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DGST), in conducting surveillance operations against civil society.
These operations are often accompanied by smear campaigns in state-aligned media outlets. The techno-authoritarian practices used by the DGST, and documented in this report, have been facilitated and enabled by various corporate actors.
The report also contains a comprehensive analysis of the Pegasus spyware system, and how it has been used by Morocco to target human rights defenders and journalists, both inside Morocco and internationally.

Tunisia

18.10.26 AJE: Tunisia’s economic crisis deepens as the promise of a better life fades: On September 27, unemployed university graduates began a roughly 300km (186-mile) march from Menzel Bouzaiane in central Tunisia towards the capital, Tunis, to demand jobs and the implementation of legislation intended to provide a clear path to public-sector employment. Many protesters say they have waited years for promises of public-sector recruitment to translate into real opportunities.
Their demands came amid broader discontent over Tunisia’s economic and political direction.
On October 17, thousands gathered in Tunis to protest against President Kais Saied’s government, deteriorating living conditions and restrictions on freedoms. The demonstration, led by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), opposition groups and civil society organisations, was among the largest against Saied in years.
Participants voiced frustration over unemployment and the difficulties many households face in meeting their basic needs.
See also AJE 31.08.26: Tunisia swelters as power cuts disrupt water supplies

02.09.26 AJE: Tunisia’s civil society faces growing pressure as crackdown widens: Tunisia’s authorities have sharply intensified pressure on civil society, prosecuting activists and NGO workers, investigating groups’ finances and suspending dozens of associations in a campaign that Human Rights Watch says has severely narrowed the civic space that emerged after the 2011 revolution.

East Africa

28.10.26 MMC: Quarterly Mixed Migration Update Eastern and Southern Africa, Egypt and Yemen, July-September 2026: The core areas of focus include the Eastern route, from East and the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula; the Southern route from East Africa and the Great Lakes towards South Africa; the Central Mediterranean Route (also called the Northern Route) from East and the Horn of Africa towards North Africa; as well as intra-regional mixed migration dynamics.
EU countries negotiate migrant return hub with Rwanda: Representatives from Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, and The Netherlands met with the Rwandese authorities this quarter to discuss a migrant return hub in Rwanda. Following the new EU returns framework which allows for establishing return facilities outside the EU, the hub would receive rejected asylum seekers and those found without the required documentation to remain in the aforementioned countries.

Chad

28.10.26 ArabNews: Clashes wound at least 72 soldiers in Chad gold mining region: Chad’s military has been locked in running battles since October 14 with a local militia in Tibesti, an arid mountain region bordering Libya and Niger boasting vast gold reserves
Gold has been a source of conflict ever since Chad’s independence in 1960, with illegal gold miners from across Africa, armed groups and the Chadian military all competing for access. The Miski Self-Defense Committee, which has prevented the state from accessing the area to exploit its mineral resources, accuses the government of going back on a 2025 peace deal by introducing levies on gold prospectors and carrying out mining in the region.

28.09.26 AfricaVews: L’afflux de réfugiés soudanais s’accélère au Tchad sur fond de crise humanitaire: Plus de 55 000 réfugiés soudanais ont fui vers l’est du Tchad depuis le début de l’année, a indiqué vendredi l’ONU, qui alerte sur l’accélération des déplacements alors que l’aide humanitaire demeure largement sous-financée.
See also Reuters 26.10.26: They fled Darfur as boys. Now their children are growing up in the same refugee camp.: [Report] Decades after Sudanese families first sought safety in Chad, war, drought and aid cuts have left many with no way home – and no viable future where they are.

Ethiopia

05.10.26 AJE: Four African leaders issue joint declaration as Ethiopia war escalates: Egyptian, Eritrean, Somali and Sudanese leaders also call for talks to end the civil war in Sudan.
See also AR 06.10.26: Egypt is trying to contain Ethiopia. Will it succeed?; AR 13.10.26: As war with Ethiopia looms, how much weaponry does Eritrea have?; AR 11.09.26: GERD: Ethiopia digs in as Egypt draws a red line on Nile dams

08.10.26 TNH: Tigray faces a double catastrophe: War and worsening hunger: [Analysis] The fragile post-war period proved to be a textbook example of an unsustainable peace. In the diplomatic rush to celebrate the "silencing of the guns" in 2022, international mediators largely overlooked the unresolved structural collapse, persistent territorial occupation, and ongoing deprivation facing Tigray’s civilian population.
Hundreds of thousands of people displaced from western Tigray remained unable to go home, leaving an estimated 44% of the region’s prime cultivable land inaccessible.
See also 22.10.26 AJE: Tigray resumes daily life amid fears of wider war; 10.10.26 AR: Tigray insurgency withers as federal forces enter Shire and resume flights to Mekelle: Defections and retreating rebels leave a power vacuum in northern Ethiopia, raising the stakes in an escalating diplomatic standoff over sea access; 04.10.26 AR: Ethiopian forces seize Mekelle as regional rivals gather in Egypt: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reclaims Tigray’s regional capital without a fight, but an Alamein summit of uneasy neighbours threatens to escalate a domestic war into a proxy conflict; 21.09.26 AJE: Ethiopian armed groups forge alliance against government: The groups announced the alliance on Sunday, saying that they would work together to set up an inclusive transitional government.

Somaliland

15.10.26 AR: Israel, Trump recognition: 5 questions on Somaliland’s place in the Horn of Africa crisis: [Analysis] Somaliland’s self-declared independence in 1991 has widened the fault lines between neighbours. Israel’s formal recognition has not brought anyone closer. Israel and Taiwan are the only countries to have diplomatic relations with the small breakaway republic.

South Sudan

19.10.26 AR: South Sudan: Salva Kiir dissolves government after seizing control of state revenue: South Sudan’s political crisis is deepening as scrutiny grows over a private company’s control of state tax revenue. At the centre is a business network linked to President Salva Kiir’s family.

Sudan

27.10.26 The Insurgent Papers: Sudan In Context II: Sudan’s Dispossession and the UAE’s Empire of Access: [Extensive Analysis] The Political Economy of Proxy War, Militarized Extraction, and the Struggle for Popular Sovereignty

26.10.26 TNH: Remembering El Fasher, the city I knew and the atrocities that changed it: What is clear is that I cannot reduce what happened to a story about resilience or the ability to begin again. That is because behind these words are people who were killed, families that were separated, and those whose situation remains unknown.
See also 26.10.26 AR: Sudan’s El Fasher, one year on: Hemeti’s bloody prize is now a ghost town ruled by guns: The RSF conquered Darfur’s last major army stronghold, but a year later, most residents have fled, civilian institutions barely function and armed commanders wield the real power.

20.10.26 Reuters: Sudanese drone attack killed more than 150 people in Abyei market, official says: "The fire is still burning. So the recovery process of the dead ones is still continuing. The situation is terrible," Ngor said, adding that some bodies had been burned to ashes. Three diplomatic sources, an aid worker and an expert on the conflict told Reuters the strike hit a fuel depot in the market. The diplomatic sources said the depot had been used in the past by the RSF to supply its forces.
See also AJE 06.10.26: UN rights council condemns attacks on civilians in Sudan, calls for truce; AJE 14.09.26: Sudan aid networks at risk of collapse, UN agencies warn: Ongoing fighting, heavy rains, and continued displacement threaten to bring an “imminent end” to Sudan’s emergency relief supply via the IOM’s Common Humanitarian Pipeline, the agency said on Monday; SWM 30.10.26: RSF Drone Campaign Cripples Sudan’s Electricity Network: A series of drone strikes by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has knocked out electricity stations across several states since Monday, leaving large parts of army-controlled Sudan without power. The attacks have damaged transformers, transmission equipment, and fuel installations from eastern Sudan to the capital, Khartoum.

11.10.26 AJE: At least 72 Sudanese miners killed in air strike: Rights monitor: “Egyptian fighter jets targeted civilian miners in the northern Wadi area inside Sudanese territory, resulting, according to preliminary information, in the killing of 72 civilians”.

06.10.26 AR: Inside Khartoum, a shattered city where peace talks meet deep scepticism: Info on state of things in Khartoum

21.09.26 SWM: Large-Scale Army Offensive Targets RSF Strongholds in North Kordofan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied groups have launched a major offensive across North Kordofan State, attacking villages held by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) west of El Obeid in Al-Sheikan Locality while also pushing west from Bara and Jabrat al-Sheikh toward parts of Sodari Locality that remain under RSF control.

11.09.26 Guardian: Curse of the Nile’s gold: how Sudan is losing its fertile fields and ability to produce food: An artisanal mining boom driven by war and poverty is causing a public health emergency, as chemicals poison soil, water and society
See also AJE 25.10.26: The search for gold is a dangerous and laborious gamble for Sudan’s miners: As Sudan’s war destroys livelihoods and pushes people towards artisanal mining, the death of 16-year-old Altayeb Alhadi highlights the dangers facing young workers in an industry offering little protection.

West Africa and Sahel

28.10.26 MMC: West Africa, Quarter 3, 2026: The core countries of focus for this region are Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic and the coastal countries.
Fatalities rose along the Atlantic (+28%) and Western Mediterranean (+121%) Routes despite fewer overall arrivals in Europe, as intensified migration controls shifted departure points and lengthened maritime routes.
Insecurity across northern and northwestern Nigeria drove cross-border migration, displacing civilians into Benin and Niger.
Senegal deepened its maritime security partnership with the EU, securing a programme that provide expanded infrastructure for intercepted migrants in Dakar and Saint-Louis.
Burkina Faso advanced regional return frameworks by signing tripartite agreements with UNHCR, Benin, Ghana, and Togo, without guaranteed safety upon return.
Senegal intensified police checks and deportation procedures targeting foreign nationals, triggering civil society concerns over arbitrary arrests amid rising anti-migrant rhetoric.

10/2026 IOM: Europe — Main West African nationalities among sea arrivals to Europe in 2025 and 2026: In the first half of 2026, 4,566 migrants from Mali, Senegal, Guinea and The Gambia were registered arriving in Europe along the Western African Atlantic, Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean routes, a 59 per cent decrease compared to the first half of 2025. Malians were the largest group (1,589), followed by Senegalese (1,184), Guineans (1,076) and Gambians (919). Together, these four nationalities accounted for 77 per cent of West African arrivals along the three routes, with arrivals predominantly recorded in Spain.

10.10.26 RFI: UN alarmed as number of displaced in central Sahel reaches nearly four million: The United Nations on Friday raised the alarm about a displacement crisis in the central Sahel where nearly four million people have been forced to flee their homes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

02.10.26 AR: West Africa’s refinery boom is long on ambition and short on supply: London’s Good Delivery rules keep industrial miners loyal to Swiss refiners. To persuade Barrick Mining, AngloGold Ashanti or Endeavour Mining to refine locally, governments must overcome one obstacle above all: the London Bullion Market Association’s (LBMA) Good Delivery label. West African refineries struggle even to secure supply, as much artisanal gold goes to Dubai, which has no Good Delivery refinery. In Africa, only the Rand Refinery, which has operated near Johannesburg since 1920, holds the label – and Switzerland remains miners’ preferred destination.
See also BBC 29.09.26: Burkina Faso's junta leader opens major gold refinery to keep mining profits at home: "We want to refine all our metals on site... we want to have the entire value chain on site," he said at the plant's inauguration in the capital, Ouagadougou, on Monday.

16.09.26 Guardian: Al-Qaida and IS-linked violence in Africa’s Sahel belt set to hit record levels this year: Islamist extremist violence in Africa’s Sahel region is set to reach historic highs after a series of sweeping offensives by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State, according to new figures compiled by the conflict monitor Acled.
See also 14.10.26 Clingendael: Clashes in Burkina Faso, Mali Niger intensifying

10.09.26 AR: Mutiny in Niger: 5 questions to understand why the AES confederation left Tiani on his own: The FU-AES still lacks sufficient troop numbers and equipment to intervene. According to our sources, the headquarters at Base 101 houses barely a dozen staff officers. And the three states do not appear to share the same military priorities. The inertia shown during the events of 28-29 August raises questions, first of all, about the AES’ ability to turn its political commitments into concrete military action.

Burkina Faso

23.10.26: Burkina Faso : un programme de 4,8 milliards $ pour élargir l’accès à l’électricité d’ici 2030: Au Burkina Faso, 34 % de la population avait accès à l’électricité en 2024, selon la Banque mondiale. Avec le programme « Faso Wa-Fulu », récemment adopté en Conseil des ministres, les autorités ambitionnent d’accélérer l’électrification du pays à l’horizon 2030.
See also: APA 26.10.26: Burkina-FMI : discussions sur l’économie;

21.10.26 AR: Burkina Faso: ‘Sentimentalism is over’, Ibrahim Traoré reinstates death penalty: According to the official state news agency of Burkina Faso, AIB, “acts of terrorism, espionage, treason, parricide and the importation of expired or prohibited products that result in death are now punishable by the death penalty”.

20.10.26 APA: Burkina Faso bans privatization of key state enterprises: pproved during a plenary session with 70 votes in favor and one abstention, the legislation empowers the state to regulate, control, and monitor essential public entities while reserving the authority to acquire equity stakes in private companies operating within vital sectors.
See also BusinessInsider 29.08.26: Libyan state bank takes Burkina Faso to World Bank tribunal after military government seizes its 50% stake

18.10.26 RFI: Burkina Faso: le gouvernement réforme les programmes d'histoire-géographie pour «décoloniser» les manuels scolaires: Depuis la rentrée scolaire qui a eu lieu au début du mois d’octobre, élèves et professeurs des collèges et des lycées doivent composer avec un nouveau lexique en histoire et en géographie au Burkina Faso.

19.10.26 Timbuktu Institute: Burkina Faso : four years of Traoré, sovereignty celebrated, freedoms in retreat: In Burkina Faso, the fourth anniversary of Captain Traoré’s rise to power was celebrated with great pomp by the nation. The “Night of the Popular Progressive Revolution” brought together thousands of residents on 30 September on the Place de la Résistance in Ouagadougou.

11.10.26 RFI: Burkina Faso: appel au «patriotisme économique», le gouvernement interdit l’exportation des farines: Les autorités burkinabè expliquent vouloir assurer la disponibilité de ces produits sur le marché intérieur. Une mesure prise alors que la campagne agricole est marquée par une mauvaise pluviométrie dans plusieurs régions du pays.

22.09.26 BeninwebTV: Burkina Faso : près de 300 blindés Nanga, Traoré refuse de dévoiler l’usine: Ibrahim Traoré affirme que près de 300 blindés Nanga ont été produits ou adaptés au Burkina Faso depuis novembre 2025. Le chef de l’État dit que la société Faso Armored restera tenue à l’écart du public pour des raisons de secret défense. Le président a aussi affirmé que quatre à cinq autres entreprises travailleraient discrètement dans le secteur militaire.

Ghana

15.10.26 AR: Ghana’s cocaine coast: Who is letting the traffickers through?: Tonnes of cocaine are slipping through Ghana’s ports and turning up in Europe.

Mali

23.10.26 Lsi : Mali : la déchéance de nationalité désormais étendue aux citoyens d’origine: Adoptée à l’unanimité des 119 membres présents, la réforme concerne désormais aussi bien les citoyens naturalisés que les Maliens d’origine, notamment en cas d’actes jugés contraires aux intérêts nationaux.

19.10.26 HRW: Mali: Military Attacks on Civilians, Insurgent Abuses: Malian armed forces and their allies have since July 2026 responded to mounting attacks by Islamist and separatist armed groups with abusive counterinsurgency operations in central and northern Mali, Human Rights Watch said today.

14.10,26 APA: Mali hosts over 322,000 refugees amid Sahel crisis: As of September 30, 2026, Mali was hosting 322,584 refugees and asylum-seekers alongside 414,524 internally displaced persons, according to figures presented by the Malian delegation at the 77th session of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva.
The official figures also recorded 90,648 returnees, while 343,091 Malians remained registered as refugees in foreign countries.

06.10.26 AJE: Mali’s army says it has taken Kidal from Tuareg rebels, with Russia’s help: Mali’s armed forces have entered the strategic northern city of Kidal, five months after separatist rebels seized it, following an air and ground campaign backed by Russia’s Africa Corps.

29.09.26 Amnesty: Mali. Des preuves accablantes de crimes de guerre commis par les forces armées de l’État et des membres du groupe Wagner – nouveau rapport: Intitulé « Nul n’est épargné » : crimes de guerre commis par l’armée malienne et les forces alliées étrangères le long de la frontière mauritanienne, ce rapport documente les meurtres d’au moins 34 civil·e·s dans sept localités du Mali entre juin 2023 et décembre 2025 commis par les Forces armées maliennes (FAMa) et le Groupe Wagner (société militaire privée russe active au Mali entre fin 2021 et juin 2025).

31.08.26 ModernDiplomacy: Inside the Sahel’s War Economy: How Juntas and Jihadists Tax the Same Fuel Trucks: Ten months into JNIM's blockade of Bamako, fuel still gets through — at five times the price. An economic anatomy of how Mali's junta and its jihadist enemies now profit from the same smuggling routes.
See also: Seneweb 27.10.26 : Un convoi de 1107 camions-citernes remplis de carburant débarque à Bamako

Mauritania

21.10.26 Sahara Media: Une embarcation transportant 191 candidats à l’immigration clandestine prise en charge par la garde côte mauritanienne: La Garde côtière a précisé que cette opération s’inscrit dans le cadre de ses efforts continus visant à surveiller les eaux territoriales, à mener des opérations de sauvetage et à lutter contre l’immigration clandestine, tout en veillant à protéger les vies humaines et à traiter les situations humanitaires conformément aux procédures en vigueur.

Niger

12.10.26 Mondafrique: Sur les routes du Niger, des migrants et des orpailleurs: [Extensive interview] Dans la région saharienne du Kawar, au nord-est du Niger, le transport de migrants en direction de la Libye a modifié le paysage économique de plusieurs localités traversées par les convois. Le sociologue Khalif Traoré a interviewé le géographe nigérien Tchiari Lowoyé Agi Hamet, spécialiste de l’exploitation de l’or au Djado, de retour du terrain.

28.09.26 Reuters: More than 50 members of Niger's security forces killed in attacks, sources say: Analysts and security sources say frustration is growing within frontline army units after repeated losses to insurgents, notably in western Niger.

17.09.26 Reuters: US seals big uranium investment in Niger, two years after troops left.: The investment could bolster US access to a strategic uranium supply at a time when Niger, the world's seventh-largest uranium producer, is locked in a ⁠dispute with French state-backed miner Orano, which long dominated the country's uranium sector. The financing is being viewed by people familiar with the matter as a diplomatic and commercial breakthrough for Washington.

14.09.26 AJE: Niger mutiny exposes growing reliance on Russia: The attempted power grab has exposed deep grievances within the army and tested Niger’s ties with its Sahelian allies. The mutiny exposed the gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those serving in better-protected units in the capital.
See also ActuNiger 22.10.26: Coopération militaire : Niamey et Alger signent un nouvel accord qui renforce leur partenariat dans les domaines de la Défense et de la Sécurité

03.09.26 AfricaNews: Thousands rally to back Niger authorities after thwarted mutiny: Wednesday's demonstration brought together several thousand Nigeriens, including junta followers and ministers, to Place de la Concertation, where hundreds had already rallied on Saturday as the clashes raged for the same purpose.
See also AR 31.08.26: How Niger’s Tiani suppressed an attempted coup: A mutiny broke out in Niamey on the night of Friday 28 to Saturday 29 August, targeting the presidency, the airport and national television. The attempt, led by junior officers, was put down by the junta, with help from Russia’s Africa Corps.

Nigeria

22.09.26 AJE: Nigeria’s refining revolution has a monopoly problem: Dangote has slashed fuel imports, but market concentration risks keeping the benefits from common Nigerians.

21.09.26 AR: US plays catch-up with China in race for Nigeria’s critical minerals: While Washington is laying the diplomatic groundwork for a foothold in Nigeria’s emerging critical-minerals sector, Chinese companies have invested more than $1.3bn in lithium processing capacity.

18.09.26 AJE: ‘Just ask Grok’: How ISIL is using Big Tech’s AI to build bombs: Boko Haram fighters are using the artificial intelligence chatbots of Big Tech companies to help build more powerful bombs, plan attacks and solve problems during combat, according to research by the University of Cambridge.

07.09.26 TNH: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal: A ceasefire agreement with the jihadist group Boko Haram has been in effect for the past three months and is expected to be extended, but has not been previously reported publicly, The New Humanitarian has learned.
See also THN 09.09.26: Finding a path to peace: Nigeria’s long, faltering history of dialogue with Boko Haram: After 17 years of war and close to 350,000 indirect civilian deaths, the conflict in Nigeria’s northeast is stalemated. Yet behind the scenes there has been a long if faltering attempt by the Nigerian government to find a negotiated breakthrough to the jihadist insurgency. Islamist ideology is not monolithic. Extremist groups are political actors that shape and are shaped by their environments. Supposed “red lines” over political demands can also fade over time.

Senegal

21.10.26 France24: Sénégal : une grève paralyse plusieurs secteurs à l’approche des JOJ: [Video] Au Sénégal, une grève générale de trois jours a débuté ce mercredi, à l’appel du Front syndical pour la défense du travail. La mobilisation rassemble treize syndicats de l’éducation, des transports.

12.10.26 HRW: Sénégal : Une répression brutale bafoue les droits des personnes LGBT: Les autorités procèdent à des arrestations massives, imposent le dépistage forcé du VIH, et restreignent l’accès à une représentation juridique

08.10.26 ACLED: JNIM’s expansion in western Mali puts Senegal’s trade and mining sectors at risk: Senegal faces no immediate threat from JNIM, but the group’s entrenchment in bordering Mali gives it access to cross-border communities, trade, and gold mining.

03.10.26 AJE: To reclaim its sovereignty, Senegal must approach debt differently: [Opinion]: Earlier this month, the International Monetary Fund and Senegal announced a new loan programme worth $2.2bn. This came after a previous deal was suspended following the discovery in July 2024 of concealed debt equivalent to approximately 25 percent of the country’s GDP, which brought public debt to over 130 percent of GDP, one of the highest ratios in Africa.
See also Africa News 02.09.26: Le FMI et le Sénégal scellent un accord de 2,2 milliards de dollars: L’accord, qui doit encore être approuvé par la direction et le conseil d’administration du FMI, doit accompagner le programme de réformes économiques et financières du Sénégal pour la période 2026-2029. Il marque la reprise d’une coopération financière interrompue en 2024, après la découverte de graves divergences dans les données relatives aux finances publiques.

17.09.26 RFI: Sénégal : le pétrole est-il devenu le nouveau moteur de l’économie?: [Podcast] Les exportations sénégalaises explosent ! En juillet, elles ont atteint 668,2 milliards de francs CFA, soit une hausse de 27,3% en un mois. Cette progression est largement portée par le pétrole brut, qui représente désormais plus de 40% des ventes sénégalaises à l’étranger.

Senegal / The Gambia

02.09.26 AR: Why did Senegal tear down a wall on the Gambian border? 5 questions answered: Apart from a coastal strip less than 100km long, The Gambia is entirely e nclosed within Senegal. Its highly unusual geography is the result of an agreement struck between French and British colonisers at the end of the 19th century.

Subsahara

DRC

01.10.26 Reuters: Thousands flee Congo Ebola-hit camp, stoking concerns about disease spread: Security forces went to the Kigonze camp looking for weapons and clashes ensued, causing camp residents to flee over the last week, according to Congolese and health officials. The camp for some 19,000 displaced residents in Ituri province now lies abandoned, UN Senior Ebola Coordinator Julien Harneis said in a statement. Reuters reported in June that more than 30 people had died in the camp in just over a month, many from Ebola

14.09.26 TNH: How Rwanda-backed M23 rebels finance their war in DR Congo: Rwanda-backed M23 rebels have embedded themselves into the local economy of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, using revenue from taxes and minerals to pay fighters, maintain an administration, and consolidate territory.
But the system faces constraints: The rebels and their backers are extracting revenue from an economy weakened by war, disrupted trade, and the collapse of formal banking, while lacking the financial infrastructure needed to revive it.

Kenya

07.09.26 AJE: Why is Kenya cracking down on foreign traders and small retailers?: Kenya is beginning a crackdown on foreign nationals operating small retail shops and engaging in hawking, after President William Ruto directed authorities to shut down such businesses from September 7. He said foreigners should not compete with Kenyans in businesses such as hawking and small retail, while foreign investment was welcome in activities requiring greater capital and investment.
See Also AT 14.09.26: Kenya: Ruto’s foreign traders crackdown stokes xenophobia fears: Undocumented Burundians and other East Africans working in Kenya’s informal economy are among those most affected, particularly in Nairobi, where many run small shops, sell food and drinks, hawk goods or work in construction.

Malawi

07.10.26 NYT: Driven to Leave Home by Desperation. Driven Back by Hate: [Reportage] Anti-immigrant violence in South Africa has forced tens of thousands to return to Malawi, severing badly needed cash flows and leaving families hungry.

South Africa

30.10.26 Guardian: Sinkholes, scarred land and scapegoats: the scourge of illegal gold mining in Johannesburg: Mining companies are supposed to seal up old mine shafts and rehabilitate the environment around them. However, in 2025 there were “6,100 derelict and ownerless mines and 1,170 unsafe mine openings”, the mining minister, Gwede Mantashe, said in response to a parliamentary question. Zama zamas have stepped into those voids left in the earth. While there is no comprehensive data on them, experts agree that a majority are from neighbouring countries, principally Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
The skyline south of Johannesburg is punctuated by the pale yellow ridges of mine dumps. Increasingly, the ground is also caving open.

West Asia

Iran

20.09.26 AJE: What’s behind Iranian authorities’ push for a mass mobilisation campaign?: The Iranian authorities’ public messaging campaign is part of a push to train and arm volunteer civilians who would serve as part of state security under the Basij militia arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Janfada recruits held their first public “military exercise” on Friday in Tehran, where thousands of children, women and men – many masked and wearing shades – marched on downtown streets.
See also Iran-Echo, 17.10.26: Le basculement du monde vers un nouvel ordre multipolaire : quelle place pour l’Iran ?

Lebanon

21.10.26 DAWN: The Path to Disarming Palestinian Factions in Lebanon Runs Through Refugee Rights: Palestinian refugees represent one of the most economically disadvantaged and excluded sectors of Lebanese society, empowering the role of non-state armed groups. The basis of this exclusion is the fear of Tawteen, translated differently across official documents as "implantation," "colonization," "settlement" or "naturalization."
Due to these restrictions, Palestinians remain excluded from the job market, with an estimated 94% relying on the informal economy to survive. Most are confined to low-pay, low-skill work, making them vulnerable to exploitation. Some Lebanese leaders, including parliamentarian Ghassan Mokhayber, have made clear how they understand the state's approach: It is "official policy … to maintain Palestinians in a vulnerable, precarious situation to diminish prospects for their naturalization or permanent settlement." In this environment, 80% of Palestinian refugees live below the poverty line, infrastructure is near total collapse and government services are absent, resulting in parallel forms of governance. Palestinian weapons fill the vacuum of law and order left by the state.

Israel / Palestine

27.10.26 FA: The Israel Netanyahu Made: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has dominated his country’s politics for the last four decades, and his influence will not end even if Israelis vote him out of office. Over the course of his tenure as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Netanyahu has dramatically reset the terms of the country’s national security politics. His persistent rejection of Palestinian statehood has helped push the idea firmly out of mainstream debates, and his longtime agitation for war against Iran is now widely accepted policy across Israel’s political and security establishment.

23.10.26 Guardian: Israel launches collective punishment campaign in Hebron after two soldiers killed: Benjamin Netanyahu announced a siege on Hebron and neighbouring Halhul and said residents of the gunmen’s home neighbourhoods would all be forced out. He promised mass demolitions of homes.
The first destruction began within hours of the attack, as ministers who had been on the campaign trail ahead of elections on Tuesday rushed to the site of the shooting.

19.10.29 Guardian: Cuts force World Food Programme to end support for half a million Palestinians in Gaza: Two-thirds of population face crisis levels of food insecurity and 200,000 people are in danger of famine
See also TNH 29.10.26: Who will answer for WFP’s ration cuts in Gaza and the winter misery ahead?

12.10.26 AJE: Maps show how Israel’s ‘Yellow Line’ keeps squeezing Palestinians in Gaza: A year into a ‘ceasefire’, Israel restricts access to 65 percent of Gaza and crams 2.1 million people into the rest.

12.10.26 NYT: Israel’s Destruction of Southern Lebanon Intensified After the Cease-Fire: Today, 48 of the roughly 60 villages and towns within Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon are mostly leveled, the Times analysis shows. The scale of Israel’s systematic demolition has fueled fears among many Lebanese that Israel is seeking to permanently empty the territory of its population.

01.10.26 Guardian: New Google Maps images reveal massive scale of devastation in Gaza: The images were taken in June this year and show further destruction of homes, businesses, places of worship and infrastructure since a fragile ceasefire came into effect almost 12 months ago.

26.09.26 Guardian: We followed five people in Gaza from dawn to dusk – this is what the headlines don’t tell us: [Reportage] There are some things, however, that rarely make the headlines, but have come to define life in Gaza. They are grinding, cruel realities that only really emerge when you inspect the minutia of a day.

16.09.26 Zeit: USA wollen Waffen in Milliardenhöhe an Israel liefern: Die US-Regierung hat eine umfangreiche Waffenlieferung an Israel beschlossen. Nach Informationen der Nachrichtenagentur AP soll das Paket rund 2,8 Milliarden US-Dollar (etwa 2,4 Milliarden Euro) und Zehntausende Bomben umfassen. Laut der Washington Post handelt es sich um die umfangreichste Lieferung der letzten Jahre.
Den Berichten zufolge soll die Lieferung unter anderem 40.000 leistungsstarke Bomben mit einem Gewicht von jeweils rund 900 Kilogramm umfassen. Auch 20.000 Bomben des Typs Mk 84 und 20.000 des Typs BLU-117 sollen geliefert werden, wie zwei US-Regierungsvertreter und eine mit den Plänen vertraute Person der AP sagten. Wegen der extrem hohen Zahl ziviler Opfer bei ihrer Nutzung im Gazastreifen sowie im Libanon haben Waffen dieser Art bereits für breite Kritik gesorgt.

See also FP 08.10.26: The End of Gaza: The fallout from Gaza’s destruction and the suffering of its people will be felt for generations. Only Israel and its chief enabler in the White House can determine whether the years to come will be a time of rebuilding and healing or one of perpetual violence and instability.

06.09.26 Spiegel: Früher war hier der Brotkorb Palästinas, jetzt baut Israels Armee einen weiteren Sperrwall: Israelische Soldaten errichten nahe der Grenze zu Jordanien eine Barriere, die palästinensische Bauern von ihrem Land abschneidet. Vor Ort wird klar: Der Wall soll offenbar auch dazu dienen, das Jordantal komplett zu besiedeln.

02.09.26 France24: Israel ‘organised and prepared’ to remove Gaza population if US gives green light, Katz says: "There is no real solution for Gaza in the end without this migration," Defence Minister Israel Katz told a conference hosted by Israeli news site Ynet and newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.

01.09.26 AJE: Israel’s multiple wars see finance, defence ministries clash over spending: Spiraling costs of Israel’s conflicts deepen rift between finance and defense ministries ahead of budget decisions.

Syria

26.10.26 Al-Monitor: Syrian women easy target in Sharaa’s drive to consolidate power: Syria’s interim president is balancing Western demands for inclusion with pressure from Islamist hard-liners as he seeks to consolidate power and shed his jihadi past.
“Hope is dimming among the people because Sharaa did not show he is building a real government for the people, but rather one for himself”. The United Nations estimates that 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line. Some 66% live in extreme poverty. Women do not protest against discrimination because “they are more concerned about how to provide their children with their next meal”.

UAE

25.10.26 Guardian: ‘That’s the way the city works’: how the UAE changed the face of Andy Burnham’s Manchester: [Long Read] The story of the emirates’ presence in Manchester winds from the Arab spring to some of the most deprived places in England – with complicated results. Emirati-linked firms’ ownership of Manchester land ‘up 39%’ in 10 years

Guardian 01.10.26: Fixer, financier, spymaster: how the UAE’s Sheikh Tahnoon is setting his sights on AI dominance: [Report]For those trying to uncover the truth behind His Highness Sheikh Tahnoon bin (or “Ben”) Zayed Al Nahyan – royal fixer, reclusive spymaster, financial behemoth – fairytales are nearly all we have to go on.

Yemen

11.10.26 Reuters: At least 139 migrants dead, including some children, after boat from Djibouti to Yemen capsizes, UN agency says: The migrants were heading to Yemen, with the hope of eventually making it to wealthier Gulf nations, even as Yemeni nationals themselves flee their country, which is experiencing the most serious escalation in fighting between Saudi ​Arabia-backed government forces and the Iran-backed Houthis since a UN-brokered truce in 2022.

06.10.26 AJE: What would it take for the Yemen offensive to succeed?: This is the most consequential escalation in the Yemen war since the UN-brokered truce of 2022. For four years, the war was managed as a frozen conflict. Now, both sides are trying to redraw the map.
See also NYT 15.10.26: Why Does Saudi Arabia Struggle to Stop Houthi Attacks?: The problem in part is that Saudi Arabia invested heavily in weapons having what some military analysts call a “glitter factor” — things like high-tech fighter jets and the latest missile interceptors. But the Houthi guerrillas often deploy cheap drones or low-flying cruise missiles that Saudi forces struggle to detect.

16.09.26 Zeit: Mehr als 100.000 Menschen im Jemen auf der Flucht: Die Kämpfe zwischen der Huthi-Miliz und der jemenitischen Regierung treiben laut UN Zehntausende in die Flucht. Unter den Toten und Verletzten sind zahlreiche Kinder.
See also TNH 15.09.26: Yemen’s latest escalation pushes millions deeper into crisis; MERIP 16.09.26: Remittances at Risk—Sanctions, War and Informal Finance in Yemen: emeni migrant workers abroad send billions of dollars to Yemen every year, making remittances one of the country’s largest and most consistent sources of foreign currency. The primary corridor runs through Saudi Arabia, which accounts for an estimated 61 percent of Yemen's formally recorded remittance inflows, with many Yemeni migrants employed in low-wage and informal sectors. For the households in Yemen that receive them, remittances are rarely used as savings or investment capital. They are survival income, often transferred through the Hawala system.

Mediterranean

19.10.26 ARD: Zwölf Migranten sterben bei Bootsunglücken in der Ägäis: In der Ägäis sind bei zwei Vorfällen mit Flüchtlingsbooten insgesamt zwölf Menschen ums Leben gekommen. Beide Unglücke ereigneten sich vor griechischen Inseln, die nahe an der türkischen Küste liegen. Das Boot vor Samos kenterte offenbar nach einem scharfen Manöver. 14 der Passagiere konnten gerettet werden. Vor der griechischen Insel Lesbos kollidierte in der Nacht ein Schnellboot mit Migranten an Bord mit einem Schiff der Küstenwache.

See also 02.10.26 Infomigrants: Après la collision en mer Égée, les versions contradictoires des survivants et des gardes-côtes grecs

16.10.26 Infomigrants: Mer Méditerranée : Frontex dénonce une nouvelle opération musclée des gardes-côtes libyens contre un canot de migrants: Selon Frontex, cet été, les gardes-côtes libyens ont percuté un bateau de migrants en détresse après avoir été alertés de sa présence par un navire de l'agence européenne de surveillance des frontières. L'action des forces libyennes a mis gravement en danger la vie des 27 exilés à bord, dont des enfants, d'après l'institution européenne.

Se also Altreconomia 25.09.26: Dietro al “calo degli sbarchi” le solite, gravissime, violenze delle milizie libiche

06.10.26 AJE: Refugee rescue group defiant as Greece targets it: A Greek court will open trial proceedings on Tuesday against Tommy Olsen to decide who is right.
Olsen is the creator of Aegean Boat Report, an independent monitor of distressed vessels in the Aegean. When contacted, he alerts the Greek or Turkish asylum service and coastguard, depending on whose jurisdiction the refugees find themselves in.

04.10.26 Alarmphone: 12 Jahre Alarm Phone: Am 11. Oktober 2026 gibt es das Alarm Phone seit genau 12 Jahren. Rund 11.000 Boote in Seenot haben sich in dieser Zeit aus allen Meeren vor den EU-Außengrenzen bei unserer Hotline gemeldet.
Zum 12-jährigen Bestehen haben wir eine vierseitige Zeitung produziert, in der aktuelle Erfahrungen aus unserer Arbeit vorgestellt werden. Die Zeitung kann hier angesehen und runtergeladen werden. Und wir freuen uns über Spenden.

17.09.26 IOM: New IOM Data: Migrant Arrivals to Europe Fall 39% in 2026 While Deaths Continue to Rise: Nearly 60,000 migrants and refugees have arrived in Europe by sea so far in 2026. That's down 39 per cent from 98,040 during the same period last year. Yet, at least 2,292 people have died or gone missing attempting the crossing, up from 1,999 for the same period last year. The Mediterranean and Atlantic routes are the deadliest maritime routes in the world.

Europe

12.10.26 NYT: The Taliban Are Using Europe’s Fear of Migrants to Their Advantage: European nations that condemn the Taliban government for its human rights record are seeking its help to deport refugees back to Afghanistan.
At a meeting in Brussels in late June, more than 20 European officials met with five Taliban representatives to discuss deportations, breaking a taboo against holding talks with the group in the European Union.

Balkan

21.08.26 BalkanInsight: ‘Return Hubs’ for Migrants Anticipated in Balkans for ‘Era of Deportations’: As the EU awaits final approval for plans to set up ‘return hubs’ in third countries for migrants awaiting deportation, it’s predicted that Balkan countries could end up hosting such holding centres despite concerns about human rights violations.

Finland

07.09.26 RAJA: The Eastern Border Fence is Completed: The in total 200-kilometre-long border fence was constructed to those areas where the operative need for it is the greatest, based on a risk assessment, and where the construction is cost-efficient. The border fence consists of a 4.5-meter-high fence, technical surveillance system, road network and a 25-meter-wide clearing.

France / UK

24.10.26 Guardian: Violence, intimidation and fear: 10 years on from the ‘Jungle’, life in Calais migrant camps is harsher than ever: People living in tents in northern France hoping to find asylum in England face increasing intimidation from police and far-right agitators.
More than 200,000 asylum seekers have made the journey from Calais to the UK since the “Jungle” – one of the largest of its kind in Europe – ceased to exist. On the 10th anniversary of it being torn down, about 4,000 people remain in smaller camps in Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne, waiting to cross the sea.
See also taz 07.09.26: Rechte blockieren Hafen von Portsmouth

10.10.26 Guardian: Why is the UK-France ‘one in, one out’ migration deal being scrapped?: The deal involved returning to France one asylum seeker who had arrived in the UK in a small boat, in exchange for another brought legally to the UK from France. It lasted 423 days – from 10 July 2025 until 1 October 2026.

Germany

07.10.26 Mediendienst: KI in der Migrationsverwaltung: Am 8. Oktober 2026 soll ein Gesetzentwurf zum Einsatz von KI in der Migrationsverwaltung, das KIMVG, in erster Lesung im Bundestag besprochen werden. Der Entwurf sieht vor, den Einsatz von KI in Visa- und Asylverfahren deutlich auszuweiten. Auf Anfrage nennt das Bundesinnenministerium als Ziel, Beschäftigte in der Migrationsverwaltung zu unterstützen und zu entlasten. Die KI soll etwa bei der Kommunikation oder Terminvergabe unterstützen. Zusätzlich soll sie helfen, Auffälligkeiten oder Widersprüche in eingereichten Dokumenten zu erkennen.

14.09.26 GFP: Waffen für die Emirate: Deutschland und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate bauen ihre Rüstungskooperation aus. Die Emirate binden sich immer enger an Israel und beliefern eine genozidale Miliz im Sudan mit Waffen.

Greece

01.10.26 ecre: Loosening the grip on civil society in Greece – NGO Registry rules quashed and referred to the EU Court: On 16 September, the highest administrative court of Greece announced that the main tenets of registration rules for civil society organisations working with refugees and migrants breach constitutional and human rights standards.

25.09.26 Infomigrants: "Les gens ici sont comme des bombes à retardement" : dans le nord de la Grèce, les conditions de vie difficiles du camp de Sintiki: En Grèce, plusieurs incidents ont eu lieu cet été dans le camp de Sintiki, dans le nord du pays. Des tensions ont éclaté entre des migrants désespérés par plus d'un an d'enfermement et les forces de l'ordre. Les exilés ont aussi dénoncé leurs conditions de détention dans une lettre.

01.09.26 novinite: New Riot at Greek Migrant Camp Near Bulgaria: The migrants tried to leave the facility by damaging parts of the camp and breaking through its perimeter fence. Police intervened and used tear gas to prevent them from escaping, according to camp security staff.
The group mainly consists of migrants from Egypt and Bangladesh. Under Greece's new migration legislation, they are not permitted to leave the camp because their claims for asylum are not considered eligible. The authorities are preparing to return them to their countries of origin.
See also novinite 24.08.26: Migrants Clash With Police, 35 Escape Greek Detention Center

Hungary

05.09.26 Rapporteur: Hungary stands by controversial migration rules despite EU pressure: Prime minister hopes to recoup fines through EU budget as strict border controls extended in wake of Ceuta crisis

Italy

14.09.26 IRC: IRC Italy Protection Monitoring Report: April - June 2026: As of June 30, 2026, 132,619 people are being hosted in the Italian reception system, a figure
that remained broadly stable compared to June 2025 when 137,939 people were registered. The main focus of this report is the Western Balkan route, and arrivals in Trieste.

Poland

08.09. 26 Border Forensics: The Death Zone: The Making of a Lethal Pushback Regime Across the Polish-Belorussian Borderlands: [Report, pdf] This report centres on the deaths and disappearances of migrants not because we consider them the only forms of harm worth documenting, but because we see them as the culmination of the violence and rights violations that migrants endure while being pushed back and forth across the border by Belarusian and Polish authorities

European Union

27.10.26 EU: La Commission propose de renforcer Frontex: une protection renforcée des frontières, un rôle accru en matière de retours et une réaction plus efficace en cas de crise: La Commission européenne propose de renforcer encore Frontex, en renforçant sa capacité à protéger les frontières extérieures et en faisant de Frontex l'acteur central de l'UE en matière de retours.
See also 27.10.26 taz: Auf dem Weg zur EU-Abschiebepolizei; taz 27.10.26: Frontex wird aufgerüstet: Die EU-Kommission will mehr Personal für die europäische Grenzschutzagentur, mehr Geld und mehr Kompetenzen. Linke, Grüne und Sozialdemokraten kündigen Widerstand an.

17.10.26 Zeit: Mitgliedsstaaten sind sich bei EU-Haushalt nicht einig: Nach dem zweitägigen EU-Gipfel fehlen bei Themen wie dem Haushalt weiterhin Lösungen. Einig waren sich die EU-Staaten dafür bei dem Notfallplan für Migrationskrisen. Demnach solle die Kommission eng mit den Mitgliedsstaaten bei der Ausgestaltung zusammenarbeiten. Die EU-Kommission hatte jüngst einen entsprechenden Vorschlag gemacht. Dieser beinhaltet in bestimmten Fällen auch ein Aussetzen regulärer Asylverfahren.

See also taz 26.10.26: Die Reform ist gescheitert: Es ist nicht einmal vier Monate her, dass die große Reform des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS) in Kraft getreten ist. Dass es aus Deutschland seitdem praktisch keine Abschiebungen nach Griechenland und Italien gab, zeigt: Die Reform ist gescheitert.; taz 18.10.26: EU-Asylpolitik: Von Litauen lernen: Die EU will das durch einen sogenannten „Krisenmechanismus“ das Asylrecht aussetzen dürfen – nach baltischem Vorbild;

ecre 16.10.26: The proposed European Emergency Response Framework: Old habits die hard; EU Home Affairs: 5-POINT PLAN TO PREVENT, ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND TO SUDDEN, MASS ILLEGAL ARRIVALS

15.10.26 erce: ECRE Policy Note: The EU Pact on Asylum and Migration: Putting new rules to the test: The paper assesses the first few months of application of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Drawing on information from civil society organisations across Europe, the note examines developments at the EU level and the practical implementation of the new rules in member states (MS).

06.10.26 Statewatch: Outsourcing Borders: Bulletin 20:
This issue shows the EU spending hundreds of millions of euros on migration control in Mauritania: Taken together, the individual projects (the majority of which appear to still be running, have very recently ended or are yet to commence) appear to total at least €265m in EU and member state funds, accounting for potential budget item duplication. This figure does not include the €180m spent in Mauritania under the ‘MPRR Migrants Protection, Return and Reintegration’ programme, or the €44m spent under the African Peace Facility.
Also: External migration committee discusses crisis in Sudan: More interesting than the analysis itself are the questions asked to delegates at the end of the paper. Having made mention of the conflict contributing to “further migratory flows, including to Europe”, it invites delegates to discuss: how regional cooperation can be enhanced to, among other goals, “avoid further international migratory pressures”; how best to anticipate and mitigate risks that might increase those pressures; how “whole-of-route” approaches may aid “stability” in the Sudan region; and how deportations to Sudan can be continued.
Also: Frontex cooperation with third countries, and
Expanded role for Frontex in social media monitoring to reinforce ‘migration situational awareness’.

See Also Outsourcing Borders Bulletin 19, 03.09.26, especially with an „Eastern Mediterranean ‚route matrix‘.

02.10.26 Infomigrants: Expulsions des étrangers sans papiers : le Conseil de l'UE adopte formellement le controversé "Règlement retour": Réunis à Luxembourg, jeudi 1er octobre, les ministres de l'Intérieur de l'Union européenne (UE) ont formellement adopté le règlement relatif à l'éloignement forcé de migrants en situation irrégulière, validé par le Parlement européen trois mois plus tôt. Les étrangers concernés devront donc quitter l'État membre dans lequel ils se trouvent et coopérer avec les autorités, sous peine de sanctions.
See also 01.10.26 ARD: EU schafft Basis für Abschiebezentren in Drittstaaten: Treffen der Innenminister: Zwei Monate nach der Krise in Ceuta verschärfen die EU-Länder ihre Asylregeln weiter. Künftig dürfen sie umstrittene Abschiebezentren in Drittstaaten betreiben. Innenminister Dobrindt hofft noch in diesem Jahr auf eine erste Vereinbarung.
Derzeit werden demnach noch "Vorgespräche" mit verschiedenen Ländern geführt. Details dazu, mit welchen Drittstaaten verhandelt wird, nannte Dobrindt nicht. Im Gespräch sind immer wieder Ruanda, Uganda, Libyen und Kasachstan.
See also euronews 04.09.26: Five EU countries aim to send migrants to return hubs by 2027; TNA 21.07.26: Egypt rejects European Union's plans for refugee camps on Egyptian shores: During a meeting with European diplomats in Cairo on 10 September, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said his country refuses the mere discussion of such a proposal under all circumstances. Egypt, he said, bears a huge refugee burden already.

21.09.26 Pro Asyl: Abschreckung, Druck und Rechtsverstösse: [Report, pdf] Bilanz der ersten 100 Tage GEAS

07.09.26 Statewatch: New files reveal EU plans to accelerate deportations to Syria: A secretive EU working group on external migration control has a new file on Syria and deportations post-Assad are its primary goal.