Research Paper

September 2026

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the role of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his forces in Libya's migrant interception operations, situating these practices within the broader framework of European Union externalization policies. Since the 2011 NATO-supported uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has become a critical transit and departure point for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The paper analyzes the legal framework governing maritime interceptions, the human rights violations documented in Libyan detention centers, the European Union's financial and logistical support for Libyan coast guard forces, and the recent expansion of cooperation with Haftar's eastern forces. Drawing on reports from international organizations, human rights monitors, investigative journalists, and legal scholarship, this study argues that the EU-Libya migration partnership has created a system of complex persecution that exposes migrants to systematic abuse while entrenching predatory armed actors and undermining prospects for political stability in Libya.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Historical Context: Libya's Political Fragmentation Post-2011
3. Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA)
4. Migration Routes and Interception Operations
5. The European Union's Externalization Strategy
6. Human Rights Violations in Libyan Detention Centers
7. Legal Framework: Non-Refoulement and the Hirsi Judgment
8. The Expansion of EU Cooperation to Eastern Libya
9. Geopolitical Implications and the Weaponization of Migration
10. The RSF Nexus: Sudanese Militia Networks and Migrant Vulnerability
11. International Responses and Accountability Mechanisms
12. Conclusion
13. References

1. Introduction

The Central Mediterranean migration route remains one of the world's deadliest corridors for human mobility. Since the 2011 uprising that deposed longtime Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the country has descended into political fragmentation, with competing authorities vying for control over territory, resources, and institutions. This power vacuum has created fertile ground for human smuggling networks and has transformed Libya into a critical transit state for migrants and asylum seekers from across Africa and beyond, seeking to reach European shores.

At the center of contemporary debates about migration governance in Libya stands Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the de facto ruler of eastern Libya and commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA). While Haftar's forces were historically less involved in maritime migration control than their western counterparts, recent developments have seen a dramatic expansion of interception activities in eastern Libya, accompanied by increasing European engagement with Haftar's administration. This shift raises profound questions about the humanitarian consequences, legal permissibility, and geopolitical ramifications of outsourcing migration control to actors with documented records of human rights abuses.

This paper examines the multifaceted dimensions of Haftar's Libya as an instrument of European migration externalization. It traces the evolution of EU-Libya cooperation on migration control, documents the systematic human rights violations perpetrated against intercepted migrants, analyzes the relevant international legal framework, and assesses the political costs of empowering predatory armed actors in a fractured state. The analysis draws on primary sources including United Nations reports, European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, investigative journalism, and field research by international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

2. Historical Context: Libya's Political Fragmentation Post-2011

The 2011 NATO-supported uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi left Libya in a state of profound political disarray. The removal of the longstanding authoritarian regime created a power vacuum that competing militias, tribal factions, and political movements have sought to fill. The country subsequently split between rival administrations: the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli in the west, and a parallel administration in the east aligned with Khalifa Haftar and the House of Representatives in Tobruk.

This enduring political division has had devastating consequences for governance, particularly in areas related to border control, law enforcement, and the protection of vulnerable populations. As the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) has noted, Libya's prolonged political fragmentation, weak institutions, corruption, and competing authorities have allowed criminal networks and illicit activities to thrive, with human smuggling ranking among the most lucrative and destructive [1].

The post-2011 period also witnessed the militarization of migration management. Whereas under Gaddafi, the European Union had pursued a prospective Framework Agreement to encourage Libya to curb irregular migration, the suspension of negotiations following the 2011 uprising led to a fundamentally different approach. The absence of a sovereign authority capable of exercising effective control over Libya's vast territory and extensive coastline prompted European policymakers to adopt a strategy of building partnerships with whatever armed actors could deliver results in terms of reducing maritime arrivals.

3. Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA)

Khalifa Haftar, a former general under Gaddafi who defected in the 1980s and spent two decades in exile in the United States, returned to Libya during the 2011 uprising. Over the subsequent decade, he consolidated power in eastern Libya, establishing himself as the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the de facto ruler of the eastern half of the country. Haftar's forces have been implicated in widespread human rights abuses, including during the 2019-2020 offensive on Tripoli, which was marked by indiscriminate shelling, summary executions, and the use of landmines.

Haftar's relationship with the international community has been complex and transactional. While his parallel government in the east lacks international recognition, he has successfully cultivated relationships with individual European member states, Russia, and various Middle Eastern powers. As the Stimson Center observes, European attempts to stem migration at the source have helped entrench some of the very actors in Libya who have frustrated mediation efforts in the country [2].

Haftar's family plays a central role in his military and political enterprise. His two sons occupy powerful positions within the forces under his command, creating a dynastic structure that blends military, economic, and political power. The Haftar family has been documented as profiting from migration to Italy even while preventing departures from eastern Libyan shores, suggesting a sophisticated strategy of leveraging migration control for political and financial gain [1].

4. Migration Routes and Interception Operations

4.1 The Central Mediterranean Route

The Central Mediterranean route, connecting Libya to Italy, Malta, and Greece, has been the primary corridor for migration to Europe since 2011. Hundreds of thousands of migrants have attempted the perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea, with human smuggling networks exploiting Libya's governance vacuum to operate with relative impunity. The route has claimed thousands of lives, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR documenting consistent patterns of shipwrecks, drownings, and disappearances.

Historically, maritime departures for Europe originated predominantly from western Libya, particularly from cities such as Zawiya, Sabratha, and Tripoli itself. However, from mid-2022 onwards, a significant shift occurred, with thousands of people suddenly departing from eastern Libya under Haftar's control. As documented by the SWP, Haftar's forces were central to orchestrating these movements, using their control over coastal territory to facilitate, regulate, or prevent departures according to political calculations [1].

The surge in eastern departures prompted alarm in European capitals, particularly in Italy and Greece. In response, Italy officially received Haftar in Rome in May 2023 and offered him cooperation on migration control. Greece subsequently launched training programs for Haftar's forces. The sudden increase in arrivals from eastern Libya to Crete in the first half of 2025—totaling 7,336 people—further intensified European engagement, despite evidence that the surge itself may have been politically motivated by Haftar to extract concessions [1].

The longer-term statistics confirm the scale of this shift. According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, more than 25,000 people attempted the journey from eastern Libya to Greece in 2025—a sharp rise from the 5,161 arrivals recorded in 2024 and a mere 815 in 2023—with almost 21,000 successfully landing in Crete or being rescued by Greek authorities, while eastern Libyan (LAAF) maritime units intercepted around 4,600 people. At least 397 migrants died on the route in 2025, with dozens more missing [3].

4.2 Arrival Statistics: Greece 2025–2026

The reactivation of the Tobruk–Crete corridor has made Greece the primary European entry point for migrants departing eastern Libya. The following statistics, drawn from Greek coast guard data cross-checked by the NGO Refugee Support Aegean (RSA), the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, UNHCR, and international press reporting, document the scale of arrivals in 2025 and 2026 [3] [4] [5] [6].

2025: Arrivals to Crete and Gavdos from Libya quadrupled over the previous year. RSA documented 20,187 arrivals in 2025, compared with 19,799 in the Hellenic Coast Guard's official response of 22 January 2026; the discrepancy is attributable to the Coast Guard's practice of excluding persons charged with smuggling from its arrival statistics [4]. Overall irregular arrivals to Greece (all routes, sea and land) totaled 48,298 in 2025, a 21% decrease from 60,886 in 2024—meaning the eastern Libya route was growing even as other routes contracted [4]. Nationality data for 2025 show Sudan (37.3%), Egypt (37.1%), and Bangladesh (18.6%) as the three main countries of origin; 99.4% of those arriving in Crete and Gavdos departed from Libya [4]. The crisis peaked in July 2025, when more than 7,000 migrants were detained in a ten-day period after reaching Crete; Greece responded by suspending asylum processing for sea arrivals from North Africa for three months and transferring hundreds of migrants to mainland detention facilities [7].

2026: The upward trajectory continued. From January to mid-May 2026, just over 6,000 migrants departed Libya for Greece—roughly 1,000 more than in the same period of 2025—with around 65% arriving successfully [3]. By 26 August 2026, approximately 11,500 people had completed the Libya–Greece crossing, and total irregular arrivals in Greece had surpassed 22,000 (compared with almost 49,000 for all of 2025); arrivals via Crete represented roughly 50% of all irregular entries to Greece [5]. Local reports estimated that around 250 people had died on the route in 2026 [5]. By mid-September 2026, approximately 14,000 people had reached Crete from eastern Libya since the start of the year—predominantly via the 'Tobruk route'—out of total Greek arrivals of roughly 27,000, placing sustained pressure on the island's reception capacity as Greek authorities transferred new arrivals to facilities on Lesbos and Samos [6].

4.3 Interceptions

Documentation by migration monitoring organizations reveals a systematic pattern of interception operations conducted by forces affiliated with Haftar's eastern command. A detailed account from July 2026 documented multiple interceptions off the eastern coast of Libya within a single day: at 04:00, Alsaiqa Special Forces intercepted a boat carrying 27 people from Sudan and Egypt off Tobruk; around 08:00, forces affiliated with Libya's eastern command intercepted 33 Sudanese people approximately 25 nautical miles off Al-Tamimi, another Alsaiqa unit intercepted 33 people including children only six nautical miles off Kambut; and at 08:30, Libyan naval special forces intercepted another boat carrying 30 people [8]. At least 123 people were intercepted in only a few hours.

These interceptions are characterized by several common features: they occur both within and beyond Libya's territorial waters; they involve armed forces rather than civilian coast guard units; intercepted individuals are forcibly returned to disembarkation points under military control, and they face immediate detention and deportation without access to asylum procedures or legal representation.

5. The European Union's Externalization Strategy

5.1 Origins and Evolution

The European Union's approach to managing migration through Libya represents a paradigm of border externalization—shifting the burden of migration control beyond European territory to transit states. This strategy has been pursued through a combination of financial assistance, equipment provision, training programs, and operational coordination with Libyan authorities. Since 2015, the EU has provided approximately €455 million (about US$525 million) to Libya under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), largely channeled through UN agencies and aimed at beefing up the Libyan Coast Guard, reinforcing border management—including along the southern borders—and improving conditions for migrants [9] [10]. By February 2022, the Trust Fund had mobilized almost €465 million in projects in Libya, and total EU support across all instruments (EUTF, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, humanitarian assistance, and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace) amounted to roughly €700 million [9]. A substantial share of this support has gone to strengthening the Libyan Coast Guard's capabilities, modernizing its equipment, and training its personnel.

The legal architecture supporting this cooperation includes the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya, EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia (launched in 2015), and various bilateral arrangements between individual member states and Libyan authorities [11]. Frontex, the EU border patrol agency, provides extensive air, radar, and distress signal intelligence to Libyan interception forces, effectively enabling real-time coordination of pushback operations [12].

5.2 The Libyan Coast Guard: Structure and Composition

The entity commonly referred to as the 'Libyan Coast Guard' is not a unified state institution but rather a collection of inter-linked militias and semi-state entities with varying degrees of affiliation to the Tripoli-based government [13]. These units have been extensively documented as perpetrators of serious human rights violations, including unlawful pushbacks, violence against migrants at sea, and direct involvement in human trafficking networks [14]. Despite this record, EU support for these forces has continued and expanded.

5.3 Expansion to Eastern Forces

Until recently, Haftar's eastern forces did not benefit from EU support, reflecting the EU's reluctance to confer legitimacy on his unrecognized parallel government. However, the surge in departures from eastern Libya has fundamentally altered this calculus. In January 2026, reports emerged of EU plans to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Benghazi, with initial funding of €3 million [15] [16]. A document leaked to Statewatch in May 2026 confirmed that the EU had begun collaborating with Libya's eastern forces on migration control, including training, support, and the development of a regional migration coordination center [17].

This expansion represents a deeply alarming escalation in EU-Libya migration cooperation. As Alamara Khwaja Bettum, executive director of Statewatch, stated: 'This marks a deeply alarming escalation in what was already a troubling and dangerous partnership between the EU and Libya. What is presented as an investment in "capacity building" is, in reality, financial support that enables the abuse, detention, and exploitation of migrants. By outsourcing migration control to third countries, the EU is effectively paying others to carry out policies it seeks to distance itself from politically and legally' [17].

6. Human Rights Violations in Libyan Detention Centers

6.1 Systematic Abuse in Detention Facilities

The human rights situation for migrants intercepted and returned to Libya is catastrophic. The UN Human Rights Council's Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya concluded in March 2023 that there are 'reasonable grounds to believe' that systematic abuses in detention centers—including torture, sexual violence, forced labor, and extortion—reach the threshold of crimes against humanity [18]. The Mission further found that the EU's support for interceptions has indirectly contributed to these crimes [18].

Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor has documented horrific violations practiced by Libyan authorities against migrants, including arbitrary detention, inhumane treatment, and financial extortion [14]. In one testimony, a young Syrian man described conditions in detention: They put us in small overcrowded cells with small ventilation holes not exceeding 20×20 cm. We had a meal every 20 hours, consisting only of a small loaf of bread with a small piece of cheese and a small amount of salty water. After several days, we were visited by people who offered to release us in exchange for sums of money that ranged between 800 and 2,500 dollars. [14].

6.2 Sexual Violence and Exploitation

Sexual violence against migrants in Libya is pervasive and systematic. Reports of migrant pregnancy from rape are common, and women and girls face particular vulnerability in detention centers and smuggling warehouses. The UN Human Rights Council has identified direct evidence of sexual violence perpetrated by government-sponsored groups including the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Stability Support Apparatus, and the Libyan Coast Guard [18]. Many migrants intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard find themselves in conditions worse than detention centers, being sold into human trafficking, sexual slavery, or left on sinking boats in cold waters without assistance [14].

6.3 The Detention-Extortion Nexus

A defining feature of Libya's migration management system is the detention-extortion nexus. Migrants are routinely detained not for immigration enforcement purposes but as a mechanism for extracting money from them and their families. The LCG units that EU resources help equip are linked to militias that profit from the detention system through embezzlement of state funds, release payments, and forced labor [14]. This creates a perverse incentive structure in which the very actors tasked with 'combating smuggling' are among its primary beneficiaries.

6.4 Recent Incidents

The violence against migrants is not confined to detention centers. In 2025, a video by NGO Sea Rescue appeared to show soldiers wearing the uniforms of the 111th Brigade—which is controlled by the deputy defence minister of the Tripoli-based government—throwing refugees into the open sea [19]. In June 2023, the Pylos disaster claimed more than 600 lives when the fishing boat Adriana, which had departed from Tobruk in eastern Libya en route to Italy, sank in the Greek search-and-rescue zone; survivors and human rights organizations blamed the Hellenic Coast Guard and Frontex for the deaths [20]. The disaster generated negative international media coverage of Haftar's role in migration. Following this incident, crossings from eastern Libya to Italy fell sharply, suggesting that Haftar's control over migration flows is deliberate and politically calibrated.

While this was the end of bigger vessels crossing from East Libya to Italy, a new route, with smaller boats, emerged, from East Libya to Crete [see 6.2].

7. Legal Framework: Non-Refoulement and the Hirsi Judgment

7.1 The Principle of Non-Refoulement

The principle of non-refoulement constitutes a cornerstone of international refugee and human rights law. Under Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, no Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion [21]. This principle has attained the status of customary international law and is considered by many jurists to constitute a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens) [22].

Under international human rights law, the prohibition of refoulement extends beyond refugees to encompass all persons who would face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or other serious human rights violations if returned. This broader protection is enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention Against Torture.

7.2 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (2012)

The landmark judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (Application No. 27765/09, 23 February 2012) fundamentally shaped the legal landscape governing maritime interceptions and returns to Libya [23] [24]. The case concerned 24 Somali and Eritrean nationals (from a group of 231) who were intercepted on the high seas approximately 35 nautical miles south of Lampedusa by Italian military vessels and summarily returned to Libya without any individualized assessment of their protection needs.

The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found multiple violations of the European Convention. First, Italy violated Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) by exposing the applicants to the risk of ill-treatment in Libya, where clandestine migrants and asylum-seekers were systematically arrested and detained in conditions described as inhuman, with reported cases of torture [23]. The Court emphasized that Italy could not evade its own responsibility under the Convention by relying on its bilateral agreements with Libya, and that the existence of domestic laws and ratification of international treaties were not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection where reliable sources had reported practices contrary to the Convention's principles [23].

Second, the Court found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion), because 'the transfer of the applicants to Libya was carried out without any form of examination of each applicant's individual situation' [23]. The Court rejected Italy's argument that the applicants had failed to expressly request asylum, holding that 'it was for the national authorities, faced with a situation in which human rights were being systematically violated... to find out about the treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after their return' [23].

Third, the Court found a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) taken in conjunction with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, because the applicants had been deprived of any remedy enabling them to lodge complaints and obtain a thorough assessment of their requests before the removal measure was enforced [23].

7.3 Extraterritorial Application and Effective Control

A crucial aspect of the Hirsi judgment was the Court's affirmation that the European Convention applies extraterritorially when a state exercises effective control over individuals. The Court ruled that Italy had exercised both de jure and de facto control over the applicants from the moment they were taken aboard Italian ships. According to the long-settled rules of the international law of the sea, anyone on board a state's vessels is legally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that state, the vessel's flag state [23]. This principle has profound implications for contemporary EU-Libya cooperation, suggesting that European states may bear responsibility for human rights violations that occur during or as a foreseeable consequence of coordinated interception operations.

7.4 Contemporary Legal Challenges

Despite the clarity of the Hirsi judgment, European states have developed increasingly sophisticated methods to circumvent its prohibitions. As documented by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, direct pushbacks by state-operated vessels on the Central Mediterranean route have largely been replaced by methods ensuring that refugees and migrants at sea are returned by non-European actors or private vessels [25]. The Commissioner has strongly condemned the fact that, through their actions and omissions, member states have further increased the risks of returns to Libya, where refugees and migrants face serious human rights violations, rather than taking decisive measures to prevent this [25].

Legal accountability remains difficult due to the nature of agreements between Libyan, Italian, and EU government entities, as well as access issues for migrants. The Libyan government does not recognize the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, and migrants lack legal access to local Libyan courts due to their status. Multiple cases have been filed before the European Court of Human Rights challenging Italy's cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard, with applicants raising complaints under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), and Article 4 of Protocol 4 (prohibition of collective expulsions) [26] [27] [28].

8. The Expansion of EU Cooperation to Eastern Libya

8.1 The Benghazi Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

The most significant recent development in EU-Libya migration cooperation is the planned establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Benghazi, the largest city in eastern Libya and Haftar's administrative capital. Originally revealed in January 2026 by German journalist Matthias Monroy, the plans envision an EU-funded facility that would provide Haftar's coastguard with an operational base and, crucially, significant international legitimacy [15]. The MRCC will be spearheaded by Italy, one of the EU member states Haftar has most directly courted, and which is already a key player in EU cooperation with western Libyan forces.

The leaked EU document confirming this collaboration represents a watershed moment [17]. For the first time, the EU is formally partnering with forces under Haftar's command, despite his record of war crimes, his alliance with Russia, and his overt use of migration control as political leverage. This development has been met with strong condemnation from civil society organizations, which argue that rather than listening to calls to end or suspend the deadly externalization partnership, the EU is only interested in expanding it further [17].

8.2 Haftar's Political Calculus

Haftar has proven adept at using migration control as a bargaining chip in his pursuit of international recognition and material support. In June 2025, Haftar declared that 'Migrants must be expelled from the country by all means, a statement that, while framed as a response to domestic racist protests, was grounded in the logic of EU externalization politics [29]. The declaration was accompanied by intensified interception and roundup operations in eastern Libya.

The July 2025 incident in which Haftar expelled a high-level EU delegation led by Commissioner Magnus Brunner illustrates his negotiating strategy [2]. When the Europeans refused his demand to officially meet ministers of his parallel, unrecognized government, Haftar compelled them to leave. Rather than marking a clean break, the incident was followed by a Frontex and Commission visit to Warsaw and Brussels of Libyan officials from both governments in October 2025—the first time Haftar's representatives had been formally received by EU institutions [2]. This sequence demonstrates how Haftar has successfully raised the price for his cooperation while extracting incremental recognition.

8.3 Greek Engagement

Greece has emerged as a particularly active partner in engaging Haftar's forces. Following the surge in arrivals to Crete in early 2025, Greece launched training programs for Haftar's forces, following Italy's lead. The Greek island of Crete, located approximately 300 kilometers north of the Libyan coast, has become a new destination for boats departing from Tobruk and other eastern Libyan ports. This geographic proximity has made Greek engagement with eastern Libyan forces a strategic priority for Athens, despite the human rights implications.

9. Geopolitical Implications and the Weaponization of Migration

9.1 Migration as Leverage

The case of Haftar's Libya exemplifies a broader trend in contemporary international relations: the weaponization of migration by transit states and non-state actors as a tool of geopolitical leverage. By controlling the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean, Haftar has transformed migration management from a humanitarian and law enforcement issue into a strategic bargaining chip. The relatively small number of arrivals in Crete—just 7,336 in the first half of 2025—was sufficient to trigger alarm in Europe and embolden Haftar to raise his demands [1].

This dynamic creates a dangerous dependency. As the SWP analysis warns, the EU and its member states are empowering and legitimizing Libyan warlords while also becoming increasingly dependent on them [1]. Should Prime Minister Dabeiba in Tripoli consolidate his power further, he would likely adopt similar tactics. The current strategy is therefore likely to deepen Europe's dependence on Libyan warlords and prompt them to increase their demands [1].

9.2 Complicity in Smuggling Networks

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of EU-Libya migration cooperation is the documented complicity of state-affiliated forces in smuggling activities. The UN Panel of Experts has singled out Haftar's forces for their role in migration-related activities [30]. Rather than dismantling smuggling networks, European support has strengthened the very actors who profit from them. The Haftar family has continued to profit from migration to Italy even while preventing departures from eastern Libyan shores, suggesting a sophisticated dual-track strategy of publicly cooperating with European interdiction efforts while privately benefiting from smuggling operations [1].

The main nationalities of those arriving in Italy from western Libya in 2024 and 2025 have been Bangladeshi, Egyptian, and Pakistani, most of whom traveled via eastern Libya [31] [1]. This pattern suggests that Haftar's forces are not merely failing to control their territory but are actively facilitating the movement of migrants through eastern Libya to western departure points, while simultaneously seeking European support for 'border control' [32].

9.3 Impact on Libyan Political Stabilization

The EU's migration-focused engagement with Libya has had significant consequences for the country's political trajectory. By prioritizing migration containment over political reconciliation, European policymakers have inadvertently reinforced the country's fragmentation. The rejection of European migration policy by the Libyan public must also be counted among its political costs. Preventing onward crossings keeps migrants in Libya, which is seen by the public as a growing threat. Europe's Libyan partners, by contrast, are primarily those who profit directly from interceptions and exploitative detention.

In April 2026, Libya's rival legislative chambers approved a unified state budget for the first time since 2013—a potentially significant step toward economic reunification [2]. However, the EU's continued reliance on warlords for migration control risks undermining this fragile progress by empowering actors who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo of division and weak central governance.

10. The RSF Nexus: Sudanese Militia Networks and Migrant Vulnerability

The intersection of Libyan migration interception operations and Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) represents a significant but underexamined dimension of the regional migration-security complex. While European policymakers have focused narrowly on reducing Mediterranean crossings, the militia networks that control eastern Libya maintain deep operational ties with Sudanese paramilitary forces, creating parallel systems of recruitment, smuggling, and forced labor that directly affect intercepted migrants.

The transport of weapons, drones and logistical support for the RSF through eastern Libya has been highlighted in the UNHRC’s report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan, as of September 2026, in an unedited version [46].

10.1 Forced Recruitment in Libyan Detention Camps

Documentation reveals that migrants intercepted and held in Libyan detention camps—particularly Sudanese nationals—have faced forced recruitment to fight in Libya's civil war. In 2020, UNHCR's Special Envoy Vincent Cochetel reported that detainees were given an ultimatum: 'stay in the camp for an unknown period of time, or be sent to the front to fight.' [33] The majority of those recruited were Sudanese, likely because they speak Arabic. [33]

A March 2026 report from the Global Initiative documented that unaccompanied Sudanese children in Libya face heightened risks of sexual violence, exploitation and forced recruitment into armed groups, particularly along smuggling corridors in southeastern Libya (Kufra) [34]. These findings suggest that detention and interception infrastructure serves not merely as an immigration enforcement mechanism but as a pool for forced labor and military recruitment.

10.2 The RSF Presence in Eastern Libya

The documented flow of personnel is primarily RSF fighters entering Libya, not migrants being recruited from Libya to fight for the RSF in Sudan. In 2019, approximately 1,000 RSF troops deployed to Benghazi to protect oil facilities alongside Haftar's LNA [35]. More recently, a 2026 investigation uncovered four camps in Libya used to train and supply RSF fighters, staffed by LNA personnel and Colombian mercenaries [36]. Medical treatment for wounded RSF fighters has been provided in Benghazi, and weapons storage has been suspected at al-Khadim airbase [37].

10.3 Mercenary Recruitment Through Libya

Foreign mercenaries have been routed through eastern Libya to fight for the RSF in Sudan. Colombian ex-soldiers were recruited via the UAE, flown to Benghazi, and then transported overland into Sudan to join RSF operations [38]. This pipeline demonstrates that eastern Libya under Haftar's control functions as a logistical hub for regional paramilitary operations, not merely a migration control frontier.

10.4 RSF Role in Border Interception

Historically, the RSF was deployed on the Sudan-Libya border—with EU funding—to intercept migrants heading to Libya [39]. However, research documented that the RSF frequently taxed migrants or provided escorts to smugglers rather than stopping them [40]. This dual role—formal border interdiction combined with informal smuggling facilitation—mirrors the behavior documented among Libyan Coast Guard units and suggests a regional pattern in which state-affiliated militias monetize migration flows while presenting themselves as enforcement partners to European donors.

10.5 Assessment: No Direct RSF Recruitment from Intercepted Migrants

There is no direct evidence that migrants intercepted at sea by Libyan forces are being recruited specifically for the RSF in Sudan. However, the Haftar-RSF axis represents a logistical and military partnership where eastern Libya serves as a rear base for RSF operations [37]. The primary recruitment pipeline involving Libya and the RSF runs in the opposite direction: foreign mercenaries and RSF fighters move through Libya to Sudan, not from intercepted migrant populations.

The absence of direct RSF recruitment from intercepted migrants does not diminish the significance of the RSF-Libya nexus for migration policy. Rather, it highlights that the armed actors empowered by EU externalization policies are embedded in transnational militia networks whose operations extend far beyond migration control. Any assessment of the humanitarian and security consequences of EU-Libya cooperation must account for these regional linkages and the broader ecosystems of forced recruitment, smuggling, and paramilitary logistics that they sustain.

11. International Responses and Accountability Mechanisms

11.1 United Nations Mechanisms

The United Nations has consistently condemned the treatment of migrants in Libya and the practice of returning them to Libyan territory. UNHCR has stated that Libya cannot be considered a safe third country or a place of safety for the purposes of disembarkation following rescue at sea [41]. The UN Human Rights Council's Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed against migrants in detention centers, and that the EU's support for interceptions has indirectly contributed to these crimes [18].

The UN Panel of Experts on Libya has documented the complicity of state-affiliated forces, including Haftar's forces, in smuggling activities [30]. These findings have been incorporated into the sanctions regime established under UN Security Council resolutions, although enforcement remains inconsistent.

11.2 European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence

The European Court of Human Rights has emerged as a critical forum for challenging EU-Libya migration cooperation. Beyond the landmark Hirsi judgment, multiple cases have been filed challenging Italy's coordination of Libyan Coast Guard pullbacks resulting in migrant deaths and abuse [23] [26]. These cases raise fundamental questions about the direct responsibility of European states for the actions of Libyan forces that they fund, train, and equip. As one legal analysis notes, the unanswered question from Hirsi was whether secondary entities, such as an African security force paid for by a European government, would create similar European liability [28].

11.3 A Landmark Decision by the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court’s decision to confirm all 17 charges against Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri and send the case to trial marks a historic breakthrough for survivors of crimes committed at Mitiga Prison and for accountability in Libya. This is the first trial arising from the ICC’s Libya investigation since the situation was referred to the Court in 2011 [45]. The Pre-Trial Chamber found substantial grounds to believe that El Hishri is responsible for committing 17 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including imprisonment, outrages upon personal dignity, torture, rape, murder, enslavement and persecution.

The confirmation of the enslavement and persecution charges is particularly significant. In a groundbreaking application of an intersectional approach, the Chamber has recognized that the crimes charged affected detainees differently depending on overlapping factors. It found, in particular, that Black migrants were enslaved and persecuted because of the combined effects of their race, nationality, ethnicity and migration status, including through racialized forced labor and other forms of exploitation and abuse. This is an important recognition of the specific experiences of migrants and refugees.

11.4 Civil Society and NGO Documentation

Non-governmental organizations have played an indispensable role in documenting abuses and challenging European migration policy. Organizations including Sea-Watch, SOS Méditerranée, Alarm Phone, Statewatch, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, and Amnesty International have provided irrefutable evidence of abuse and human rights violations occurring when boats are intercepted, including immediate beatings, drownings, and clear carelessness of human life [14] [26] [42] [43] [44]. NGO vessels also serve as critical witnesses, anthologizing the stories of those saved and providing humanizing accounts of the suffering experienced at every stage of the journey.

11.5 The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has been a vocal critic of European pushback practices. In her 2021 recommendation, the Commissioner urged member states to: guarantee the presence of adequate and effective state-led search and rescue capacity at sea, ensure safe and prompt disembarkation of those rescued, stop hindering civil society organizations human rights activities, end pushbacks, coordination of pullbacks, or other activities leading to the return of refugees and migrants to areas where they are exposed to serious human rights violations, and expand safe and legal routes [25]. She strongly condemned the fact that member states have further increased the risks of returns to Libya rather than taking decisive measures to prevent this [25].

12. Conclusion

The intersection of Khalifa Haftar's Libya and European migration interception policies represents one of the most troubling chapters in contemporary migration governance. What began as a technocratic strategy of 'capacity-building and 'integrated border management has evolved into a system that systematically violates the human rights of vulnerable people while empowering and legitimizing predatory armed actors in a fractured state.

The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates several interconnected conclusions. First, the expansion of EU cooperation to Haftar's eastern forces marks a dangerous escalation that risks normalizing engagement with actors responsible for war crimes and systematic human rights abuses. The planned Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Benghazi, while presented as a technical arrangement, would confer significant international legitimacy on Haftar's unrecognized government and create a permanent institutional framework for cooperation with forces documented as complicit in smuggling and abuse [17].

Second, the human rights consequences of this cooperation are not incidental byproducts but foreseeable and documented outcomes. The UN Human Rights Council, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, and numerous NGOs have established beyond reasonable dispute that migrants returned to Libya face torture, sexual violence, forced labor, extortion, and arbitrary detention in conditions that may constitute crimes against humanity [14] [18] [25]. The European Court of Human Rights has already ruled that returning migrants to Libya without individualized assessment violates the European Convention [23]. Yet these legal standards are systematically circumvented through the outsourcing of interception to Libyan forces [25].

Third, the geopolitical costs of this strategy are mounting. By making migration containment the overriding priority of its Libya policy, the EU has become dependent on warlords who use migration as leverage, undermined prospects for political stabilization, and alienated Libyan public opinion [1] [2]. The weaponization of migration by Haftar and other Libyan actors is a direct consequence of the incentive structure created by European externalization policies [1].

Fourth, legal accountability mechanisms, while imperfect, offer important avenues for challenging this system. The Hirsi judgment established clear principles regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, non-refoulement, and the prohibition of collective expulsion [23]. Ongoing cases before the ECtHR may further clarify the responsibility of European states for the actions of Libyan forces that they support [26] [28]. However, litigation alone cannot substitute for political will to fundamentally reform European migration policy.

Ultimately, the case of Haftar's Libya and migrant interception operations reveals the moral and political bankruptcy of a migration policy that subordinates human rights to border control. As Alamara Khwaja Bettum of Statewatch has argued, this approach is not only morally indefensible but perpetuates racialized and colonial power dynamics that continue to shape European migration policy [17] [44]. A genuine alternative would require the EU to expand safe and legal routes for migration and asylum, invest in search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, end support for Libyan interception forces, and condition any future cooperation on verifiable human rights safeguards and a genuine political framework for Libyan reunification. Until such a transformation occurs, the Mediterranean will remain a graveyard for those seeking safety and dignity, and European institutions will remain complicit in the abuses perpetrated in their name.

13. References

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